Categories
Economical policy

The necessity for structural reforms – my speech to the “Nocturnes de l’économie” evening talks, 2018.

Structural reforms are often misunderstood because they are perhaps poorly defined or because the concept is too vague. In actual fact, their purpose is to increase an economy’s potential for growth. They do not have to entail cuts to wages and welfare payments through austerity policies. The two approaches are often confused.

Why is it essential to increase France’s growth potential, for example? Firstly, of course, to reduce the rate of structural unemployment. At around 8.5%, the level of structural unemployment in France is awfully high. Even when the economy is running well, as it is now, we struggle to get below 9%. Whereas in Germany, for example, it is 4%.

Moreover, looking at the unemployment rate for young people, in France it is structurally about 25% for the 15-24 age group, while it is 7% in Germany. There is therefore obviously something wrong to examine.

I will only make comparisons during my short talk with countries in the eurozone so as to use comparable social structures, and not countries where social structures are very different to our own.
The second reason for increasing an economy’s growth potential is evidently to boost the solvency of the state and public services. And as a consequence of that, naturally, to improve the sustainability of social welfare and pensions

Furthermore, developed economies are having to face two revolutions, firstly globalisation which has now been going on for 20 years but really took off from 2000, and secondly the technological revolution of digitisation and robotisation. All in all, in developed economies in future, there will obviously be less and less repetitive work, less and less work of low added value, and less and less unskilled work. And if work of this kind disappears, there are two possible reactions in developed countries. The first is to try to lower the cost of labour, wages and salaries, and social protection, i.e. implement austerity policies to regain a competitive edge. The second is to try to improve value for money, obviously by seeking out what makes the knowledge economy worthwhile, what generates added value in production of goods and services, innovations. What I call “taking the high road”.

And to take the high road out of the crisis, to improve value for money, meaning to seek out added value and to stand out through innovation from the countries that are part of this globalisation, such as Asian countries, for example, there is only one possibility, namely structural reforms to improve value for money through innovation and the search for the best added value in production, i.e. the right positioning in the range of products and services manufactured.

Which is therefore the third reason to do so, entirely connected to the first two reasons, of course.

One very simple example, linked to the eurozone crisis. At the time of the crisis, southern countries experienced what economists call a “sudden stop”, i.e. an abrupt halt in financing the balance of payments deficit. Countries gripped by a sudden need to rebalance their exports and imports, were forced to suddenly curb their spending, consumption and investment alike, in order to loosen the binds of external constraints, at the cost of lowering their domestic standard of living through austerity policies.

It became clearer at the time that there were three possible situations in the eurozone. Firstly, situations like Germany, which had gradually built, through successful structural reforms, an economy that was industrialised and based on high added value.
Then there was Spain, which, in response to the catastrophe it was in at the time of the eurozone crisis, a result of the somewhat low added value of its industry and excessive private debt, could only slash wages and welfare protection so as to regain competitiveness, rapidly reduce its imports, and gradually increase its exports. This at the cost of a substantial drop in the standard of living. Which worked fairly successfully because now, in economic terms, Spain is doing quite well. However the consequences have been dramatic in terms of populism and countless impacts on unemployment, adverse social effects, etc.

Thirdly France, somewhat in between the other two, which in actual fact has labour costs similar to Germany and, by and large, industrial specialisation that is really not much better than in Spain. As a result, until the change in government and the launch of reforms, France was hemmed in by endless difficulties, with a balance of payments constantly in the red, whereas almost all the other countries in the eurozone were breaking even again or running a healthy surplus. France as a corollary was seeing an extremely high rate of unemployment, permanent public deficit, etc.

Structural reforms in a developed economy make it possible to avoid austerity policies if they are started early enough. That is, if we do not wait until the last moment, acting with a gun to our head and thus no choice but to adopt austerity policies to regain competitiveness, but caught in a race to the bottom, not taking the high road.


As is known, potential growth is, basically, the sum of the growth in population available for employment plus productivity gains. These are the two essential forces that act to push the potential growth rate up or down. Increasing the active labour force on the one hand, and productivity gains on the other, makes the economy more efficient and offers more potential for growth.

A number of structural reforms are therefore needed to increase the economy’s efficiency.

1) Improve education & training levels

Because in a knowledge-based economy, there is no other solution for a developed country but to try to improve the education and training of the workforce. And we know that in France, apart from for the élite, this area is in decline. France ranks poorly in all of the OECD’s comparison criteria. And its rank is falling. This is obviously dangerous, as there is a fairly sound correlation between the employment rate in developed countries and the knowledge level of 15-year-olds, which is measured by tests in all OECD countries in the same way. This is the PISA test. Or there is the PIAAC test, also by the OECD, which measures competencies in terms of numeracy and literacy skills of use in the workplace. Here too, France is quite poorly ranked and gradually falling. Therefore, in actual fact, education in France is declining and is too low compared with the best-performing countries.

Levels must therefore be improved. In addition, work-related training in France is, as we know, not effective. It is not targeted as a priority to those that need it most, and costs a great deal for a very low return. These two points are priorities for the current government.

I might add that in France, for education, it is not a question of resources. The resources might be allocated poorly, but there is no issue with the level of resources overall. Public-sector education in France equates to 5.5% of GDP while in the eurozone excluding France, it is 4.5%. However, there are plenty of European countries that are much higher than us in the OECD rankings.

