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“The financial crisis : lessons and outlook”,

The recent financial crisis, the consequences of which are still being felt today in the form of little or no growth in various regions around the world, was of a severity unseen since the Second World War. The lessons we can learn from it and the uncertain outlook force us to look back at the causes of the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009, and to the idiosyncratic causes of the eurozone crisis. We may then attempt to establish some lessons for the future and consider whether the crisis has actually been resolved or whether it is likely to rear its head once again.

CAUSES OF THE 2007-2009 FINANCIAL CRISIS

First contextual factor: the vital intervention of the Federal Reserve System (the “Fed”) of the United States and of other central banks following the major stock market crash of 2000-2003 led to an environment of low rates until 2004. A severe global recession was thus avoided. However, this focus on interest rates did not in fact support the stock market but rather the property market. Via a wealth-creation effect this support enabled the U.S. consumer to become the “consumer of last resort”. And so, between late 2003 and early 2004, growth resumed.

Second contextual factor: globalisation can also help to explain the 2007-2009 crisis. This is clearly the result of emerging economies who from the early 2000s were opting for a very different development strategy to that followed previously by the Asian countries, a strategy which had failed with the crisis of 1997-1998. This strategy, based on domestic consumption, had struggled with current account constraints in the face of a very sharp turnaround in the capital markets which had previously been flying a little too high. In 1997 we suddenly found ourselves in the midst of widespread panic, with capital that had been invested short-term in emerging economies in search of higher returns being withdrawn. The emerging economies, those in Asia in particular, learned their lesson and sought an alternative, more favourable, path to development. And so they adopted an export-based model, seeking out demand in developed countries.

This choice was entirely legitimate and rationally based on their comparative advantages owing to low labour costs, meaning that they could offer very competitive prices on certain product ranges. This new model was also developed by many and by China in particular on the basis of an undervalued currency, facilitating their exports and thus supporting their growth dynamic. During the 2000s, the production capacity of emerging economies increased sharply, but demand did not keep up. Subsequently, global supply found itself in a position of significant production overcapacity because, while developed countries were seeing their own production in certain product ranges being challenged, they clearly did not reduce their own production levels accordingly.

Global supply of goods and services again found itself superior to demand, a by-product of which was very high levels of global savings, far exceeding investment. This concept was assigned the term savings glut by Ben Bernanke, former chairman of the Fed, while he was still a professor.

Effectively, the emerging economies were piling up savings because they had low consumption levels and increasing revenue. This enabled them to generate substantial savings surpluses that were not sufficiently absorbed by an increase in domestic investment. Interest rates were therefore structurally low because global financing capacity was superior to financing requirements.

At the same time, real wages in developed countries were seeing little or no increase, because the global wage competition in certain sectors of activity and the associated product ranges prevented regular increases in purchasing power. This stagnation once again led to low inflation and very low interest rates.

Third contextual factor: the automatic refinancing of the American current account deficit, as the counterpart of the aforementioned factors. While China, the oil-producing countries and other emerging economies were, as we have seen, expanding their growth through higher exports, with domestic consumption still weak, they were also seeing growing current account balance of payments surpluses. Meanwhile the United States was experiencing increasing deficits in its current account balances.

With the exchange rates of emerging economies deliberately kept low, the deficits of the United States were accentuated further. But these were no obstacle for one very simple reason: while the Chinese were accumulating foreign exchange reserves through current account surpluses, they were investing them in the United States. This capital was therefore spontaneously going back to the U.S. and being used to finance the increase in American debt (private, company and public debt).

There was a kind of automatic recycling of the surpluses from the emerging economies towards the deficit countries and, primarily, towards the United States. Here again, long-term rates therefore remained very low because the additional American debt was refinanced without difficulty or pressure. And, since early 2004, as growth returned, while the Fed increased its short-term rates quite significantly, up to 5%, long-term rates saw little or no increase. This historic decorrelation between long-term rates and short-term rates was referred to as a conundrum, or enigma, by Greenspan, the then chairman of the Fed: how is it that, while the Fed is significantly increasing its short-term rates, the long-term rates do not rise automatically? The answer was probably not so enigmatic, as we have seen.

The consequence for private borrowers was a situation of debt facilitated by the fact that rates were lower than the nominal growth rate from 2003 to 2007. In a way, it all played out as though the global overproduction borne from unregulated globalisation had been masked by the growth of consumption in developed countries, except that it was based on a progressively unsustainable debt situation, resulting in a genuine situation of over-indebtedness. The overall increase of debt against a backdrop of stagnant purchasing power in the developed countries thus supported, albeit artificially, the levels of growth which otherwise could never have been achieved.

Household debt in the United States in 2000 was equal to 100% of disposal income; by 2007, it had reached 140%. Over the same period, it went from 100% to 170% in Spain and Great Britain, from 55% to 70% in France and from 65% to 85% in the eurozone. The only country where this increase did not occur was Germany: 70% in 2000, and the same in 2007. Corporate debt also increased significantly between 2000 and 2007 in the same countries.

With the return to growth from 2004, borrowers and lenders alike entered a euphoric phase, leaving traditional prudential regulation behind them. Debt levels far surpassed historical averages, and risk premiums were dangerously low, as in any credit bubble. This was the effect of a well-known cognitive bias known as “disaster myopia”. What happens is the more we move on from the last big crisis, the more we forget that a new, large-scale crisis could occur, just as we forget the potentially disastrous consequences. The more time passes, the higher the likelihood of the return of a catastrophic crisis. As a result, we gradually accumulate more financial debt, and enter into fragile situations that later will reveal themselves as dangerous when the bubble bursts at the end of the euphoric phase. The banks, but also other lenders, relax their criteria for granting credit, request fewer guarantees and accept lower margins. Selection becomes less rigorous and leverage increases.

Add to that the fact that since the mid-1990s, and even more so in the 2000s, one phenomenon facilitated this debt situation: securitisation. This consists of taking loans from the balance sheets of banks and selling them to investors, who then sold them indirectly to individuals and companies. From 2005, securitisation experienced exponential growth, particularly at American banks.

Unregulated securitisation was rife. There was increased securitisation of various kinds of assets, securitisation of already securitised debt, etc.

The complexity added to a lack of transparency made it very difficult to assess the true value of these investments.

In addition, securitisation allowed certain banks to feel that they held no responsibility for the credit they were approving. In fact, if a bank granted a loan that it then securitised and sold soon after, it could excuse itself from any serious risk analysis of the borrower and any monitoring of the customer account. It is part of the economic role of banks to monitor and advise customers, ensuring that they do not overcommit themselves, whether the customer is a business or an individual. In certain types of bank, what is known as “moral hazard” conduct became common practice, where the banks’ own actions produce additional risk for the overall economic system.

Lastly, the spreading of securitised packages among investors who were not so well-informed, as well as those who were supposedly informed, led to a general uncertainty over who bore the risk and what where the systemic and other effects of the situation. In the end, the effect of spreading meant that there was no longer any prudential supervision. Traditional economic and financial theory, which assumes that a wide distribution of risk is better and more easily managed than risk concentrated within supervised and licensed banks, has turned out to be completely false. Evermore sophisticated arrangements (CDOs[1], CDOs of CDOs, etc.) have enabled numerous investment banks to rake in increasing income, since they were the ones who performed the financial engineering that made these arrangements possible.

In the U.S., securitisation culminated in the development of subprime lending. In many cases, mortgages were offered to people who did not have the income to repay them. These were known as NINJA loans; no income, no job, no asset. It all rested on the idea that the property would see a permanent increase in value, and to repay the loan it would suffice to sell the property. Regular household income did not need to be considered. When these securitisations were revealed as problematic, the holders of these securitisation vehicles who were seeking repayment from the debtor found that in some cases the relevant contractual documentation did not even exist. So it wasn’t just a case of no income, no job, no asset, but sometimes no document either.

