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Conjoncture Economical and financial crisis Economical policy

A 20-Point GDP Gap with the United States: Europe Is No Longer Falling Behind — It Is Settling into Decline

For almost twenty years, Europe has been falling behind — not as the result of a temporary cyclical shock, but as the outcome of a cumulative and structural process. The comparison with the United States is now unambiguous: while the U.S. economy regained a sustained growth trajectory after the 2008 financial crisis, Europe appears stuck in a regime of persistently low growth, with lasting economic, social, and geopolitical consequences.

Since the global financial crisis, real U.S. GDP has grown at a markedly faster pace than that of the European Union. As a result, the American economy has expanded roughly twice as fast as Europe’s over the period, creating a gap of more than 20 percentage points in GDP.

Growth is not merely an economic variable. It determines fiscal capacity, investment in research, defense, and infrastructure — and therefore, in the long run, global power itself: the ability to protect living standards and uphold one’s values.

A Growing Productivity Divide

The divergence is also visible in GDP per capita. In the early 2000s, Europe stood close to U.S. levels. By 2024, GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms reached roughly $75,000 in the United States, compared with around $55,000 in the European Union. This gap no longer stems primarily from differences in hours worked, which have remained broadly stable over the past two decades, but from a widening disparity in productive efficiency.

At the heart of Europe’s challenge lies insufficient productivity growth — more specifically, weak total factor productivity gains. These depend on incentives to innovate and take risks, on competitive market structures, and on the capacity to allow new firms to emerge while less efficient ones exit. In other words, on enabling “creative destruction” in the Schumpeterian sense, as formalized in modern growth theory.

Europe has suffered from a chronic deficit in these areas. Since the late 1990s, productivity growth has been significantly lower than in the United States, often close to zero in the euro area.

Innovation tends to be incremental rather than radical; markets remain fragmented; scale effects are limited; and incentives for risk-taking are insufficient.

The weakness of venture capital — particularly at the scale-up stage — combined with burdensome regulation and penalizing tax structures, leads many European start-ups either to sell prematurely or relocate abroad, fueling a silent outflow of technology and talent.

Structural Handicaps

These weaknesses are compounded by structural constraints: energy dependence, persistently higher energy prices than in the United States, critical dependence on rare earths, and chronic underinvestment in defense and key technologies.

The illusion of European “normative power” — the idea that Europe can shape global standards without sufficient industrial and technological leadership — collides with reality: standards ultimately follow market power.

The remedies are well known. They require acting more collectively and more swiftly. Institutional governance is at stake. They involve deepening the single market, particularly in capital, energy, and digital sectors; massively reducing intra-European regulatory barriers; and pursuing a more ambitious and risk-embracing innovation policy.

They also require faster reallocation of resources toward the most productive firms, greater labor mobility, and a decade-long investment effort spanning climate transition, defense, energy, and critical technologies — alongside a substantial upgrade in education and skills.

Ultimately, the issue is not merely economic; it is political. Without stronger and more durable growth — and therefore without the structural reforms that make it possible — neither Europe’s social model nor its ability to shape the global order can be preserved.

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Conjoncture Economical and financial crisis Economical policy

Why Europe Is Falling Behind — and How to Accelerate

Olivier Klein
Professor of economics at HEC
February 12, 2026

Over the span of two decades, the European Union’s relative slowdown has turned into a genuine divergence from the United States—and increasingly from China as well. This is no longer a cyclical gap: Europe’s growth trajectory has become structurally weaker, with profound implications for living standards, social cohesion, and the continent’s geopolitical weight.

Since the 2008 financial crisis, average annual growth in the U.S. economy has significantly outpaced that of the European Union. A one-percentage-point growth gap sustained over twenty years results in a GDP difference exceeding 20%, translating into reduced capacity to finance defense, infrastructure, the energy transition, or education. GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms—once relatively close to U.S. levels in the early 2000s—has gradually drifted away, signaling a relative decline in European living standards.