2) The job market

The divide between those who have a job and those who do not is totally unfair. The rate of unemployment in young people is obviously intolerable. Newcomers to the job market must have some chance of finding work. Workers in declining sectors need help switching to sectors that are on the way up. And everyone, during their lifetime, must have training opportunities to change their field of work, when they need them. This requires a solution to the unfathomable paradox specific to structural unemployment, whereby it seems impossible to achieve an unemployment rate under 9% yet half the businesses currently looking for staff are struggling to recruit, as economic growth returns.

This is a typical area for structural reform – how can we organise matters such that structural unemployment falls and the labour market is more efficient? One avenue to explore is “flexisecurity”, as has been done in Scandinavia, giving back some flexibility by providing decent security to those actively seeking work. And, once again, by reforming work-related training to improve its effectiveness.

3) Government efficiency

The fact is that France is top of the class in Europe when it comes to public-sector spending relative to GDP and taxes and other deductions relative to GDP. And both figures are some 20% higher than the rest of the eurozone.

This difference could be viewed from the perspective that government departments produce highly quality services very efficiently, but OECD comparisons across all public services show that we rank only average among the countries compared in terms of public service quality, although we are among the highest spenders on those services. So in fact there is a large efficiency shortfall.

Some studies show, for example, that €6-10 billion per year could be saved on social security in France, quite simply by working better and more efficiently, without the multitude of structures that exist in different places.

Again, remember France takes nearly 40% more in taxes and mandatory deductions from businesses than other countries in the eurozone. This obviously has an effect on employment. Same applies to employers’ social security contributions, part of those deductions, which are about 65% higher in France than in the eurozone countries other than France. And the level of employers’ social security contributions correlates closely with levels of employment; so the higher employers’ contributions are, the lower the level of employment. This shows a strong correlation across all OECD countries.

4) Pensions

Public spending on pensions as a percentage of GDP is some 40% higher than eurozone countries other than France. And our pensioners do not enjoy noticeably better retirement. But the difference arises in another area entirely. The employment rate for the 60-64 age group in France is 28%, in Germany 56.5%, Sweden 68%. Demographics make such a low level in France difficult to support financially and obviously it will be difficult to balance pensions until this problem is resolved. Even if progress is being made, much more remains to be done to track changes in demographics and do what some Scandinavian countries have done, and set retirement age as a function of life expectancy. In the 1960s, life expectancy post-retirement was about two and half years; it is now 24 years. There is obviously a major problem specific to France since we have reduced our retirement age, and not pushed it back as we ought to have done, and as other countries have done. Again, reforms are very much needed.

5) Innovation, R&D and value for money

France is lagging behind in private R&D spending, lagging behind in the proportion of information and communication technology in GDP, and in changes in that proportion, and in the number of triadic patents.

What is missing? The fact that companies in France, between about 2000 and 2014, saw profit over GDP declining slightly, while all the other countries in the eurozone were more or less up, except probably Italy. And profit over GDP for French businesses is structurally lower than that in other eurozone countries. This means that if we do not leave businesses enough money to be able to invest in research and development and innovation, they are restricted to staying as they are. And if they do not develop in terms of quality of output and innovation in the world as it is, with its two revolutions in terms of globalisation and digitisation, obviously they are also less able to employ staff.

Last point on value for money. France’s labour costs are substantially the same as in Germany, but the quality, industrial specialisation and added value are too low. On average, naturally. There are some companies with very high added value. This results in France running a balance of payments deficit of about 2% of GDP, while all the other eurozone countries are breaking even or running a surplus.

There are reasons intrinsically linked to how the eurozone works, admittedly, but not just that. We must look closer to home for the main reasons behind our 9% unemployment rate. The government deficit has existed continuously since 1974, without exception. It has also climbed continuously, and now stands at 100% of GDP. Industrial output in 2017 was 90% of the 2002 figure, while in Germany it increased 22%. So France loses 10% and Germany is up almost a quarter.

These are the effects of applying inadequate structural reforms for too long. Even in the short run, it cannot be sustained. We either have to choose to do what Germany does, or what Spain has done. I’ll leave you to judge which seems preferable to me!

Categories
Economical policy Euro zone

« Seizing the momentum for strengthening the economic and monetary union »

Retrouvez ci-dessous le programme complet de ce rendez-vous, ainsi que la transcription de mon intervention.

Brussels, Monday 9 April (evening) and Tuesday 10 April (all day) 2018

The new political environment in continental Europe which emerged after Brexit, following the presidential election in France and thanks to the improved economic climate, has created a momentum for the European Union to implement reforms. The main concern is still the euro area which has to become more resilient, capable to resist to any external asymmetric shock and to stave off the existential threat which still hovers on the European currency.

Among the flurry of proposals, the European Commission recently set out a roadmap for deepening Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. The subject is on the table of the European Council and a summit is to meet on June 28 and 29 during which decisions should be acted.

This Euro 50 Group meeting, a few weeks before the European Summit, which will take place in the premises of the European Parliament with the participation and contribution of policymakers is an excellent opportunity for the Euro 50 Group to contribute to the debate by looking at the main pieces which are lacking in the current EMU architecture and hence at the reforms (including those which have a political dimension) which are absolutely indispensable in the EU framework to make the euro area a fully-fledged and efficient currency area.