The investors, whether individuals or specialists, had been caught out by a classic cognitive bias: the anchoring effect. Up until the end of the 1980s, long-term interest rates were at very high levels. The 1990s and 2000s saw rates falling, regularly and steeply. Investors believed (this is the anchoring effect) they could achieve rates of return far higher than those being offered to them and which were compatible with the economic growth rate and the rate of inflation. When they were not offered what they considered sufficient rates of return, they did not try to understand how these “abnormal” rates of return had been possible, and hence blindly ignored the level of risk involved in any given investment, such as high debt levels or cascading debt, for example. Some companies agreed to increase their debt level in order to show a rate of return on their shares (ROE – return on equities) that would meet investor expectations, sometimes even resorting to accounting or financial acrobatics.

The period between 2003-2004 and 2007 was therefore a euphoric phase, similar in reality to the euphoric phases of the 19th century or the first half of the 20th century. They consisted of credit bubbles, property bubbles and/or stock market bubbles. In the recent crisis, there was both a property bubble and a credit bubble that were self-sustaining. During all euphoric phases, we grow increasingly blind to disaster and preventative behaviour diminishes over time, thus accelerating the very possibility of a return of the crisis.

To conclude this first section, we have seen that the 2007-2009 crisis is very much a case of history repeating itself, exacerbated by a new factor, in this case, securitisation. The property crisis was like no other, particularly in the United States, the UK and Spain. Simultaneously, we had a debt and leverage crisis, followed naturally by a general phase of debt reduction and deleveraging, which still continues today. If this is anything like similar situations in the past, growth should remain low for some time to come.

Added to which, a major liquidity crisis erupted, intertwined with the property crisis, credit crisis and the debt crisis. In fact, 2008 saw a liquidity crisis of unprecedented force. Faced with the basic uncertainty of who held what and the very content of the securitisation instruments, the interbank market, in particular, completely froze. Had the central banks not intervened so heavily, there would have been no more banks. A very serious liquidity crisis also occurred in 2010-2011 affecting the eurozone banks, but for other reasons (see below).

Poorly regulated financial globalisation, which began in the early 1980s, led to the reappearance and repetition from 1987 of systemic crises all intermingled with the three types of financial crisis mentioned above (speculative market crisis, credit or debt crisis and liquidity crisis).

 ANALYSIS OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS

You could be forgiven for thinking that the eurozone crisis was the consequence of the preceding global financial crisis. However we do not believe this to be entirely true. That said, some of the arguments are true: public debt increased after the 2008-2009 crisis because, on the one hand, certain governments contributed money to their banks in order to save them and, on the other hand, some governments, legitimately enough, attempted to combat the collapse of growth through countercyclical fiscal policy.

However, in some European countries, this increased spending only added to a pre-existing downward spiral of public finance deficits. France, for example, has not had a balanced budget since 1974. The effectiveness of fiscal policy and the value of public deficits are well proven, but on one condition: that these deficits are temporary. In other words, when the economic situation improves, the deficits become surpluses. This policy allows for debt when needed, but requires that the debt is repaid when times are better. In reality, permanent deficits undermine fiscal policy because, when public debt levels are too high, fiscal power can no longer be used.

But if the public debt crisis in the eurozone was not simply the consequence of the preceding financial crisis, it is because the same increase in public debt rates, following that of private debt rates, did not pose the same fundamental problems in the United States, Japan, or elsewhere. This was a problem unique to the eurozone. In fact, as a consolidated entity, the eurozone did not have a problem. Its position would even have been slightly better than that of the United States and significantly better than that of Japan. So why did it experience this specific crisis from 2010?

The creation of the eurozone was a very interesting and promising gamble, provided that either it pursued the vital ingredients that were missing, or that it granted entry only to countries experiencing sustainable, strong, economic convergence. There were therefore two schools of thought around the creation of the euro. The first imagined, in line with the creation of Europe from the outset, that economic advances would generate essential political advances. In fact, if a monetary zone incorporates countries that are not all similar in terms of their economic level and development, in order for such a monetary zone to function efficiently in the long-term, it is essential that it maintains the following three attributes:

  • coordination of the economic policies of the member countries of the monetary zone;
  • a system of fiscal transfers, as in the United States for example, that allows assistance to be given to a state in temporary difficulty, thanks to the existence of a federal budget;
  • workforce mobility between different countries in accordance with changes in their economic circumstances, so as not to have a situation of high and long-standing unemployment in those countries experiencing a difficult economic environment.

Under these conditions, the creation of a single currency facilitates both trade within the zone and the stability of expectations of economic players. But above all, the key point is to analyse the current account balance at the borders of the monetary zone and not of each of the member states. This would mean that the growth of a particular state would not be automatically restricted if it is in a more favourable economic position than the others, due to its demography for instance. Whereas if the external constraint applies to the borders of this state, a growth differential would immediately result in a deficit in the current account balance that would sooner or later, in the absence of a devaluation, require a restrictive policy to restore the balance between its imports and exports. This is a good example of what happens between the various states of the United States of America.

The eurozone, unfortunately, does not have any of these attributes:

  • with regard to the coordination of economic policies, in Europe, there is no economic government. France is virtually the only country that seems in favour of a European economic government, regardless of which government is in power in France. There is therefore strictly speaking, no established coordination of economic policies that would allow for, as the case may be, recovery in Germany, while the countries of the south were forced to slow down so as to restore their budget and current account balances, thereby reducing the economic and social effects of this slow-down;
  • with regard to budgetary transfers, the European budget represents approximately 1% of the GDP of the European Union. The countries and their populations do not feel united and are not accepting of the idea of a transfer necessary for the smooth running of the monetary zone. Obviously, for such transfers to occur, one essential yet insufficient condition is to implement federal supervision of national budgets. In fact, no population can be united if it thinks that this union is without foundation, or even that it may encourage other populations to act without self-discipline, or favour morally hazardous behaviour. But in Europe it is clear, both due to historic reasons and certainly political will, that there is a shortage of any desire to share or the desire for solidarity between nations, facilitated by a feeling of belonging to the same community of interest;
  • with regard to workforce mobility in Europe, this is restricted by varying tax and social legislation (including unemployment benefit rules), but also because of language barriers; in the United States, the fact that everyone speaks English facilitates mobility.

Without workforce mobility, without coordination of economic policies, without budgetary transfers and without the possibility of currency devaluation, the sole method of adjustment, in the event of an asymmetric shock between countries of the zone, is for a country in difficulty to find the lowest costing social, economic and regulatory solutions. This policy amounts to internal devaluation, since adjustment through exchange rate movement is no longer possible. If several countries are in the same situation at the same time, this method of regulation and adjustment then leads to a lack of sustainable growth in the zone as well as to medium or long-term social and political difficulties given the continuous obligation to adjust from the bottom up. Internal devaluation can also have a depressive effect since it reduces revenue without reducing debt, in the same way a devaluation would with a foreign currency debt.

This does not mean that in a full monetary union, countries could afford to become lax, or that they may be exempt from structural reforms essential to the pursuit of competitiveness and to the boosting of their growth potential. Full monetary union would not exonerate them from taking steps to address the unsustainable nature of their deficits and public debts. But if we assume that all countries had completed their structural reforms, it would still remain true that a partial monetary union, i.e. one without the attributes listed above, would inevitably lead to deflationary pressures within the union. The eurozone is incomplete and upholds this dangerous bias.