This divergence comes at a time when the global economic order has shifted from a U.S./Europe bipolarity to a tripolar configuration: United States, China, and the European Union. Economic weight determines not only internal prosperity but also the capacity to fund military power, sustain diplomatic ambition, and shape technical and regulatory standards. Growth, in other words, has become a strategic variable.

An Efficiency Problem, Not a Labor Quantity Problem

One key lesson from recent research is that Europe does not suffer from a lack of capital or from a massive education or skills deficit relative to the United States. Nor has the historical gap in annual hours worked—traditionally lower in Europe—widened since 2000.

Europe’s relative deterioration over the past two decades stems primarily from an efficiency problem in organizing production and innovation. Total factor productivity (TFP)—which measures the ability to innovate, adopt new technologies, and efficiently reallocate resources—has grown much more slowly in Europe than in the United States since the mid-1990s.

The gap is highly sectoral. Europe remains competitive in traditional manufacturing and certain regulated services, but it lags significantly in high-technology sectors: digital platforms, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. These sectors now concentrate productivity gains and give rise to “superstar firms” that drive overall economic dynamism. The combined market capitalization of major U.S. technology companies far exceeds that of their European counterparts, revealing a deep imbalance in the capacity to create and capture innovation-driven value.

A Schumpeterian Reading: Europe’s Creative Destruction Deficit

To understand this divergence, a Schumpeterian framework—particularly as formalized by Philippe Aghion—is especially relevant. Long-term growth depends on creative destruction: the entry of innovative firms, the exit of obsolete ones, and the rapid reallocation of capital and labor toward the most productive sectors.

Near the technological frontier, this process requires strong incentives for breakthrough innovation, sufficient competition to push incumbents to reinvent themselves, and institutions that accept failure and structural transformation. This is precisely where Europe underperforms.

Stylized facts are clear: since the mid-1990s, TFP growth has been roughly twice as high in the United States as in the euro area, with the gap concentrated in the most innovative sectors (ICT, digital technologies, biotech), rather than across the entire economy.

Politically and socially, Europe shows a marked preference for ex ante protection of existing jobs and firms—through regulation, labor law, and taxation—whereas the United States tends to rely more on ex post compensation for losers, via labor mobility and income-support mechanisms. The result is lower firm entry and exit rates in Europe, more limited sectoral and geographic labor mobility, and therefore slower reallocation toward the most productive activities.

Innovation Institutions: Europe’s Structural Lag

Another key dimension concerns the organization of innovation systems. In economies close to the technological frontier, growth depends less on imitation and more on the capacity to generate and diffuse breakthrough innovations. This requires specific institutions: effective intellectual property protection, competitive markets, deep capital markets, and public agencies capable of financing long-term, high-risk projects.

The United States has, for decades, developed agencies such as Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), ARPA-E, IARPA, and BARDA. These bodies operate with significant autonomy, substantial funding, and high tolerance for risk. Led by program managers from scientific and industrial backgrounds appointed for limited terms, they fund applied research projects with transformative potential, often at the intersection of public needs (defense, health, energy) and private innovation.

This model has played a decisive role in the emergence of technologies that are now ubiquitous: the internet, GPS, advanced semiconductors, and key components of artificial intelligence and biotechnology.

By contrast, Europe has built a fragmented landscape of research institutions and innovation programs, often oriented toward medium-scale projects, with limited tolerance for failure and lengthy decision processes. The difficulty lies in concentrating resources on strategic priorities, taking bold technological bets, and ensuring a smooth continuum from public research to start-ups, innovative SMEs, and large firms.

Energy, Industry, and the Low-Growth Trap

Performance gaps are also explained by real factors such as energy and industrial structure. The European Union remains structurally dependent on energy imports, particularly gas and oil, while the United States has become a net exporter. Recent energy shocks have exposed this vulnerability, durably increasing energy costs for European firms, especially in energy-intensive sectors.

Some national policy choices have compounded the problem: rapid nuclear phase-outs without immediately available decarbonized alternatives, underinvestment in dispatchable generation capacity, and slow development of interconnections. Since energy is a core production input, persistently higher costs weigh directly on competitiveness, industrial employment, trade balances, and investment capacity in other areas such as R&D and infrastructure.