Monday 9th April 2018
Venue: BNP Paribas Fortis 20 Rue Royale, B-1000 Brussels

19:30

  • Welcome Dinner
  • Introduction: Alain Papiasse, Deputy Chief Operating Officer at BNP Paribas
  • Guest speaker: Poul Thomsen, Director of the European Department of the IMF
  • Comments by: Marco Buti, Director-General for Economic and Financial Affairs at the European Commission

Tuesday 10th April 2018
Venue: European Parliament – Room PHS3C050
60 rue Wiertz / Wiertzstraat 60
B-1047 Brussels

8:00 – 8:15 : Registration

8:15 – 8:35 :

  • Welcome Remarks
  • Edmond Alphandéry, Chairman of the Euro50 Group; Former Minister of
    Economy of France
  • Lucio Vinhas de Souza, Head of the Economics Team of the European Political
    Strategy Centre at the European Commission

8:35 – 8:55 : Exchange of views with Domenico Siniscalco, Managing Director and Vice Chairman of Morgan Stanley and Former Italian Minister of Finance on “The Italian political situation and its potential impact on the Eurozone

8:55 – 10:25 : Session I – A European Monetary Fund: For what purpose?

This session will deal with the missions that should be assigned to the proposed European Monetary Fund and therefore with its governance and its political accountability. It will look at the issues of common interest which are not yet in the realm of the ESM and which should be dealt by the proposed EMF.

President: Daniel Gros, Director of CEPS

8:55 – 9:10 : Guest speaker: Klaus Regling, Managing Director of the European Stability Mechanism

9:10 – 9:25 : Panellists (6 minutes each):

  • Laurence Boone, Group Chief Economist, Global Head of Multi Asset
    Client Solutions & Head of Research at AXA IM
  • Maria Demertzis, Deputy Director at Bruegel

9:25 – 10:25 : Roundtable discussion

10:25 – 10:35 : Coffee break

10:35 – 12:15 : Session II – The missing pieces of the Banking Union

This session will focus both on the technicalities and on the political and economic dimensions of the completion of the Banking Union and on the creation of a more resilient banking architecture.

President: Stefano Micossi, Director-General of Assonime; Honorary Professor of the College of Europe

10:35 – 10:50 : Guest speaker: Andrea Enria, Chairperson of the European Banking Authority

10:50 – 11:15 : Panellists (6 minutes each):

  • Dirk Cupei, Managing Director responsible for Financial Stability at the
    German Banking Association
  • Lars Feld, Member of the German Council of Economic Experts and
    President of the Walter Eucken Institute
  • Olivier Klein, CEO of BRED Bank; Professor of Financial Economics at
    HEC
  • Gilles Noblet, Deputy Director General for International and European
    Relations at the ECB

11:15 – 12:15 :  Roundtable discussion

12:15 – 13:25 : Buffet lunch / Lunch session

12:55 – 13:15 : Guest speaker: Jyrki Katainen, Vice President of the European Commission for Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness

13:15 – 13:25 : Q&A

13:25 – 14:55 : Session III– The need for budget and fiscal integration?

This session will explore the degree of fiscal integration which may be necessary to strengthen the euro area and make it more resilient to external shocks, and also to facilitate convergence and hence prepare the non-euro area Members to join.

President: Niels Thygesen, Chair of the European Fiscal Board; Professor Emeritus of International Economics at the University of Copenhagen

13:25 – 13:40 : Guest speaker: Marcel Fratzscher, President of DIW Berlin for a presentation of the Franco-German economists’ proposal: “Reconciling risk sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform

13:40 – 13:55 : Panellists (6 minutes each):

  • Pervenche Berès, Member of the European Parliament
  • Otmar Issing, President of the Center for Financial Studies at the Goethe University of Frankfurt
  • Charles Wyplosz, Professor of International Economics at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva

13:55 – 14:55 : Roundtable discussion

14:55 – 15:05 : Coffee Break

15:05 – 16:50 : Session IV – Enhancing and strengthening financial integration

This session will deal with the issue of the mobilisation of private savings across EU Member States, the question of sovereign debt, including the issue of dealing with a default through sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, the creation of a risk-free asset.

President: Jakob von Weizsäcker, Member of the European Parliament

15:05 – 15:20 : Guest speaker: Erik Nielsen, Global Chief Economist at UniCredit, (on mobilising private saving through the euro area)

15:20 – 15:35 : Guest speaker: Lee Buchheit, Partner at Cleary Gottlieb, (on sovereign debt restructuring)

15:35 – 15:55 : Panellists (6 minutes each):

  • Elena Daly, Senior Counsel on Sovereign Debt and Emerging Market Matters at EM Conseil (on effective management of public debt in Europe)
  • Isabelle Mateos y Lago, Managing Director at BlackRock
  • Miranda Xafa, Senior Fellow at CIGI (on Capital Markets Union)

15:55 – 16:45 : Roundtable discussion

16:45 – 17:00 : Concluding wrap-u

Jacques de Larosière, Honorary Governor of Banque de France and Former Managing Director at the IMF


EUROPEAN BANKING UNION – THE MISSING ELEMENTS

Transcript of Olivier Klein’s keynote

At the heart of the huge crisis of the Euro Zone, we experienced two negative feedback loops :

  • The first one : between the public deficit and the interest rate of the Public Debt ;
  • The second doom loop came about through the interaction between Bank Risk and Sovereign Risk. In fact, at this time, the only option of saving a bank was to bail it out through its own State’s intervention.

To break these two vicious circles, we had to rely :

  • First and foremost, on the ECB’s actions,
  • On the settlement of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM),
  • And, specifically for the second vicious circle, on the emerging concept of the European Banking Union (EBU).  It was also a mean to improve the sustainability of the EZ itself.