The second school of thought on the creation of the eurozone was based on the assumption that any form of federalism was either undesirable, or unrealistic. The attributes of a complete eurozone were therefore, according to this idea, not possible. The solution thus consisted of ensuring that all participating countries were similar and were in the same economic position. It was necessary also that they respect the convergence criteria (relating to rates of inflation, public deficits and public debt), both at the time of entry into the union and subsequently. By doing so, this school of thought itself made several errors, which have been borne out over time.

The first error was to allow entry into the zone of countries that were neither economically nor structurally convergent, either because they had “organised” their statistics without anyone knowing, or because they did so and people were indeed aware.

The second error was the failure to understand that a monetary union would likely lead to industrial polarisation. By the very definition of a single currency, there is no longer any exchange rate variation between the participating countries. Consequently, companies can opt to produce in only one country of the zone, and profit from the best conditions. These companies no longer need to directly establish themselves in the major countries to avoid suffering from exchange rate fluctuations that could be detrimental to the competitiveness of their factories or production sites. It should also be added that a single monetary policy for countries who are experiencing divergent situations could aggravate this divergence. In Spain for instance, where rates of growth and inflation were higher than in Germany, the interest rate set by the European Central Bank (ECB) for the entire zone was at a lower level than was ideal for Spain, which allowed for pain-free debt and notably stimulated the property bubble. Over a long period of time, the growth rate there was driven ever higher by the increase in both household and corporate debt.

The third error consisted of believing that the markets could be the guardians of orthodoxy of the public finances and of states’ current accounts. Instead we have experienced failure of the markets. The financial markets, contrary to traditional theory, are not omniscient. They are not wrong all the time, but they are repeatedly wrong. In this case, with the creation of the eurozone, they believed that the Greek or Spanish current account balances did not need to be supervised as such. So they converged the long-term rates of all the countries of the zone towards the German rate.

As a result, there was no warning shot from the markets, no caution about the unsustainable trajectories of certain countries of the zone. The markets did not play their part. If, prior to the onset of the crisis, they had raised alarm bells by increasing long-term interest rates to warn that the risk was increasing due to domestic debt and a current account deficit that was hard to sustain, macrofinancial constraint could have been exercised in advance and avoided the crisis, either in part or in whole. It was only in 2010 that the markets eventually took notice of the growing divergence in the eurozone and its inability to self-regulate.

Both schools of thought had therefore failed. And none of the public authorities within the eurozone had anticipated such a situation, and therefore had no plans for how to handle it. As a result, the Greek crisis was ignored for far too long. Subsequently, once it was recognised as a serious problem, too much time had elapsed, and it was too late.

But above all, due to the absence of the aforementioned attributes that contribute to a full monetary union, we have not seen any viable economic coordination, nor any transfers of public subsidies from better off countries to less well-off countries. Beyond the specific matter of Greece, which had shown little respect for basic rules or good economic sense, the only method of adjustment within the eurozone was therefore revealed to be considerable efforts from each country in difficulty to reduce public spending, increase the tax burden and re-establish competitiveness through devaluation within the zone. In other words, through an overall reduction in costs. These efforts certainly led to a decrease in demand, which in turn rapidly led to a reduction in imports and, as a result, a drastic reduction in the current deficit. But this type of policy, if employed in several countries at the same time, as we have seen, inevitably results in an overall slow-down of growth. And yet tax revenue is a function of growth.

We have therefore seen a frenzied dash to reduce public spending combined with a compression of costs and an increase in taxes, alongside reduced tax revenues caused by the slowdown in growth. This observation does not mean that structural reforms were not strictly vital for the countries concerned, since only these reforms were likely to boost growth potential and fundamentally sanitise the situation, shifting from growth driven by debt to growth based on productivity gains, innovation and the mobilisation of the working population. Nevertheless, these structural reforms, in order to be accepted and successful, must be accompanied by a short-term economic policy which is not in itself depressive.

The eurozone, in the face of a lack of institutions enabling regulation, saw the introduction of two vicious circles.

The first vicious circle was that of public debt and interest rates. The domestic competitive devaluation policies and the fall in public spending, as described above, resulted in reduced demand and slower growth, meaning that taxes could not be collected at expected levels and budgetary deficits were therefore not reduced as hoped. As public debt continued to increase, the financial markets increased their distrust in the sustainability of the trajectory of public finances of the countries in question. The long-term interest rates of these countries therefore had to be drastically increased, encouraging a spiralling increase of their public deficits, with the governments having to borrow at increasingly higher cost. The first vicious circle thus came to its inevitable conclusion.

The second vicious circle linked the governments to the banks. European banks in general hold the debts of their own state, but also those of other states within the zone due to the financial integration produced by the creation of the eurozone. When certain states are considered to have a heavy debt burden, the corresponding assets of the banks are considered potentially toxic. And so the vicious circle keeps spinning: the financial markets do not trust the banks in question and lend to them either at higher rates or reduced amounts, thereby making them weaker. The states thus appear further weakened since they are eventually obliged to save their own banks. This weakening leads to further mistrust of these same banks.

We have escaped the clutches of these two vicious circles thanks to two measures. The first measure was taken by Mario Draghi who committed to a huge liquidity distribution programme to the European banks (VLTRO – very long-term refinancing operations) and then, in summer 2012 announced that the ECB would buy the public debt of eurozone states if their interest rates were too high and speculatively moving away from their equilibrium ratio (Mario Draghi added: “Whatever it takes.”).” By making this announcement, the President of the ECB successfully kept the markets under control, thus allowing the long-term interest rates of the countries in difficulty to return to a more sustainable trajectory, and a level closer to that of nominal economic growth. We must highlight however, that the ECB holds significantly less member state public debt than the Bank of England or the Fed.

The second measure was the introduction of European banking union. This consists of three elements. Firstly, for solidarity to function properly, it must accept supervision at federal level. This is why the supervision of the major European banks has moved from national level to federal level, at the headquarters of the ECB in Frankfurt. Solidarity itself operates on two levels. Once the bail-in rules have been applied, i.e. the bail-out of banks in difficulty by their own shareholders and creditors, a mutual fund may be established between European banks to save a bank that is still suffering from serious difficulties. The second pillar of solidarity: an interbank guarantee fund for customer deposits.

 LESSONS AND OUTLOOK

Do we believe that all the fundamental problems of the eurozone have been resolved? Short-term confidence is not inappropriate, largely because the ECB is convincing in its intention to intervene should the situation worsen. Furthermore, in January 2015 it launched a programme of quantitative easing that will mean public debt rates are sustainably maintained at very low levels, with the aim of supporting a return to growth and trying to ensure that the eurozone does not fall into deflation.

That said, could all the countries of the eurozone, with some help, manage to recover their position thanks to the time bought for them by Mario Draghi? Many so-called “peripheral” countries of the eurozone have significantly repaired their current account balances. Time seems to be acting in their favour. But if we take a closer look, as we have seen before it is actually the drop in demand that is the key factor.

The restructuring of production resources and re-industrialisation, if it happens, will be slow going. The debt reduction of economic players, both private and public, also takes time. The consequences are a very low level of growth for a significant amount of time, with correlated unemployment rates. The questions therefore relate to citizens’ patience with regard to these long-term phenomena. The observed rise of populism and an anti-European sentiment is no surprise. Once again, it is not a case of underestimating the strictly essential structural reforms that have been postponed for too long, but of underlining the difficulty of simultaneously and quickly reducing spending and debt in a number of countries.

The eurozone, still incomplete, has not yet found a satisfactory method of regulation. All the factors described above that lead to structurally sluggish growth remain present. But what would happen if growth began to increase in a country that practised austerity without having rebuilt its production resources? Its current account balance would rapidly destabilise once again, with imports growing more rapidly than exports. This imbalance would very soon force it to re-establish slow-down policies so as to avoid being faced once again with the difficult, if not impossible, financing of its current account deficit by the rest of the world.