Thus emerges a “low-growth trap”: weak growth, underinvestment, technological lag, and renewed weak growth.

Europe Is Not Doomed to Decline

The diagnosis should not lead to fatalism. The European Union retains considerable structural strengths: high levels of education, world-class universities and research centers, and a dense base of engineers and scientists. Its socio-economic model—social protection, reduced inequality, strong public services—remains widely supported by citizens.

Europe also benefits from stable institutions: rule of law, judicial independence, central bank independence, and robust property rights protection. In a geopolitically fragmented world, such stability is a valuable asset that can attract talent, capital, and firms—provided Europe regains a more dynamic growth trajectory.

Recent history shows that the Union can respond decisively in times of crisis: the creation of the European Stability Mechanism and banking union progress after the euro crisis, joint debt issuance after the pandemic, and renewed emphasis on reindustrialization. Yet such advances are often incremental and slow.

Three Reform Axes to Escape the Trap

  1. Deepen the Single Market.
    Goods markets remain fragmented by national regulations; services markets are far from integrated; capital markets remain segmented. A genuine capital markets union, deeper integration of energy and digital markets, and reduced entry barriers in protected sectors would generate scale effects comparable to those enjoyed by U.S. or Chinese firms.
  2. Reinforce Frontier Innovation Capacity.
    R&D policy must increase overall effort and, above all, create institutions capable of financing long-term breakthrough projects with agile governance and explicit tolerance for risk. Universities, research centers, start-ups, and large firms must be more tightly connected. Venture capital and growth capital must be strengthened. Europe must enable the emergence of new “superstars” in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, health, and low-carbon technologies. More broadly, it must move away from hyper-protection and hyper-regulation—often intertwined—and toward greater acceptance of risk, failure, and the recognition and reward of success.
  3. Redesign the Social Contract.
    If creative destruction is to intensify, it must be socially acceptable. Protection should shift—as in Denmark—from protecting specific jobs to protecting individuals. Flexicurity in labor markets, large-scale lifelong learning, portability of social rights, and stronger income-insurance mechanisms are essential to reconcile economic dynamism with social cohesion.

Europe must move beyond the implicit compromise that trades short-term stability for a gradual erosion of the productive base that finances its social model. The continent’s divergence is not inevitable; it is the consequence of institutional and political choices that can be revised.

The question is not whether Europe should abandon its model, but whether it can equip itself with the institutions of a competitive frontier economy and a sufficiently strong and dynamic productive base to sustain that model in a world of far harsher power dynamics—more technological and more competitive at once.

Only then can Europe continue to shape global standards and remain a consequential actor on the world stage.

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Economical and financial crisis Economical policy

Can France still escape its economic and social trap?

Olivier Klein , published by Les Échos , on the 2nd of January, 2026

We know it — or rather, we should know it after so many years trapped in the vicious circle in which our country finds itself. France will not escape the circular chain of causality linking excessive compulsory levies, an employment rate that is too low, and an uncontrolled level of public debt through yet another increase in taxes and social contributions.

Stabilising the debt ratio instead requires a coherent strategy based on effective management of public spending, policies aimed at increasing our growth potential — including a higher employment rate — and a genuine approach to change management, so that all stakeholders understand and adhere to the path we must take to make our model sustainable once again.

Rethinking the rules of Social Security

The greatest margins lie at the very heart of the social model, starting with pensions, the largest item of public expenditure. Raising the average retirement age by one year, combined with greater convergence between public- and private-sector schemes and an active policy to promote senior employment, would make it possible, within a few years, to generate €10 to €15 billion per year (direct effects and those induced by stronger growth), without undermining retirees’ living standards.

It is also necessary to review the rules governing the use of the Social Security system in order to limit moral hazard: sick leave, the consumption of healthcare services and medicines must be organised so as to ensure responsible and solidarity-based use.

Rebalancing rights and duties, strengthening controls where necessary, but also encouraging virtuous behaviour — both in health and in the labour market — is a sine qua non for the sustainability of our social model.