This EBU was conceived with 3 pillars in mind :

  • 1st Pillar : the Single Supervisory Mechanism,Of course, no cross-border solidarity without common discipline and common supervision of this discipline.
  • Which was, among other reasons, necessary to allow cross-border risk-sharing.
  • 2nd Pillar : the set up of the Single Resolution Mechanism to install a regulatory framework for orderly resolutions.
  • Notably in order not to leave banks with the only possibility of being bailed out by their own State.

Including :

  1. First priority : Private bail-in to avoid tax payers paying instead of creditors and investors who made wrong choices,
    and to combat moral hazard that was to be accompanied by additional banks’ Capital Buffers (TLAC and MREL).
  2. The creation of the Single Resolution Fund, to intervene if private bail-in solutions were not sufficient, and only if bail-in solutions had already taken place.
    This Fund represents the introduction of elements of solidarity within the Euro Zone banking sector.
  3. And finally, on top of this, the European Commission proposed possible support from the European Stability Mechanism, that is to say common funds, as a final backstop to complete construction.
  • 3rd Pillar : The European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS).

The plan was to phase-in a cross-border unification scheme.
Under those conditions, the EBU would have been complete and efficient.


But today, even if every economist and most politicians agree that the process must go on, it is currently blocked. Because understandably some States and Banks, which are in good health, are afraid of rescuing national banking systems, which are in poorer health, fearing their legacy.

But is this good policy ?

In fact, over all, we have a unsatisfying Banking Union. At least as far as breaking the second vicious circle by risk-sharing is concerned.

  • First : The European Deposit Insurance Scheme stayed at the national level. There is up to now no cross-border risk-sharing while it was previously planned. 
  • Secondly : Till now, there has never been any effective intervention of the Single Resolution Fund. Even in the recent cases of the Spanish and Italian banks, Banco Popular in Spain and  Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza in Italy. In the latter case, because the private bail-in was declared by Italian Authorities as not applicable without a terrible effect on the Region’s economy. Which led to a national rescue solution.
    In one way or another, it appeared that only national solutions have taken place up to now.
  • Thirdly : We still do not precisely know, if a severe systemic risk occurred, if and how there would be any final backstop.

My concern is that instead of a clear and complete Banking Union, we had the “No bail-out” rule, often thought of as the only possible option, as a dogma :

  • With the good intention of combating moral hazard,
  • But also, to take into consideration a real lack of solidarity.

Unfortunately, even if the intention is commendable, the no bail-out rule as the only possible option might bring ever more risk. May we rely only on the bail-in rule if solidarity and final backstop are missing ?

I am afraid not. Why ?

  • First, the no bail-out rule could work for isolated bank risks, but not for systemic risk, 
  • Secondly, even in the case of an isolated risk, if the EBU remains incomplete, the private bail-in rule can lead to an increased risk of contagion on banks bonds and even on deposits.
  • Also because of the complexity and the variety of definitions of bail-inable debt.
  • Thirdly, is it always preferable to make the savers pay instead of the tax-payers ? Is it in any case less harmful economically ? And less painfull politically ? The savers are individuals or institutionals. But behind institutionals, there are again individuals as final investors.
  • On top of that, a huge loss due to bail-in proceedings could lead to a panic toward institutionals and raise systemic risk.
  • Fourth, the bail-in principle increases the cost of the banks funding, id est the cost of lending. 
  • Moreover, it obviously exacerbates the pro-cyclicity caracteristics of bank financing, as when things get worse, the banks funding costs more. And conversely.

So, under stress, the private bail-in rule as the only possible option can increase the fragility of the system, rather than reinforce its resilience.

Thus, an incomplete EBU might trigger State intervention on a national basis again. That is to say the infamous interaction between Bank Risk and Sovereign Risk would come back. While avoiding the negative feed-back loop was one of the main reasons for creating EBU.

Or even worse, if we are stuck in the no bail-out dogma, and by chance no national bail-out is put in place, it could lead to a major catastrophe.

The ECB unconventional interventions which have saved the Euro Zone and stabilized the banking system might not last forever.


In conclusion, my main points are :

  1. Clearly, fighting moral hazard is a fundamental necessity. But if we do not complete the Banking Union and we do not articulate clearly the different kinds of solutions, we could find ourselves in a bad position, mainly because of the contagion risk.
  2. To try to avoid moral hazard, we must obviously put in place rules and incentives ex ante. But, if despite these provisions, a big crisis occurs, being stuck in doctrine, with no bail-outs, the crisis might degenerate with disastrous consequences. Fighting moral hazard is right ex ante. It is not, when the big crisis is there.
  3. Of course, solidarity comes with common supervision and with the clearing of bad legacy, but only as much as possible. And if the willingness to achieve solidarity takes too long to be seen, the fear of an incomplete Euro Zone could come back to haunt us.
Categories
Conjoncture Economical policy Euro zone Finance

Exiting the ECB’s highly accomodating monetary policy : stakes and challenges

Revue D’Économie Financière – Extrait du numéro 127 – Article Olivier Klein

Categories
Conjoncture Economical policy Finance

Cercle Les Échos : Faced with predicted Uberisation, what are the keys to success for banks ?

Is banking experiencing Uberisation? And if so, how do we deal with it? What assets do we have? There are certain analyses and lines of reasoning that we can put forward with a fair degree of certainty without looking into a crystal ball.

The word “Uberisation”, broadly speaking, can refer to the threat to an established model posed by a series of innovations and new players. We shall focus here on retail banking since it is, in principle, more greatly affected by this phenomenon than corporate banking. There are various types of digital innovations that may find an application in the banking sector: robotisation, the digitalisation of processes, of contracts and signatures, big data, artificial intelligence, payments, payments and many more. Clearly, these innovations are causing many profound changes and are creating a number of possibilities for revolutions that need to be analysed and incorporated into our strategies. Two types of profound change in particular are interesting to study.