It therefore seems that, for the eurozone, the solution lies in its completion. Implementation first and foremost of genuine coordination of economic policies would allow for recovery in some areas and slow-down in others, as appropriate, thereby facilitating the fine-tuning of the entire zone. The signing of the European monetary union treaty (TSCG – treaty on stability, coordination and governance) does not address this possibility, despite its title. It is therefore necessary to extend the treaty and to give it its intended force.

An organised and conditional transfer of public revenue between eurozone countries, i.e. an agreed partial sharing of public levies, as in the United States – from those states that are doing well to those experiencing temporary difficulty – would also be an essential element of the system. A community loan to, for example, fund investments in the eurozone as a whole and for which the member states would be jointly liable would serve this purpose. But it is very unlikely that this will occur at the current stage of European integration, since it would mean a genuine degree of federalism.

And this is where we encounter the root causes of why the single currency is not complete: the absence of a true federal level, with a federal government and federal-level debt. This absence is clearly due to the existence of national sovereignty and the non-existence of European sovereignty, in conjunction with European citizens’ lack of sense of belonging to the same community. The historic construction of the continent did not create the United States of Europe. It is also essential to believe that palliative arrangements are feasible, without expecting an unlikely federalism to emerge in the short or medium-term.

A funding mechanism for the current account deficits of some by the current account surpluses of others should thus be established, with an a priori commitment by deficit countries to repay their debts. Without risk of a market crisis this mechanism would allow the financing of one state’s current account deficits by the surpluses of others; as such it would mean that external constraints were felt only at the borders of the eurozone. This would be a powerful driver of growth in the zone, because any one country requiring more growth than another, for adjustment or demographic reasons for example, would not be forced into adjusting its activity in line with those countries who do not have this necessity[2].

But even mechanisms such as these, in the absence of the sense of shared community interest, require strict conditions for application. As with intrazone funding mechanisms, transfers require fiscal policies to be supervised by a democratically elected body that acts as a representative for the countries that make up the said economic and monetary area. It is not possible to have solidarity without both a priori and a posteriori supervision. Mutual confidence is required in order for a policy and practice such as this to be established. To establish integration, reassurance is required that unacceptable behaviour and moral hazards cannot occur. This is much the case today, provided that certain, and in some cases substantial, improvements are made. The TSCG, which entered into force in 2013, requires the budget of each country to be in balance or in surplus, with a structural deficit no more than 0.5% or 1% depending on its debt-to-GDP ratio, and specifies an adjustment path should these be exceeded. Non-compliance will be fined.

But this is not sufficient. It is equally vital that these transfer or funding mechanisms organised ex ante, and not just during the crisis, are themselves conditionally activated. In the spirit of the above, it is not feasible to imagine that countries are going to finance, subsidise even, other nations that may experience a sustainable increase in spending compared to their revenue, i.e. a permanent current account deficit, and are not able to meet the structural deficit rules outlined above. Furthermore, within countries of non-homogenous national communities, such tension may exist between different regions officially belonging to the same national framework (Italy, Belgium, etc.). It is therefore essential that the said transfers or funding mechanisms are conditional, for some countries, on policies or structural reforms allowing for an increase of their potential growth level. These policies are listed in detail elsewhere and are not austerity policies: labour market reform, pension system reform, reform of public systems to ensure efficiency of costs in relation to quality attained…

Lastly, a monetary zone naturally leads to industrial polarisation, as mentioned above. If we do not ultimately want to see entire regions of the eurozone be permanently dependent upon the transfers of others, it is likely that, aside from the structural policies to be implemented nationally, a truly modern and motivating industrial policy will be essential at supranational level, such that clusters of competitiveness may form and be maintained in all the major regions of the zone. These clusters would allow all countries to benefit from competitive and exportable industries and services, and would ensure a minimum level of attractiveness for the various regions.

Because the European countries do not constitute a nation, some believe that the necessary sense of belonging to the same community will always be lacking in order to forge the acceptance of solidarity, even if the strict conditions above are met. If this is true, there would be no option but to turn back on European integration and wipe from history the mistake in such a scenario of the birth of the eurozone and, at best and where possible, to imagine a different, more realistic, configuration. This argument, albeit unappetising, must not be dismissed, for we have seen for some years now certain populations being forced into austerity and emerging politically as potentially dangerous and radical, Greece being a paroxysmal example. Similarly, we are also seeing so-called “Northern” populations dismissing any idea of having to fund ad vitam aeternam the so-called “Southern” countries, purported to be not quite as industrious as themselves.

Which is why the modest suggestions made here should be considered without delay and in depth, in order to avoid both the unrealism of the construction of the United States of Europe and the self-dissipation of what has been created thus far. As we have already seen, the temptation of mandatory intrazone homogeneity, through uniform technical rules, has already demonstrated the extreme difficulties it would cause.

Various recently introduced factors (actions of the ECB, European banking union, ESM – European Stability Mechanism – TSCG, etc.) already mentioned constitute steps in the right direction, but for the most part have not been seen through to completion. Even in combination, they do not form a satisfactory structure. It therefore remains, where applicable, to identify those countries likely to participate in an updated eurozone, based on the acceptance of a method of regulation such as the one presented here, and to clarify the mechanisms and institutions specific to such a monetary zone as opposed to those that apply to the European Union as a whole.

In conclusion, will we see more financial crises? Our opinion is that they are inevitable in the world as it stands today. On one hand, because finance is intrinsically unstable. For the last thirty years we have experienced financial cycles in which euphoric phases are followed by credit bubbles, affecting the price of capital assets – shares and property in particular – followed by depressive phases and the bursting of the very same bubbles. Leading to serious liquidity crises, these depressive phases can result in major financial crises. Financial and banking regulation is therefore absolutely essential. But assuming that this is fully effective, it would probably just bridge the gap between the highs and the lows, but not eliminate the sequence of phases.

On the other hand, prudential regulations themselves are not free from error. They often try to put right the causes of the previous crisis but underestimate the potential causes of future crises. Lastly, certain excessive or poorly judged regulations could themselves even increase the cyclical nature of finance, or even contribute to the next crises.

In our opinion it is both possible and necessary to alleviate financial instability with the right measures and good regulation, especially macroprudential regulation, but it is misleading to pretend that we can eliminate it. Similarly, banking regulation is absolutely essential, but it would be dangerous to try to reduce the level of risk that they take, since their economic and social usefulness resides in the fact that they do take risks – with credit, with interest rates, liquidity, etc. – and that they manage these risks professionally and under supervision. It would no doubt cause greater instability should these risks be pushed outside the realm of banks, into shadow banking or hedge funds over which there is little or no control or, by means of securitisation, onto the companies and households that are not equipped to manage them.

[1] A CDO (collateralized debt obligation) is a securitisation vehicle.

[2] The recent option for the ECB to buy government securities, as with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), an international financial institution which became operational in 2013 for the granting of loans to countries in difficulty, are both pointing in the right direction, however their ability to be of manifest use in good time remains unclear.

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THE FINANCIAL CRISIS LESSONS AND OUTLOOK – Revue financière mars 2015

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Bank Economical and financial crisis

Financial crisis : something old, something new

Financial crisis follows financial crisis, each one originating and playing out in fundamentally similar ways, while also displaying some unique characteristics. Every financial crisis takes at least one of the three classic forms that have been regularly observed from the 19th century to the present day. They often take the three forms in turn or simultaneously. The following analysis is inspired by the work of Michel Aglietta and economists from the Bank of International Settlements.