At the same time, better management of public administrations — reorganisation with targeted non-replacement of departures, reduction of administrative overlaps, digitalisation, and redeployment towards frontline services — could yield around €20 billion per year, with a reduction in staff of about 5%, without any reduction in civil servants’ pay.

Several advanced economies have reduced their number of civil servants by 7% to 10% without triggering a slowdown in growth or a decline in the quality of public services.

Acting on expenditure — and employment

But a lasting exit from the French trap depends as much on employment as on expenditure control. A six-point increase in the employment rate, bringing France up to the German level, achieved — beyond raising the retirement age — through a coherent reform of unemployment insurance, the fight against inactivity traps, and a more effective system of vocational training, would generate nearly €60 billion in additional revenue under unchanged tax legislation. That represents a reduction of around 60% of the primary budget deficit.

An increase of roughly ten points in the active population — equivalent to the Dutch level — would even bring the primary deficit down to zero, following a logic of wealth creation rather than additional taxation, which would instead be regressive.

Still, these reforms — assuming they are voted into law — would have to be genuinely implemented. This requires an assertive approach to change management: a clear and intelligible national strategy, well-defined and understandable milestones, appropriate means to achieve them, and incentive systems aligned with the objectives pursued so as to secure the engagement of all.

By combining 1.5 to 2 percentage points of GDP in recurring savings with 1.5 to 2 percentage points of annual revenue linked to higher employment and growth, France could improve its public balance by 3 to 4 points of GDP within a few years. Enough to stabilise public debt — not through inevitable austerity, but through a calm and responsible reassertion of control over our economic and social model.

To procrastinate further — or worse, to move in the opposite direction of what reason and successful international experience teach us — would be to blindly drive the country ever deeper into a vicious circle that tightens day by day.

Olivier Klein
Professor of Economics, HEC

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Economical and financial crisis Economical policy

French Paradoxes

Published in L’Opinion, December 2, 2025

The paradox of the French social model becomes clear in the accumulation of striking figures: according to the latest OECD data, France holds the European record for mandatory levies and public spending, with more than 32% of GDP in direct social transfers. And the consolidated weight of public expenditure far exceeds that of its neighbors—sometimes by nearly ten points of GDP. Yet it seems particularly difficult for public authorities to reduce spending and quite easy to increase taxes, such is the pressure not to touch the former and the almost paroxysmal demand for fiscal justice. One might therefore conclude that it is useless, or even dangerous, to change a model that appears effective and that everyone seems eager to preserve. And yet…

And yet these deep-seated political tendencies fail to confront the rising and unsustainable cost of our model. The deficit has become almost permanent: France posts a significant primary deficit every year, even as the interest burden—thanks to higher rates—has become one of its largest budget lines, and as the public-debt ratio has risen about three times faster than in the rest of the euro area since 2000. This places the country’s ability to finance this societal choice at serious short- and medium-term risk. The Governor of the Banque de France and the IMF now warn of a major sustainability problem, while fiscal room for manoeuvre shrinks as revenues stagnate and the working population declines relative to the number of retirees, owing to demographic trends.

And yet, on the purely economic front, the picture is no more reassuring. The evolution of GDP per capita over the past twenty years shows a gradual French decline relative to more dynamic neighboring countries. While Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and the Netherlands continue to advance, France has been steadily losing ground in the ranking of wealth created per inhabitant. This productive weakening is also evident in the low share of industry in national value added.

And yet 78% of French citizens now consider the level of taxes and social contributions too high (according to the Compulsory Levies Council’s barometer).

The French paradox is also strikingly visible in the perceived effectiveness of public services. Although spending on health, education, and pensions is comparable to or higher than that of other universalist welfare states, the layering of administrative structures, normative inflation, and over-administration undermine the system’s efficiency. The problem is glaring in the hospital sector, where administrative workloads are far higher than in Germany or Nordic countries, without yielding better outcomes for users. The same pattern exists in education, burdened by a heavy organization and struggling to ensure equity, even as international assessments such as PISA and PIAAC now place France at average or mediocre levels compared with high-performing countries across most key competencies. Multiple cost-effectiveness metrics from international organizations place France only in an average—or even poor—position in nearly all domains studied. And the share of citizens who say they trust and are satisfied with their public services stands at 52% in France, versus 66% on average across the OECD. The Compulsory Levies Council’s latest barometer also shows that the share of French people who believe tax money is well used by the state has fallen by 11 points in two years—from 33% to 22%. Should we really avoid changing anything and continue raising taxes and contributions?