The first approach involves asking the question of whether digitalisation could go as far as to do away with branches, or at least a significant reduction in the network bank model. This is a question that needs to be asked since there are far fewer customers visiting branches. We can therefore legitimately ask ourselves whether this will continue, whether this reduction is affecting all branch-based roles and whether we are heading towards an almost unique model of online banking or neo-banking.

The second approach involves studying the extent to which this technological revolution is allowing a number of start-ups, such as the fintechs, to grow and compete with commercial banks on one part or another of their value chain. Is there a possibility, in this case, that, in time, profitable segments will be lost? Could profitability fall without jeopardising the network banking model in the process?

These two questions are important and different, even if the answers one might give to them sometimes merge into one.

The first approach is fundamental: can we imagine a world where banks have no branches? This is what some analysts are claiming, speaking of banking’s “tomorrow’s Kodak” or, a little less radically, “the next iron and steel industry”. This question cannot be ignored. On the contrary, we need to get to the bottom of things. This subject merits answers founded on solid analyses. First of all, we need to differentiate the issue of digital from that of interest rates. We can see the convergence of these two phenomena but neither has anything to do with the other. On the one hand there is a very flat interest rate curve that is damaging the profitability of retail banks. We can reasonably expect that these rates will rise again, specifically with a sufficient gap between short- and long-term rates and a central bank which will gradually emerge from quantitative easing. We expect the ECB to make announcements in this vein at the end of October.

On the other hand, we have digital and its impact on profitability. I think we need to be careful not to answer the question of interest rates with digital by thinking that low rates structurally change the model. The interest rates as they are today do not change the model in itself but temporarily damage profitability, which is not exactly the same thing.


In my opinion, the line of reasoning to be followed involves going back to basics: What is the very essence of a retail bank? What is the essence of the banking relationship? Here we need to distinguish those non-variable contextual points which vary depending on current technology and how they are used by customers. In retail banking – the model of which can incidentally differ by country according to the customs and habits that are specific to each one – there are two major areas: everyday, transactional and relationship banking, that of “life plans” and advisory banking. These are two very distinct banking requirements, even if their paths often cross.

Clearly, everyday banking involves current transactions: picking up a cheque book, making a payment, making cash withdrawals or deposits etc. This type of banking practically no longer requires a network, even if there is still demand, albeit ever decreasing, to go the counter. The development of the internet, smartphones and automated machines means that this transactional banking practically no longer requires a network to carry out these common transactions. This reduction in visits to banks is very significant overall. This is very important because the demand for “cashiers” is becoming increasingly small and this must clearly be integrated.

On the other side is relationship banking, that of life plans and advisory services ̶ as well as being the banking called upon at those difficult times that can come upon everyone sooner or later – which essentially characterises the most profound relationship between private individuals and their bank, going far beyond managing means of payment. This is the long-term relationship with customers. This is crucial because this long time is linked to the fact that their life plans are being taken care of, both in their development and their deployment. These can be very important projects: financing one’s studies, your first start in the professional world, buying a home, preparing for retirement or planning for your heirs. They can also be small life plans that are linked, such as preparing for a trip or buying a car. This is all part of a world in which banks are entirely legitimate since they meet the needs of customers by offering them the necessary products, namely loans, savings and, of course, insurance (for property and people), which enables them to be protected. These plans require time to be for them to be prepared and brought to fruition. This creates a long and strong relationship of trust between customer and banker since it relates to the security of one’s property, person, family and, fundamentally, one’s well-being. The world of needs served by relationship banking is therefore a long-term one, just as loans, savings and insurance are long-term products.

It is a nomal and commonplace for thoughts to be polarised within society: at the end of the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, there was a lot of debate over whether mass retail would replace banking. At that time many people wrote knowledgeably that mass retail would remove whole swathes of banking. This is not what happened, however. Back in 2004, I wrote a long article in Les Échos on this subject. My thought process stemmed from the following point: mass retail deals with the short-term because what is bought through this medium is consumed almost immediately. If this does not satisfy us, it’s easy to change to a different brand or even a different outlet. In banking it is difficult to change quickly, depending on the consumer experience, because if someone takes out a loan, makes savings or takes out an insurance policy, this is generally a long-term affair. This is why bank advisors need to remain in their jobs for a sufficient length of time. This is also a strong demand from customers. Whereas in mass retail, by and large, there are no more “sales representatives” in store. I have never truly believed, therefore, that mass retail can take significant market share from banks, specifically because the fundamental analysis of what makes the very essence of what was the banking relationship led me to believe that no-one would buy savings in a pre-packaged form. The only meeting points between mass retail and banking are consumer credit and payment and loyalty cards, both of which are an exact extension of the act of purchase. There is therefore only one area in which, until now, there has truly been competition between mass retail and banks.

Furthermore, depending on the country, there are different mixtures between relationship and everyday banking models. A study carried out on behalf of the French Banking Federation in 2010 sought to discover which countries had a strong relationship model. France stood out as one of the strongest countries. This does not mean that French banks are not transactional but simply that they placed relatively more weight on the relationship aspect than many other countries do. Countries that have models which are far more transactional than relationship-focused therefore have a vested interest in closing large numbers of branches since branches have little new to offer. In relationship-focused banks, something else is going on.