The first form of any banking crisis, past or present – we could even say it is the oldest form of crisis – is the speculative crisis. How is it that assets (shares, property, gold, etc.) can become the subject of speculative bubbles? It is because their prices, unlike those of reproducible industrial or commercial goods or services, do not depend on their cost price, or what economists call their marginal cost. That is why they can diverge so significantly from their manufacturing cost.

Asymmetries

The price of a financial asset is ultimately a function of the confidence that people have in the promise of future earnings it could yield, a promise made by the issuer. But determining the price also requires each player to anticipate how much confidence others will have in that promise. Everyone is thinking along the same lines.

As long as information is not readily shared (between the lender and the borrower, the shareholder and management, or between market players themselves) and the future remains highly uncertain, these informational asymmetries and this fundamental uncertainty drives players to imitate one another. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to ascertain the intrinsic value of the asset in question and thus to bet on it. In this case, the market is dictated by others, as it is a pure product of the majority opinion that emerges. Players imitate each other rationally in an effort to anticipate and play on market trends, and this process is entirely self-referential. That is how strong, long-lasting speculative bubbles arise. These bubbles end by bursting suddenly when the majority opinion swings in the opposite direction, in an even more dramatic fashion than during the previous phase.

The market is a pure product of the majority opinion that emerges.

Euphoria

The second form, a credit crisis, occurs when a long period of growth causes everyone (banks and borrowers) to gradually forget the possibility of a crisis and to believe that there is no limit to the expansion. During this euphoric phase, lenders dangerously lower their sensitivity to risk and leveraging (the ratio of debt to wealth or income for households or net assets for companies) reaches levels that any objective observer would consider inadvisable. And this phenomenon is further amplified when lenders stop evaluating borrower solvability on the basis of their likely future earnings and begin using the metric of the expected value of the financed assets (especially shares or property) or of those that are used for collateral.

During this phase they also accept margins that will not cover the future cost of risk for the credit in order to compete with others. The financial situation of these economic actors proves to be extremely exposed when the reversal occurs. Then, when the crisis finally arrives, lenders (banks and markets) have an extreme change of heart in terms of their willingness to take on risk, and they run to the opposite extreme in terms of volume and margins, until a credit crunch occurs, further worsening the economic crisis that caused it.

Distrust

The third classic form of crisis: a liquidity crisis. During the dramatic events of financial crises, a contagious sort of distrust takes hold. This is typical of the financial and banking crises we know today. For some banks, this distrust leads their customers to withdraw their money in what experts call a bank run, causing the bank to fail.

It can also cause banks to slow down or even stop lending to each other altogether, fearing a chain reaction of failures. This illiquidity in the market for interbank financing – unless central banks intervene as lenders of last resort – produces the very failures they feared. There are other forms of illiquidity that can occur. Some financial markets go from being liquid one day to illiquid the next, due to the fact that the idea of market liquidity is again highly self-referential, as an analysis by André Orléan shows. A market is only liquid if the players think it is. If they begin to doubt its liquidity, all the players will try to sell so they can exit the market, and by doing so they cause the illiquidity problem from within. In the current crisis, the most emblematic case is the market for ABS (asset-backed securities).

A market is only liquid if the players think it is.

One Thing Leads to Another

These types of crises often intersect and join forces to create an extremely serious situation. For instance, credit can expand too rapidly, through abnormally high growth in the prices for the assets being used as collateral for these loans. This makes asset prices balloon, as additional purchases are made possible by these easily obtained loans. That is when a self-fulfilling and potentially long-lasting phenomenon takes hold with markets that are unable to return by themselves to “normal” levels. By the same token, the liquidity crisis may be caused by a sudden panic about the value of the bank bonds and financial assets held by financial institutions.

Looking for liquidity, banks invest less in the economy and attempt to sell off their assets. In turn, this fans the flames of the speculative crisis and the credit crisis. The devastating crisis that began in earnest in 2007 is, like previous crises, a combination of all three of these forms. It first began as a speculative housing bubble, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain. Then it became a credit crisis caused by a dangerous rise in household debt levels in these same countries and overleveraged investment banks, LBOs and hedge funds. And finally it turned into a liquidity crisis in securitisation and interbank financing markets resulting from the after-effects of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Each crisis aggravated the others in a self-perpetuating cycle.

Hidden Aspects

What makes the current crisis unique is the rapid development in the last few years of securitised debt instruments.
Through securitisation, credit institutions were able to transfer debt instruments for individuals, companies and even municipalities off their balance sheets. These instruments were then haphazardly combined into bundles into that were themselves overleveraged; these were then sold to other banks, to insurers and to investment funds, in short, to anyone and everyone.

Securitisation helped increase the financing of the global economy, as it enabled banks to grant more loans than they would have been able to if the loans had remained on their balance sheets. But this technique led the banks who used it the most (notably in the United States) to significantly lower their standards for selecting and monitoring borrowers and to provide loans to agents that were increasingly insolvent, because once they were securitised the loans no longer posed a threat to the banks. That is how the number of subprime loans proliferated, which further amplified the credit crisis that hit after the housing bubble burst.

Unregulated securitisation significantly aggravated the credit and liquidity crises. The fact that the loans were so difficult to track and the practice of bundling good and bad loans into the same securities, along with the opacity and complexity of the securitised instruments (CDOs made of CDOs, etc.), expanded the scope of the crisis as well. As the players involved no longer had any confidence in the quality of these kinds of investments, or even in their own understanding of them, liquidity was suddenly brought to a halt. Fears about the assets held on bank and insurer balance sheets caused a liquidity crisis in one fell swoop, especially for interbank lending, on a level that many had thought would never be seen again. Governments found themselves faced with the increasingly difficult task of solving these problems. The first lesson to take away from this has to do with the unregulated boom in securitisation and the role this mechanism should play for banking in the future.

Deception

Ratings agencies also played a huge role, as they gave the highest rating (AAA) to tranches of these instruments based on mathematical models that used poorly understood restrictive assumptions and solely analysed past series. This rating proved to be essentially worthless as the crisis unfolded. These ratings, which did not cover the liquidity risk, led many investors, including banks, to falsely reassure themselves about the quality of their financial assets, without thinking too deeply about how an AAA-rated investment could offer such a high rate of return. Reforms are needed to ensure that these agencies can re-establish objectivity in their work and the credibility that they need to survive.

The combination of the three classic forms of financial crises and the unique features of the current crisis explain the extreme gravity of the situation, involving distressed banks, panicked investors, an ongoing credit crunch and a severe economic crisis. Only strong measures from public authorities, at a time when players have no faith in anyone else, have been able to begin to relax the interbank market and prevent the entire financial system from imploding. Now is the time to act to counter the economic consequences of the financial and banking crisis and to prevent us from finding ourselves in a similarly dire situation again in the near future.

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Economical and financial crisis Global economy

What reforms are needed to keep under control financial instability?

Today, two obvious facts clash. In the first instance, financial markets are not self-regulating. In global and deregulated finance, they lead unavoidably to crises which are violent to a greater or lesser degree and which intensify, or even spark cycles in the real economy, as much in their euphoric stages as in periods of depression. The second fact is the essential character of these same markets which allow for the reallocation of risks (interest or exchange rates, for example) and which allow, in tandem with the banks, the adaptation of the needs and capacities of global finance. Today the banks alone cannot assure the sum total of financing the economy.