The declining effectiveness of French public policy calls into question the sustainability of the social compromise: although the model seeks to protect all citizens through very high taxes and one of the strongest redistribution systems in the OECD, it no longer provides sufficient social mobility—income equality after redistribution is high, but equality of opportunity is far more debatable—nor dynamic growth, nor even efficient and satisfactory public services.

In the absence of structural reform, the continuous rise in public spending is accompanied by growing collective disillusionment. This paradox at the heart of the French model raises questions about its future and heightens the tension between the desire to preserve an ambitious social pact and the need to restore the means to ensure its effectiveness and sustainability over time.

It is time to move beyond today’s unrealistic debates and address France’s structural difficulties head-on. They harm the country’s economic and social health. And without action, sooner rather than later, they will undermine tax consent, the social pact, and national cohesion itself. The apparent paradox could thus swiftly turn into an economic and societal crisis.

Olivier Klein
Professor of Economics, HEC

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Economical and financial crisis Economical policy

Bitcoin in Question: The End of the Dream of a Currency Without a State?

Published in Les Échos , December the 3d , 2025

In early October, and over several weeks, Bitcoin—the emblem of cryptocurrencies and the flagship of a libertarian utopia—experienced a brutal decline: its price fell from nearly €106,000 to €73,000, a drop of about 30% in less than two months, before partially recovering. Over this period, more than $1 trillion in market capitalization vanished from the crypto market as a whole, affecting not only Bitcoin but all major cryptocurrencies such as Ether, Solana, and XRP.

This dramatic volatility highlights the intrinsic fragility of these private, decentralized “currencies,” which rely solely on algorithmic trust rather than on institutional foundations. The dream of a universal, non-national currency able to escape government control had appealed to many advocates of an economy free from state regulation, following in the footsteps of Hayek and the Austrian school. Bitcoin was explicitly designed to counter the monetary manipulation associated with official currencies. The prospect of large, seemingly easy gains also attracted many newcomers.

But this shock exposes the purely self-referential basis of the value of these so-called currencies, which have no underlying economic counterpart—unlike bank money, which is backed by credit to the economy. This makes them hyper-speculative, deeply volatile crypto-assets, whose value bears no relation to real economic needs and is subject to no institutional regulation.

The recent sharp swings thus illustrate a key point: money is never simply a technical object; it is an institutional and social fact. Unlike bank money, which rests on confidence in banks, central banks and states, cryptocurrencies are backed by no “official” institution and therefore depend solely on the collective trust of their holders—trust that can evaporate suddenly. The immediate causes of the decline are multiple: fears of an excessively steep prior rise, reduced expectations of imminent interest-rate cuts in the United States, massive liquidations of highly leveraged positions, risk reduction by institutional investors, and regulatory uncertainty, among others.

Given such volatility, cryptocurrencies cannot impose themselves as a universal means of payment; they remain, de facto, objects of pure speculation, with no objective value external to the crypto market itself. They are therefore highly susceptible to episodes of euphoric exuberance as well as panic and flight. Beyond the philosophical debate between “algorithmic trust” and institutional trust—mirroring the profound differences between the libertarian and the institutionalist schools—the recent sequence marks a return to reality: without the anchoring of institutions, whether visible or invisible, capable of channeling uncertainty and conflict, no currency can sustainably fulfill its role as social and economic mediator, nor ensure the expected stability or efficiency. The promise of Bitcoin and its successors as currencies thus cannot escape the fundamental question faced by any form of money: its universal acceptance depends less on its technology than on its capacity to preserve the trust on which it rests. Failing that, they are nothing more than hyper-speculative objects.