Therefore, people are visiting their banks less and less for everyday matters, that is certain. However, will people’s appetite for relationship banking decline? For the last decade or so, relationships with banking networks have been evolving: physically and due to telephone, e-mail, visual communication and live chats etc. These are not however removing the need for banking advisors. Although banking advisors are needed as much as ever, if not more, it is therefore important to know where to place and accommodate them. Customers want to see their advisors face to face on a regular basis, for more complex subjects or for simple reassurance. Having branches closer to them is, therefore, not entirely incongruous, especially since branches, as a place where banking takes places, also act as reassurance for many private individuals and even professionals. Therefore, since we already have branches nearby, why deprive ourselves of this asset, especially when they offer us miles’ worth of advertising space in our branch windows that even online banks envy?

Therefore, relationship modes evolve and complement each other but they are not killing each other off. The essence of what they are is not changing because there is no fall in demand for banking related to life plans, far from it in fact. With the advent of the Internet, customers are ever more demanding when it comes to the quality of advice because they are adept at browsing the web to find out information and to compare and switch if they need to. They require their advisor to be even better, more responsive and more proactive than before.

In reality, the fact that fewer people are going to “counters” is an opportunity for banks and this is not a paradox. Firstly, digital is taking repetitive, unpaid tasks away from the counter, thereby reducing costs. We can therefore offer a lot more business time to customers who request more and, in doing so, make customer advisors out of those employees who used to be at the counters. Most of the time these are young people in their first job who don’t expect anything different, therefore making them easy to train. Thanks to digital, business time is developed and therefore avoids repetitive tasks for experienced sales staff.

The second argument, which follows from the first, is that we increase the productive business time of our own advisors, which increases our productivity. Our net banking profit is therefore increased by our ability to better serve and advise our customers and therefore meet their needs.

Thirdly, the customer experience is clearly made easier by digital since certain operations are much more easily handled remotely or by machines. Customer satisfaction is therefore increased because the bank becomes more practical.

Lastly, digital is also an opportunity because it makes it possible to improve the relationship model itself. Big data and artificial intelligence, which we are gradually trying to integrate, may allow us to better understand our customers and their needs, to better prepare for our meetings and therefore serve customers better. This therefore makes us much more efficient. This is about intelligent commercial productivity, which really satisfies customers since they will only be called regarding things that concern their true needs.

Increasing the practicality of our banks and the quality of the advice are therefore two fundamental keys to success. There are two axes that allow the banks to do this: training, the budget of which we have increased significantly at BRED, and digital itself!

We therefore need to ensure that online banking is just as practical. Of course, if we ensure it is just as practical but we don’t have correspondingly low prices, there needs to be something else that sets us apart: high quality advice. Without wanting to criticise them, because they are perfectly legitimate, purely digital banks do not have advisors.

Customers in France actually want both: highly practical everyday banking and an assigned advisor who can provide them with added value. They will only, therefore, seek to separate transactional and advisory banking or even to be satisfied with just one low-cost everyday bank if their usual bank does not excel at these two levels.

Retail banks therefore have a certain comparative advantage, provided that today, on the one hand, they continue to invest so they are as good as online banks when it comes to the practicality of everyday banking. Nothing impossible here. On the other, they also need to make sure that they can provide quality advice at the same time, the added value of which warrants remuneration. Significant investment in digital and training are therefore definitely two keys to success.

However, the agile organisation of each branch and of the network and optimising the use of resources to ascribe them to the most productive in terms of net banking profit is also crucial. In certain cases, banks may close branches because the need for transaction counters is disappearing. As a result, we effectively no longer need to have a branch every 200 metres in large cities, even if we still need branches to provide advice. Therefore, according to the configuration of banks today, the number of branches to be reduced may be quite different.

It should be added that, for the moment, online banking is not profitable precisely because it is having great trouble equipping customers. Furthermore, in order to gain customers, it incurs considerable cost corresponding to the need to advertise more than the other banks. Since they have no “shop windows”, online banks need to attract the customer before they spontaneously visit one of our branches. In the same vein, online banks need to offer many more gifts and free offers. For example, customers typically receive 80 euros for opening an account, but many students go to several banks one after another to collect these incentives in turn. Enhancing loyalty is not easy, therefore. As a result, online banking focuses mainly on transactional banking. It is therefore quite difficult to monetise these models and capitalise on customers unless they start to expand their offering and assign advisors, which is starting to happen here and there. If this were to develop, it would be very interesting since there could then be transactional banks that go digital and online banks which would start to play the traditional banks’ game by appointing advisors. Both types of bank would then start drawing nearer to one another in an interesting way.

However, this begs the question: can advisory services be digitalised? Can we do without humans therein? We could of course say the following: with quality big data and good automatic intelligence, automating “pushes” (text messages or e-mails) to customers would render the human advisor useless. The customer would receive intelligent suggestions, sometimes even more intelligent than those an advisor who has not been sufficiently trained or assisted would make. Why, therefore, would we need banking advisors in future since everything would be digital?

We are convinced that the opposite is true, even if it is impossible to predict with any certainty what will happen in ten or twenty years’ time.

We know that machines can beat humans in many areas. We also know that humans and machines acting in concert beat the machine alone. We need to remain very modest, however, because who knows today what artificial intelligence will be capable of tomorrow? Artificial intelligence experts themselves remain very cautious. There are, however, some key elements to be borne in mind.