That is why one conclusion is abundantly clear : the need for adequate rules and reforms of a diverse nature enabling us to limit the intrinsic instability of finance, as we cannot make it disappear. We must take care, with the subsequent return to a new period of euphoria, to ensure that these reforms have begun before we rush to forget the recurring lessons that each financial crisis shows us.
The reasons for the inherent instability of finance are increasingly well analysed. They reside in the underlying nature of a financial or property asset, for which the price is not determined by its production cost, following the example of a reproducible good or service. In fact its value corresponds to the estimation of a promise of future revenues that the asset in question will bring. And yet, this forecast is very uncertain in as much as the future is hard to predict in a decentralised and monetary economy. In fact, the evolution in household savings levels as the multiple interactions of private competition and complementary economic agents renders their respective successes or failures very difficult to foresee, and even more so to quantify.

Here economists talk about a situation of radical or fundamental incertitude, but the forecast is equally uncertain because the exact risk to the issuer of the asset in question (for example shares or bonds) is not known to its holder. In effect they possess accurate information on neither the issuer’s current situation nor what their future actions will be, therefore ultimately deeply altering their risk profile. This information asymmetry and fundamental incertitude leads to a profound difficulty in knowing the equilibrium prices, that is to say the “normal” prices, of the financial assets for all circumstances in all likelihood, so facilitating mimetic behaviours in them and creating bubbles. Add to this the capacity to forget the effects of previous crises during euphoric periods and you have economic agents increasing their debt levels, thus pushing the leveraging effect to such a level that it threatens their financial situations, and during periods of depression they seek desperately to reduce this debt, thus considerably worsening the economic reversal. In other words, this phenomenon increases further when borrowers no longer gauge the solvability of lenders by the yardstick of their likely future returns, but by the expected evolution in the asset prices (for example shares or property) which are so financed or which act as a guarantee.

In addition, exogenously there are rules on the remuneration of the involved parties and accounting and prudential standards which can end up adding to the instability and procyclicity of finance.
All reform projects must therefore aim to combat the endogeneous as much as the exogeneous causes of financial instability. To tackle the exogenous causes is without question the least arduous task.

Tackling the exogenous causes.

First proposal

The IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) accounting standards have given priority to the assessment of assets in terms of their fair value, essentially based on the market price. This decision is based on the hypothesis that at any given moment the market price is the best indication of the “real” value of a given asset. And yet, today’s major credit crisis has shown, as if proof was needed, that while the market is fading under pressure from sellers, in the absence of buyers, prices are falling beyond all fundamental reality. In the same way and symmetrically, while we are in the middle of a speculative bubble the market price is totally dissociated from all equilibrium value. It is therefore necessary, as was the case in 2008, to be able to reasonably estimate value in an asset assessment, when the market does not allow it. Without this, the accounts depreciation leads to additional sales strung together one after the other in a self-maintaining flow towards low prices, and symmetrically in the event of a rise. In the event of market failure it is then necessary to use other methods than fair value to evaluate an asset. Avoiding returning to the method of accounting through historical value, which can be misleading in the case of assets held in trading, it may be useful to move to mark to model, provided there is external control of said methods, or the simple updating of reasonably expected future cash flows.

Furthermore, in contrast with the effect of the IFRS standards, in order to reduce the procyclicity of credit it is first highly desirable to encourage the banks’ supply. If they can accountably fund in advance as yet unproven future risks to their credit, they are less obliged to reduce their credit production during the occurrence of a major economic downturn. The impact of their accrued losses due to the increase of the cost of credit risk to their shareholders’ equity is in fact then compensated for, at least partially, by their provision write offs. Finally, it we should to re-examine the virtues of the old accounting framework of the banks on one point: that which would allow for the accumulation and discretionary provision write offs for general bank risks.

Second proposal

In the same way, the Basel 2 prudential standards are themselves procyclical. The bank shareholders’ equity required by Basel 2 is proportional to their credit liabilities in particular, themselves weighted by their associated risk. At the same time the positions in the financial markets are also considered according to their own risks (the value at risk method).

With evaluation models for these risks being essentially based on the data from a few previous years and hardly taking into account extreme risks, as much to credit as to market, a euphoric economic period leads little by little to more credits and speculative positions for the same amount of equity capital, and so further heightening the euphoria. While a period of depression forces banks to slow their credit rhythm or reduce their market positions for a given amount of equity capital, thus reinforcing the depression itself. It is also essential to modify the risk evaluation methods and the length of past time that they take into account, or moreover to apply stress scenarios to the models, enabling them to take into account more extreme cases (decomposition of risk factors and application of independent shocks).

In the end, with identical models following the example set by Spain, the solution is probably to adapt the ratio of required equity capital itself, according to the economic phase in progress, enabling it to be raised during a boom period in the cycle and lowered when there is a reversal permitting it to play a contra-cyclic role. In theory the second pillar of Basel 2 allows monetary authorities to proceed in this way but in practice, in the absence of clearer and better shared rules, it does not function in a satisfactory and coordinated way.

Third proposal

The question of the way in which the rating agencies work is also at the heart of the issue. Their procyclical nature is also obvious here. Furthermore, the CDO (collateralised debt obligation) rating is not the same as the corporate. The evaluation models for ranges of securitisation have failed, and not just because they did not integrate liquidity risk. In addition the fact that these models used data collected over too short a time period, they took little or no notice of the non-linear effects linked to the threshold effects, themselves due to the successive bringing into play of risk in different ranges of securitisation. Moreover, they have not appreciated the correlations in the flaws of the different components of the supports of securitisation.

In short, it is crucial to enforce that the marking agencies be obliged to show or make shown due diligence in the underlying securitisation, which is not the case at present (for example the cheating on sub-prime credit documents stems from this).

On another level we should add that these agencies are paid by the issuers who need their rating, which could lead us to doubt their impartiality. However, because its users are spread out and of very unequal size, it is impossible to conceive a viable system based on a payment from these users, so the choice is either to nationalize these agencies, claiming that they provide a service for the common good, or more likely we put them under a supervisory organisation which checks the quality of the methods used and the results after the event, so respecting proper ethics.

Likewise, as this has been done with external auditors, it would be prudent to establish their civil responsibility in case of an error in their rating process in counting on the jurisprudential control to further assure that their method of payment does not influence their decisions. In the end, in the same sense it seems absolutely necessary to separate their rating and advice functions (advice in terms of preparing for a rating).

Fourth proposal

The question of trader compensations is also decisive even if we cannot in any way make them the principal cause of the current chaos. Bonuses, paid annually, represent extraordinary amounts on an individual scale and are in principle based on the achieved earnings thanks to their trading positions. This compensation system is totally asymmetric because it does not erase the previous bonuses in the case of a final loss.

Thus, it is a strong incentive to take significant risks. At the very least it would be essential to only calculate and transfer the bonuses once the positions are finally released. But above all, because more and less favorable phases in the market follow one another over time, even disastrous phases as is the case now, we might say that the main part of the bonus may only be paid at the end of three or five year cycles for example, thus encouraging more long-term behaviour in traders. Without doubt it would be equally wise to limit these same bonuses to a multiple of their fixed salaries, not only as a question of social equality but also and above all to avoid unreasonable professional behaviour induced by abnormal sums.

Lastly we can remark that these compensation systems could be examined by supervisory bodies when looking at prudential solvency ratios. In effect it is likely that only banking self-regulation cannot manage to settle down the necessary new system of compensations once inter-bank competition is once again strong in this area.

Facing up to the endogenous causes.

To face up to the endogenous causes of financial instability is, less comfortable. A certain number of trails must therefore be followed.

Fifth proposal

Let us begin with the easiest path to apply to this end; monetary policy. As many central banks tell us, in the first place it is extremely difficult if not impossible to use interest rates as a weapon to slow or stop the emergence of euphoric phases in asset markets, because it is also the level of intervention of central banks that enables them to influence the rate of economic growth. And yet, slowing growth by an increase in rates is not often desirable even if it would be useful to prevent a euphoric state developing in the markets.