Private currencies can replace “official” currencies only if the latter suffer from profound and prolonged institutional failures—whether state or central-bank failures—leading to a collapse of trust. As of today, the market has reminded us—at least for the moment—that the anarcho-capitalist utopia represented by cryptocurrencies as currencies remains, above all, a utopia.

Olivier Klein
Professor of Economics at HEC
CEO, Lazard Frères Banque

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Conjoncture Economical and financial crisis Economical policy

THE FRENCH POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MODEL MUST UNDERGO A DEEP RENEWAL

29.11.2025

Below is an in-depth essay on the necessary renewal of the politico-economic-social model that defines the system in which we live in Europe, regardless of right–left alternations in power. This renewal is all the more essential in France, where this tradition of thought has gradually been diluted into an overdeveloped statism and the byways of wokisme.

“A state that interferes everywhere not only weakens institutions; it also destroys the relations of trust between citizens, for it stands between them and makes them strangers to one another.”
(The Crisis of Culture) — Hannah Arendt

A Model Out of Breath

The model as it exists today in France has run its course. It has contributed a great deal over the decades. But its intellectual foundations have evolved very little—in fact, they have drifted—while at least four major developments have taken place. These developments have been ignored, left unexamined, sometimes denied, or worse still, embraced without understanding their consequences. Let us list them without ranking.

The issue of public authority, security, and migration, along with the rise of Islamist ideology—reshaping the question of what makes a nation. The rise of fierce individualism, marked by the overvaluation of individual rights and the devaluation of duties. The obsession with equality, leading to a dangerous egalitarianism at the expense of equal opportunity and fairness. And finally, the expansion of an oversized public sector whose entropic growth breeds inefficiency, discouragement, loss of trust and rising anxiety.

We will return to each of these points. The essential challenge of the ecological transition is not mentioned here, for our model—with too many dogmas and an insufficiently scientific approach—has nonetheless integrated it relatively well into its framework. We must therefore renew our thinking, or risk becoming obsolete, by exploring areas that have so far been insufficiently examined. Let us try, modestly, to lay a few building blocks.

Market and State

The market is indispensable, for it generates economic dynamism, allocates resources, and matches supply and demand—imperfectly, of course, but irreplaceably. Yet the market cannot be a sufficient regulatory mechanism on its own, for to remain effective and sufficiently stable it needs law, rules, institutions, regulatory bodies, and intermediary groups capable of acting when the market becomes destabilizing. The public sphere is therefore essential to regulating the market, the economy, and society at large.

Thus the State—in the broad sense—is necessary for maintaining society’s balance, including by fostering intermediary bodies such as trade unions, which help regulate the whole. The various forces at play in society can then be channelled more or less harmoniously in a shifting, inherently unstable balance. And this regulatory model has enabled—unevenly and not linearly—a rise in well-being, relatively well shared across European countries.

The most developed manifestations of this regulatory model, combining ethics and efficiency, have been found in Northern Europe and Germany. Later, with nuances, a form of social democracy spread across Europe and became, volens nolens, one of its defining features. Overall, our model, with its variants, has for decades achieved a successful combination of markets with institutions and rules—including redistributive ones.

We use the term social market economy in a broad sense, beyond the alternation of right- and left-wing governments, to designate the common foundation that best captures the regulatory mode of European countries.

However, Europe now appears to be experiencing a relative decline—and in recent years even a significant economic lag behind the American model. The proliferation of norms and regulations, the weaker incentives for initiative and risk-taking, and the unchecked drive for equality—not fairness—seem to be part of the explanation. This model, even in its reformist versions aware of this dangerous trajectory, has become insufficient.

Authority, Security, Immigration

It is essential to integrate into public-policy thinking the issues of public authority, security, and better regulation and integration of immigration. Failing to address these matters in a republican manner leaves them to populist movements, which can then attract voters who are rightly dissatisfied at not being heard on sensitive issues of daily life.