The first element is that trust is a key part of the banking relationship for a very simple reason: people are trusting us with their money and helping them to construct their life plans. We enter into the inner world and security of people and their families. Having an interpersonal relationship allows us today to cultivate infinitely more trust than is possible with a robot, even an “intelligent” robot. The youngest among us, who are extraordinarily accustomed to digital, for example, need our banks to have assigned customer advisors, even if they are visiting our branches less often. At BRED, we have also experimented with sending commercial proposals to groups of customers who are in identical situations via text message or e-mail. As is always the case with mailings, there was a positive response rate of around 2% to 3%. We then sent out e-mails or texts again to other people with identical characteristics and then had the customer advisors ring them regarding the same subject. Our success rate then multiplied ten-fold. This very modest experiment therefore provides some hope for the human relationship.

The second challenge hinges on the fact that the basis for trust also resides with the institution’s reputation, which is an added value and an asset for banks.

Moreover, cognitive science currently shows that, to be able to make a decision, rational intelligence but also emotional intelligence is needed. Studies present certain cases of people who have been injured and lost the use of part of their brain used for emotional intelligence. They are therefore entirely incapable of making decisions even though their capacity for reasoning and analysis remains intact. Advances in cognitive science therefore demonstrate that, in order to make a good decision, we need to have an inkling of the solution as well as good analysis. Therefore, the human relationship can be a powerful aid in the decision-making process. In the same vein, econometric studies have recently updated the belief that a lesson could be learned more successfully in a “classroom setting” with a teacher, than through massive open online courses (MOOC). This in no way calls into question the extraordinary interest MOOC have in disseminating knowledge and their ability to reach many more students. However, this does not mean the classroom teacher has no future.

Finally, every day we receive more diverse and varied requests from people or organisations we do not know, in the form of “push” e-mails or text messages. A few years from now, we will all be saturated with these requests, if we aren’t already. What will make the difference at that point are humans capable of calling, in addition to these “pushes”, providing additional added value. This differentiation will surely prove decisive.

For all these reasons, retail banks will probably not be threatened with extinction by what seems to be a possible “Uberisation”.


There is a second approach that involves asking ourselves whether there is a possibility that profitable market segments will be lost due to external players like fintechs.

Let’s take fintechs which are flourishing. We are seeing more and more development of services proposed on certifications and authentications, biometrics, budgetary management, electronic safes, aggregators, payments, blockchain etc. The question therefore is: is there a risk of becoming disintermediated, as a bank, from portions of the banking chain that would be profitable?

The example that could be of legitimate concern is that of external aggregators which are now capable of accessing data, suggesting bank transfers and therefore initiating payments. On top of these, they can also add budgetary management services and suggest best-priced banking products. What could actually stop them, in future, from analysing our customers’ data and offering them the banking services they need? Such players could, for example, offer consumer credit by using brokers and suggest the cheapest provider – though not necessarily the most suitable one – which may not be the customer’s traditional bank. This hypothesis of banks being partially disintermediated is perfectly foreseeable.

I think – perhaps wrongly – that these fears may be exaggerated.

Firstly, many fintechs will not have access to customer data, such companies being, for example, those that offer budgetary management software. These companies will have difficulty in taking market share away from certain segments that are currently operated by banks. There are therefore two solutions open to them: either they cooperate with specific banks, the former being bought out by the latter or by forming a more or less exclusive partnership, or they form cooperative platforms with several banks in order to offer services that can be shared. Thus, they invite and integrate themselves into the banks’ value chain without disrupting their model. They would even help to enrich it since banks would become even stronger in the global model with their customers by expanding their services. For example, in the BCPE group, we sought out fintechs to offer professional customers CRM solutions linked to payments. Therefore, either the banks have the IT investment capacity to enhance their services themselves or they can look to subcontract. In fact, the reality is, of course, a mixture of the two. What does change, however, is the fact that banks were wont to do everything themselves, whereas in the future this is also likely to be an assembly profession, not just a complete, fully integrated profession. There’s nothing wrong with assembling as long as that allows us to expand our overall relationship base and our revenue.

The second case, which could of course pose a problem, is the one in which fintechs will have access to some of the data. Web scratching – which may soon be prohibited or at least highly regulated – and, more generally, DSP2 and APIs, pose the question of opening up banks’ data and customer accounts. Currently, all banks have built their aggregators to try to make sure that their customers don’t need to leave the bank’s environment to access their accounts at other banks and this works well. In future, by regulation, accessing data will be accompanied by strong authorisations which will certainly, and legitimately, make it much more difficult for external players other than the customer’s bank to process data (whether or not these players are banks).

The discussion is also currently focused on knowing which data can be accessed. We can say that there is growing awareness amongst customers, and the population in general, of the danger of allowing uncontrolled use of their data. This trend is likely to accelerate, being particularly noticeable among young people. This awareness will most likely put the brakes on any intrusion.

Furthermore, a new data protection regulation will be implemented next year (the General Data Protection Regulation – GDPR – which will apply from May 2018), which will reiterate the fact that the data belongs to the customers and that any use of such data must be approved by the customer. This will apply not only to banks but also to all data users. This is probably good news since, even if it is difficult for banks to justify everything, this regulation will make it possible to slow down the arrival of third parties that wish to use this data in a cavalier fashion, which will again put the brakes on intrusion. Banks must remain this trusted third party which processes people’s personal data and they clearly must not be allowed to disclose this information without the customer being aware of this and giving their consent.


Once again, therefore, banks’ ability to provide for and improve their overall relationship model with their private customers will be a deciding factor in resisting Uberisation while integrating and offering new services that meet the needs of the customers served by banks.