Secondly, the central banks cannot determine fundamental values with certainty and so cannot be sure to spot the beginnings of a speculative bubble. On the other hand there is no doubt that the monetary authorities could manipulate prudential solvency ratios better than they do presently, depending on the phase in progress. In effect, more often than not speculative bubbles on the stock market, as property bubble, come with a development of credit which is too fast in terms of the levels of debt and of leverage. If the debt was not able to increase in an abnormal fashion, than with a tighter control on bank solvency ratios, the bubbles would have less oxygen with which to develop. Following the same objective, the setting of an obligatory rate of reserves can be seen as the perfect companion.

However, the risk remains for the central banks to act at the wrong time.

Sixth proposal

As we have seen, these bubbles stem from the actor’s ability to develop a strong mimicry – rational in individual examples, but which lead to a collective irrationality – in the absence of reliable bearings as far as their fundamental values.

The central banks then try to speak out regularly, when it is necessary, in order to clarify to the market that prices seem to them to be some way off normal levels corresponding to a fair appreciation of the fundamentals. However, in general these warnings have little effect. Thus, Alan Greenspan spoke about an irrational exuberance in the stock market in 1996. This has did not avoid the creation and bursting of one of the strongest bubbles in 2000.

It may be possible to imagine an independent watchdog, a scientific panel of renowned experts, perhaps linked to the FMI or the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), that is capable of producing public reports on a quarterly basis for example, and which measures speculative tensions in the different asset markets.

Economists at the BIS have updated the fairly reliable predictive indicators of coming financial and banking crises. Essentially they are based on the measurement of the gap between the instantaneous evolution of property prices and stock prices and their long term tendency, along with the level of credits on the GDP and their long-term benchmark level. It is feasible to hope that if such relationships were regularly made and public, with suitable effect, little by little they could influence the creation of agent expectations on the markets. They could also enable a reduction in the capacity for markets’ disaster myopia. This largely shared cognitive bias fits with the progressive desensitisation that everyone has to the risk they are running, which grows little by little as the memory of the most recent of these rare yet violent events (in this case the financial crisis) fades with time, so encouraging behaviours which will ease the advent of the next disaster.

Seventh proposal

hort termism is inherent in finance since it is rational for fund managers or bank management to adopt or to have adopted a very short-term view in the management of their positions, taking into account the uncertainty concerning the fundamental value of assets. When we do not know what the “true” price is, we don’t bet for long on a convergence of market price towards an uncertain estimation of the fundamental value.

Thus, it is difficult to reduce this short-term view.

Some options, then. Aside from sovereign funds which are not restricted by the short term, it would be possible to aim certain funds towards the long term, for example pension funds, because their outflows can be predicted far in advance. Their accounting should be adapted in order to avoid needing an accounting of short term market fluctuations. In the same way, the rules for the outflows of funds could be revised according to their nature so that, for example, asset funds don’t have a daily liquidity thus lengthening the view of investors and managers.

Limiting this short termism could also be done by publishing fund values and their benchmarking at a reduced frequency so as not to enhance the mimicry of their managers.

Furthermore, in order to encourage individual investors to buy certain funds, for example, an attractive taxation should be implemented. In effect it is more sensible to impose low or nil tax rates, not to wrapped products or funds such as PEA’s in France, but to the direct or indirect holding of funds which are long-term in nature. In fact, even within a PEA it is perfectly possible to buy or sell funds listed daily and benchmarked monthly. Whether held within a PEA or not, these funds are led rationally to adopt very short term views and very mimetic behaviours in order to be sold as soon as they no longer have a high profitability, which could be offered by other funds. A beneficial taxation reserved for long term funds could therefore be a useful tool in limiting the inherent short termism in financial markets.

Eighth proposal

To tighten supervision is a necessity agreed upon by everyone. It comes through the supervision of up to now loosely or uncontrolled bodies, notably with hedge funds and securitisation vehicles. In effect they behave like banks but have an uncontrolled leverage and risks which are not scrutinised by supervisors. Evidently the same goes for investment banks in the US which for the most part have been helped by the Fed, although they were not supervised by the Fed itself. Added to that, supervision in the US is very broken up. And so for example, organisations which distributed sub-prime credits were not supervised by the Fed.

Besides, it could certainly be useful to envisage a pooling or at least an active cooperation on the part of bank and insurance supervisors. In effect, the circulation of credit risks between insurers and the banks is intense, for example due to the CDS market (credit default swaps).

In addition, a single supervisor, or at the very least federal, would be of great benefit in the euro zone, or even the European Union. With the supervisory bodies being national and the phenomena of financial crisis being worldwide since the advent of financial globalisation, a more forceful coordination in these bodies has become necessary.

More generally speaking, the regulators must pay extreme attention to the capacity of economic agents to raise leverages to unacceptable levels during euphoric phases, sometimes by circumventing the rules or using their shortages (distribution of sub-prime credit in the US, securitisation allowing the banks a strong leveraging effect despite Basel 2…).

Ninth proposal

A lot of ink has been spilled over securitisation and CDS market. They are certainly the specific and aggravating factors of the current financial crisis. They are, however, necessary since they enable banks to grant more credits than if they didn’t exist. Banks would not be able to finance the global economy solely through their equity capital. It merely remains that they be rethought so that they are at the same time more efficient and more “moral”. First and foremost, the supports of securitisation, such as the CDS, must be standardised. Their current heterogeneity added considerably to the mix-up of markets and their lack of liquidity. For CDS’s, it is furthermore essential to put them into organised markets, with guardianship of the market and clearing house, in order to guarantee a good end to contracts thanks to calls for a daily margin and deposits, which almost allows the elimination of risk of compensation.

For securitisation it is necessary to lessen the moral hazard which comes with them, since a bank which securitises its debts no longer bears the risk of credit it has granted, nor the obligation to monitor the borrower for the duration of the credit. All things which nevertheless normally define the role of banks in the credit process, from selection for the allocation of credit up to its’ reimbursement. To obstruct the possibility for banks not taking an interest in the reimbursement of credit – so as not to play the role of bank – as was seen at a preposterous level with the sub-prime market in the US, an obligation should be imposed on them to keep their risk liability at around, for example, 10% of securitised credits, by clearly indicating in their prospectus the exact risk held by the bank and enforcing a precise reporting next to the subscribers.

Finally, it is unreasonable to have allowed securitised bank debts hold by structures (conduits) bearing credit which are often long term, with a very short term refinancing. These conduits are in a sense the ersatz of uncontrolled banks, de facto allowing them to increase their leverage without the same regulatory control. And yet these same banks should give guarantees for the refinancing of their conduits, callable in cases of liquidity problems, so obliging them to retake previously securitised risks. In addition, in that case the disappearance of market refinancing with which the conduits were faced reveals a deep uncertainty as to the quality of the so securitised debts.

Tenth proposal

Upstream and more fundamentally, major financial instability is often facilitated by global macroeconomic and macro financial imbalances. This is certainly the case with the current financial crisis which has unfolded in the context of very high American current external deficits. These deficits are financed with no limits through official Chinese reserves, themselves due to imposing current account surplus, and are made possible by a long undervalued Chinese currency. It is from here that the discussion on a new Bretton Woods agreement stems, in particular regulating the value of currencies between themselves in a more harmonious fashion. It is unfortunately unlikely that such an attempt will succeed since the national interests in question cannot agree with one another. However it is not useless to look for possible arrangements, even temporary, which could eventually establish the resolution methods for such a divergence of interest in a more coordinated way.