These subjects are crucial, and they must not be treated moralistically or with disdain. Likewise, conceiving a country, a nation, as a multicultural kaleidoscope with no unity, no real borders, no shared culture, no genuine identity, and with nothing in common but disembodied universal values is an ethereal vision that dissolves history, geography and the very notion of nationhood. It ignores the cultural bonds that forge a country, enabling its inhabitants to recognize themselves within it and live together. Denying this truth leads sooner or later—volens nolens—to disaster.

Renan had already said it all: “What unites us is not a language, a religion or a race, but a shared past and a shared willingness to live together. A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle, built on the memory of past glories and the present consent to continue that common life. A nation is a daily plebiscite.” Let this be an inspiration.

These fundamental issues, however, will not be further developed in this paper.

Over-administration: a Brake on Action

We must also examine carefully the loss of effectiveness in the public sphere. Just as markets are not free of errors and endogenous dysfunctions, public decisions may be ineffective, or simply wrong. Neither markets nor the State are omniscient. We must acknowledge—beyond ideology—that public policy may fail, be unsuitable, or even undesirable. It may even generate perverse effects contrary to its goals.

This must become core to the renewal of social-market-economy thinking. It is worth remembering that there is no “evil capital” and “virtuous State.” No camp of good and camp of evil. This simplistic and dangerous Manichaeism is misleading. Capital and its institutional counterpart each follow their own logic of endless expansion—there, in terms of return, accumulation; here, in terms of control and power. Both feel, like living organisms, the vital need to grow. Yet both are necessary and complementary—so long as neither is allowed to dominate and destabilize the delicate balance required for progress.

The State’s Logic of Growth: Over-administration
We must think freely about the decades-long expansion in France of an omnipresent State that increasingly intermediates relations among individuals—that is, between individuals and society. This State exercises ever-tighter control over citizens and, in an entropic dynamic, develops an ever-heavier over-administration with diminishing returns.

This analysis is especially necessary in Europe—and more particularly in France—much more than in the United States. Over-administration breeds discouragement, nostalgia, and a sense of powerlessness. It also drives individuals to seek maximal advantage for themselves, or even, for some, to desire sedition or insubordination. Through its intrinsic logic of endless growth, over-administration infantilizes people and continually pushes them to demand ever more from the State. This inevitably leads to disappointment, which in turn fuels fear—even in the face of small problems—because the sense of personal responsibility has been eroded.

Too much State intervention atomizes individuals² and alienates them from their own capacity to act. An overintrusive State can undermine self-confidence and mutual trust. It hampers individual and collective action and weakens self-organized solidarity within society.

“Action is what enables human beings to appear before one another, to reveal themselves in their singularity, and to build a common world. When the State monopolizes this capacity, citizens are reduced to mere spectators.”
— Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition

In short, following Arendt’s insight, this dynamic erodes the necessary balance between individual and collective freedom and responsibility on the one hand, and necessary social regulation on the other. “The danger is not only in the violence of authoritarian regimes but also in the gradual slide into a soft, paternalistic administration that suffocates freedom under the pretext of protection.”

The Essential Combination of Ethics and Efficiency

Since the public sphere can err and tends to expand until its effectiveness collapses, the State must regain clarity of vision and vigour. It must avoid developing superfluous structures and refrain from generating unnecessary laws, rules and institutions. The public sphere must ensure the best possible balance between ethics and efficiency; neither belongs exclusively to the market or to the State. Their interplay is complex and interwoven. Ethics and efficiency belong together in companies and in society as a whole; neither can endure without the other.

Hyper-democracy

We must also question democracy’s natural trajectory—its endogenous dynamic—what I call hyper-democracy. Democracy can generate its own excesses. Tocqueville already warned of this. Without deep reflection on these tendencies, democracy can weaken itself and ultimately even disappear, paving the way for populism—whether far right or far left.

We cannot avoid reflecting on democracy’s own specific excesses: the endless expansion of individual rights, enforceable against everyone else, combined with the erosion of duties. This leads to extreme individualism, egoism, and fragmentary communautarisme. These are symptoms of total self-absorption. And ideologically, they are reinforced by the simplistic idea that everyone is necessarily either an oppressor or oppressed, with thought policed by new dogmas.