Therefore, if banks invest heavily in training and digital and carry out the essential changes their organisations require, there is no reason to believe that the retail banking model is dead. However, as with all enduring models, it no longer needs to be a chemically pure model. On the contrary, that model now needs to be intimately combined with digital. Today we are seeing in all areas of distribution that purely digital models are having a hard time surviving and that purely physical distribution models are dying out. The future will involve this mixture, with the right replies being found in understanding what the very essence of the banking relationship is. It seems to me that this is possible.

The risk of Uberisation will also, as in other sectors, have provoked strong competition, which is essential in a sector that is highly regulated and poorly suited to swift changes. We must be lucid, however: this stimulating effect which, overall, has led to an improvement in the banking model and benefited its customers, is not the only factor. A reduction in profitability, all other things being equal, caused by new players entering the market and putting pressure on prices, is likely. However, other sectors can no doubt be developed in parallel, connected with the recurring activity of commercial banks, which will see their revenue grow.

The risk of Uberisation, to quote the title of the conference, must be assessed in depth in the light of the assets that can be mobilised by commercial banks. Coming out on top, therefore, seems possible. But this is contingent on correctly appreciating the changes that need to be made and the adoption of a deliberately offensive strategy by these same commercial banks.

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Conjoncture Economical policy Euro zone Finance

Exiting the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy is necessary, but difficult.

On 26 October, the ECB (European Central Bank) will probably announce how it is planning to recalibrate its current highly accommodative monetary policy. Primarily consisting of massive purchases by the ECB of sovereign and corporate bonds and the introduction of negative interest rates, this policy has proven its usefulness in combatting the risk of deflation and the disintegration of the eurozone. It has, therefore, been effective.

Gradual withdrawal of the policy now appears necessary. Deflationary fears are now behind us, growth in the eurozone is confirmed and the unemployment rate has fallen considerably. Although we are experiencing stubbornly low inflation, continuation of the policy entails significant risks.

Through a policy of very low and even negative interest rates, below the nominal growth rate, the ECB, by supporting borrowers, impacts the remuneration of savers and lenders. Germany, a country of declining demographics and thus more sensitive to this situation, reminds the ECB regularly of this. Furthermore, and whether or not they are contractually required to deliver minimum yields, institutional investors (insurance companies, pension fund managers, etc.) may therefore be inclined to extend the duration of their investments and accept higher counterparty risks in exchange for higher remuneration. Should it continue beyond its necessary duration, this policy could cause future financial instability.

Additionally, such a policy may encourage speculative behaviour, a cause of bubbles, consisting of borrowing at low rates in order to buy risky assets (equities or real estate) in order to benefit from the yield differential. Yet, although such bubbles had not clearly been seen until recently, certain assets appear to have been experiencing quite rapid price hikes over the last few months, both on the US equities markets, for example, and on real estate markets of a number of large American and European cities (including in Germany).

By seeking to position long-term interest rates at very low levels, it destroys the differential between banks’ lending rates and the rates applicable to their sources of funds, while savers’ bank deposit rates cannot fall below zero. But this interest margin constitutes a fundamental building block of retail banking income. In the case of France, for example, since 2016 this negative effect has not been offset by higher lending volumes and a lower cost of credit risk, due to the same very low interest rates. Yet at the same time, results from their other activities (investment banking, international, insurance, etc.) have enabled them to generate very good overall results. Consequently, sooner or later the lower income from retail banking in domestic markets runs the risk of impeding their ability to support lending growth alongside resurgent economic growth, at a time when the solvency ratio demanded under prudential rules continues to rise.

For all these reasons in particular, the start of normalisation of the ECB’s monetary policy has now become necessary. It would also enable the institution to re-establish vital room for manoeuvre to combat any future cycle reversal, particularly as the budgetary policy of many European governments currently has little room for manoeuvre given their levels of public debt.

To implement this turnaround, from 2014 the US Federal Reserve commenced a gradual tapering and subsequently ended its asset purchase programme, and finally gradually increased its key rates (short-term rates). The ECB will probably announce its own tapering plans on 26 October. By deciding to unwind its asset purchase programme very gradually, and by first of all stabilising its stocks, it could trigger a very prudent rise in long-term rates over the coming years. At the same time it could also raise negative rates towards zero, a situation that can only exist in very exceptional circumstances. Key rates would only be raised after this first step.

The rates rise will be managed very prudently, as it also involves significant risks. It could cause major market shocks if it is very sudden and poorly anticipated. Similarly, in view of the high levels of sovereign, corporate and household debt, it can only be implemented very gradually. The euro has already risen sharply against the dollar. With the rise of our currency clearly having an effect which could counteract anticipated inflation growth following higher economic growth in the zone, the ECB cannot, however, run the risk of accelerating the revaluation of the euro while it is seeking to get inflation back up to around 2%.

The policy implemented by the ECB has, in practice, been designed to buy time for the eurozone, to enable its states to carry out structural reforms and to make the necessary modifications to the institutional and organisational framework of the monetary zone itself. As the policy cannot last for ever, it is becoming all the more imperative for the countries concerned to implement such reforms in order to enhance their competitiveness (quality/price) and sustain their growth potential. And consequently, in the absence of austerity policies, to reduce public deficits, including welfare, and structural current account deficits. The objective must be to create the foundations of a strengthened eurozone, through better coordination, with greater solidarity and where all members will be able to improve their growth potential.

Co-written with Thibault Dubreuil, Finance Major at HEC

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Bank Economical policy Euro zone

Low interest rate and negative interest rate policy : reasons and consequences for the banks

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