To reduce financial instability is not easy, but, as we have seen, serious and pragmatic paths are open to us. The ideas presented here are certainly not exhaustive. But it is necessary to study them and, if needs be, to accomplish them as quickly as possible. Financial stability is a collective good which contributes to growth and the well-being of all. A demonstration from the absurd is in the process of being given.

Essay written in January 2009.

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Economical and financial crisis Finance Global economy

The Current Financial Crisis : something old, something new

A New event or history repeating itself?

Financial crises happen time and again, each time exhibiting a fundamental similarity in their origins and the way in which they unfold, but also in their own specific characteristics. All financial crises take at least one of three canonical forms which history has regularly taught us since the 19th century, at least. Often they take on and combine each of the three forms successively or simultaneously. Let us analyse them, with particular reference to the works of Michel Aglietta and the economists at the Bank of International Settlements.

The first and oldest of these forms is the speculation crisis. Why do property assets (shares, real estate…) become the subject of speculative bubbles? Because their price, in contrast to goods, industrial services or repeatable trade, does not depend on their production cost. That is why their price can be some way off their manufacturing costs. The price of a financial asset depends fundamentally on the confidence we place in it based on the future returns it can bring as forecast by its issuer. But the determination of price also depends on what everyone anticipates regarding the confidence placed in this promise by others. Everyone reasons in this way.

If the information is not fairly shared (between lender and borrower, the shareholder and the management, or between the market actors themselves), coupled with the fact that the future is difficult to predict, these information asymmetries and the fundamental uncertainty favours mimicry in the parties. So it is in fact very difficult to know the fundamental value of the asset in consideration, and so also to bet on it. In this case, the direction of the market is decided by the others because it is the pure product of expression of the majority opinion which then becomes clear. So the parties understandably imitate each other, hoping to try and anticipate and go with market trends in a totally self-referring manner. Thus these bubbles can burst suddenly, with the reversal of the majority opinion, in an even stronger movement than that which characterised the previous phase.

The second form, the credit crisis, stems from the fact that over a prolonged growth period all parties (banks and borrowers) progressively forget about the possibility of crisis occurring and end up expecting unbounded growth (an effect of “disaster myopia”) . In this euphoric state, lenders dangerously lose their sensitivity to risk and the level of leverage (debts on the level of wealth or of household revenue or of net assets for businesses) and end up increasing excessively.

Besides, this phenomenon is considerably amplified where lenders no longer gauge the solvency of the borrowers against the yardstick of their likely future revenues, but against the yardstick of the expected value of the financed assets (notably shares or property) or which serve as collateral. In the end, and more often than not, during this phase they accept margins that do not cover the cost of risk of forthcoming credit, as is the competitive nature of the game.

The financial situation for the economic agents proves very vulnerable during the next economic reversal. Also, while the crisis is happening, the lenders (banks and markets) carefully reconsider the level of risk they are running, and by a symmetrical effect of the precedent, they sharply reverse their practice of credit grants, as much in terms of volume as margin, until they provoke a “credit crunch” which will itself reinforce the economic crisis that it has created.

The third canonical form of crisis; the liquidity crisis. During a certain dramatic sequence of financial crisis events, a contagious wariness appears as we are witnessing with today’s financial and banking crisis. For certain banks this defiance induces a fatal rush in their clients to withdraw their deposits. It can also lead to a rarefaction, even a disappearance of willingness with the banks to lend to each other for fear of a chain of banking bankruptcies. But this illiquidity in the market of inter-banking finance – without the last resort intervention of the central Banks in the role of lenders – produces these bankruptcies which are so dreaded. Apart from this, other forms of illiquidity can be produced.

Certain financial markets which yesterday were fluid can suddenly become illiquid; so much so that the concept of market liquidity is still highly self-referential, as André Orléan has analysed. A market is only liquid if all the parties involved believe it to be. If suspicion arises as to its liquidity, as was recently the case with the ABS market for example, all parties will find themselves selling to get out of the market, at the same time provoking its illiquidity in an endogenous fashion.

These three types of crisis are often interlaced and mutually lead to an extremely critical situation. As an example, credit can quickly grow excessively by virtue of the unusually high growth in the price of property assets which act as guarantees to these funds. And the prices of these assets shoot up themselves since easier credits allow for additional purchases.

Here we end up faced with a self-maintaining and potentially long-lasting phenomenon in markets which do not stabilise themselves at normal levels. Likewise the liquidity crisis is generated, for example, by a sudden fear over the value of bank debts and the financial assets which the financial organisations possess. In the search for liquid assets the banks will finance the economy less and try to sell their assets, which in turn worsens the speculative crisis as with the credit crunch.

The major crisis which began in 2007 is a combination of these three forms. Firstly a speculative property bubble, notably in the US, the UK and Spain. Next, a credit crisis due to a dangerous rise in the levels of household debt in these same countries, and to a very high leveraging from the investment banks, businesses in leverage buyout and hedge funds in particular. Finally a liquidity crisis in the securities products and inter-bank refinancing markets.

Each crisis reinforces the other two in a self-maintaining process.
The idiosyncratic element of the current crisis lies in the rapid development in securitisation of bank debts in recent years.
Securitisation comes from the credit organisation report of bank debts for individuals, businesses and local authorities. These debts are often grouped in a heterogeneous manner into supports with a high leveraging effect themselves, revenue supports to other banks, to insurers and to displacement funds, in other words ultimately for everyone.

Securitisation has therefore enabled significant growth in the financing of the global economy since it allows the banks to make much more funding than if they’d kept them in their balance sheet. But this technique, which is not controlled, has also incited the banks who use it most (particularly in the US) to considerably lower their selection standards and their monitoring of borrowers, and to agree to lend to increasingly insolvent borrowers because they then run no more risk after securitisation. So, for example it’s in this way that sub-prime credit liabilities multiply, significantly increasing the credit crisis which has come about following the bursting of the property bubble.

Non-regulated securitisation has then considerably aggravated the credit crisis, but also the liquidity crisis. In effect the difficulty in tracking these funds and the mixture of good and bad credits in the same supports, like the opaqueness and complexity (CDO…) of securities products, have in turn worsened the extent of the crisis itself. With everyone losing all confidence in the quality and even in their understanding of this kind of investment, their liquidity has in fact found itself suddenly dried up. In fear of the assets then being held in the banks’ balance sheet, and so those of the insurers, at the same time this has led in particular to an inter-bank liquidity crisis of a gravity that we thought had been consigned to the past. For public authorities the difficulty in resolving the problems which have arisen has increased.

Finally, the credit-rating agencies, armed with unappreciated mathematical models based on restrictive hypotheses and the exclusive analysis of past series, have accorded a quality grading (grade AAA) to sections of the supports in question. And yet this seal of approval has revealed itself little by little, as the crisis unfolds, to be of very poor quality. These grades, which moreover do not account for the risk of liquidity, have led many investors including bankers to reassure themselves of getting off lightly, and in the end wrongly, on the quality of their financial assets, without asking themselves overly about the reasons for which an AAA investment quotation could be so well compensated.

The entanglement of these three canonical forms of financial crisis, other specific elements and the current crisis explain the extreme seriousness of today’s situation, with its procession of banks in distress, the panic of investors, the “credit crunch” in process, and finally the powerful economic crisis. Only the strong actions of the authorities, at the precise moment when everyone doubts each other, has recently been able to begin to calm the inter-bank market a little and to avoid a total collapse of the financial system.
All that remains is to watch for, and try to counter, the economic consequences of the most serious financial and banking crisis since the ‘30’s. And to hope that the resultant risk of credit to businesses and households does not revive the banking crisis in a vicious circle which would once again exacerbate the coming recession.