This produces hatred of the Other—those assigned as oppressors, burdened with indelible guilt. The oppressed, in turn, are deemed to be freed forever from duty or responsibility. Redemption for the “oppressor” is only possible through total re-education and self-denunciation. A fantasy reminiscent of totalitarianism.

All this hides behind totemic words, repeated endlessly—hollow words but mandatory, belonging to the “good” camp. Other words become shameful, forbidden. A police of morals, a police of thought. Wokisme is the caricature and most advanced expression of this distortion of democracy. It is not an extension of democracy, nor of progressivism. It is a new ideology of democratic excess, ultimately destructive of democracy itself.

Opposing wokisme—understood as the intolerant, totalitarian radicalization of progressive activism—is neither conservatism nor reaction. The defenders of the democratic, liberal, social-market model cannot leave the critique of wokisme to populists alone, at the risk of disappearing themselves. The American example is clear; so is that of today’s French Socialist Party, absorbed by NFP/LFI as the RN grows in parallel.

Other endogenous excesses also emerge from hyper-democracy: the quest for absolute equality, magical thinking that suffocates the very dynamism of society. As Tocqueville wrote: “There is no passion so fatal to man and society as the love of equality, which can debase individuals and lead them to prefer a common mediocrity over individual excellence.”

Without self-reflection and regulation, our model drifts fatally. We must reassess absolute equality, equality of rights, equality of opportunity, and fairness, along with their moral, economic and social implications.

Hyper-democracy leads to regression, the erosion of economic dynamism and well-being, financial collapse, and moral decay. It unleashes the lowest passions—jealousy, resentment, hatred—which are already at work.

Without renewed thinking about democracy’s endogenous excesses, about over-administration and its effects, about the legitimate republican need to restore public authority, and about better immigration regulation and integration, mistrust toward democracy will not diminish. The rise of populism does not originate solely in these factors, but it would be dangerous to deny that they are part of the cause.

A False “Progressivism” Concealing a True Regression

Benevolence—or blindness—toward the causes and consequences of these four trends does not constitute progressivism, despite its self-presentation. Quite the opposite. These phenomena confine, isolate, and provoke fatal regressions in relation to humanist and universalist values—always values of progress, responsibility, emancipation and harmony. Imperfectly realized, yes, but they have enabled societies to recognize and respect minorities without doing so at the expense of the majority. They have supported racial, gender and social equality, and facilitated equality of opportunity.

The combination of too much State with hyper-democracy creates a pernicious, destructive dynamic resolved only through limitless expansion of rights and the collapse of duties and responsibilities, as well as through declining effectiveness of socio-economic regulation. This generates societal mistrust toward institutions, politics, and others—in short, toward society itself. And ultimately, it drives unsustainable public debt.

A society with a social market economy must ensure essential protection for the most vulnerable while balancing this with individual and collective responsibility. The welfare state is essential, but it cannot and must not attempt to protect from everything, without limit, at the cost of widespread disempowerment.

Tocqueville again: “The sovereign extends its arms over society as a whole; it covers its surface with a network of small, complicated, minute, uniform rules… it does not break wills, but it softens and bends them… until each nation is reduced to nothing more than a flock of timid, industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.”

The Survival of the Social Market Economy Model

The proper balance—the viable equilibrium—has been broken. This endangers the welfare state itself, and thus the precious social protection it provides.

The present analysis questions whether democracy, social democracy, and the public sphere can avoid entropic decline and stabilize at an equilibrium combining justice (ethics), efficiency (wealth creation), and economic and social well-being.

This is a matter of survival for our European socio-economic model. With specifically French shortcomings making the system increasingly inefficient, our regulatory model will sooner or later become incapable of reproducing itself—incapable of surviving. If renewal does not come in time, the consequences will be widespread impoverishment and a moral and financial collapse.

The reflection must therefore continue. How can we design mechanisms that limit these excesses? How can we restore the vital equilibria that allow our societies to survive and regain vitality?

That is the challenge. It is a fundamental question for our future, our “model,” our Europe, and our country.

Olivier Klein
Professor of economics at HEC Paris