Categories
Economical policy Global economy

Businesses, State: the Necessary Art of Change

Today, the urgency of change in the management of public administrations is essential. For companies as well as for public administrations, without confusing the two, changes in the behaviour of employees and users or  customers or technological revolutions often require deep transformations to survive and develop for some and to remain effective and legitimate for others. In a changing world, nothing is a given. And, without anticipation, crises lie in wait, which then force sudden, uncertain and socially painful ruptures.

We have to be constantly attentive to changes in the conditions in which we carry out our activity, regularly rethink the validity of our model, while maintaining a methodological doubt so as to never be caught up in our own certainties. At the same time, to avoid Brownian movements, it is essential to rely on a clear analysis of what is invariable in our activity. What it is fundamentally and how it is sustainably useful to people and the economy. Thus, clearly conceiving the very essence of our activity and simultaneously perceiving the changes linked to our mode of practice is a crucial key to forging a good strategy and reaching your goal in the best way possible, ensuring a calm transformation and not a brutal disruption.

But as necessary as this may be, to succeed, it also requires thoughtful and appropriately organised change management. We have to anticipate the reactions that employees, customers/users, and even the competition will manifest in response to the changes that we want to implement. To anticipate correctly is to allow ourselves to act correctly.

Consistency is also a fundamental key to success. It must be totally implemented in the strategy. Otherwise, there is a loss of meaning and with an inconsistent course and divergent directions given, we will go nowhere. But there is more. There must be constant alignment of the strategy, the means needed to achieve it and the incentive systems. When the means implemented are in line with a relevant strategy and the incentive system ensures that each person or team is inclined to direct their action towards the achievement of the proposed strategy, success is often the result.

Finally, it is necessary to have adequate change management and support. This means detecting and considering obstacles to change in advance, thanks to feedback from the teams themselves, especially because they are stakeholders in the change but also because they are in their field. Change cannot only be driven from above. It must be the result of ongoing dialogue between managers and managees. This process is demanding but necessary and fruitful.

Which logically leads to a well-conducted trial-and-error process. Change must have a clearly defined course. But, if it is necessarily a well-thought-out process, it must be flexible. Change should not be planned rigidly and stuck to no matter what. Very flexible and dynamic planning, with a clear route, integrating the encountered realities, in a back and forth between the conceptualisation of the process followed and the reality that is revealed as it is deployed, allows one to achieve one’s objective with much more certainty.

Life is change, a permanent evolution. Just like companies and administrations and their environment. We must therefore think about and lead the essential changes, before being forced to do so by the otherwise inevitable crises. Companies are born and die when they have not been able to adapt. Public administrations do not die by themselves, but they can experience such entropy that they become less and less efficient and more and more costly, and can even lose their legitimacy. This then leads to deficits and debts which, when facing the wall, can lead to a disruption that is always hazardous and painful.

Olivier Klein
Chief Executive Officer of Lazard Frères Banque
Professor of Economics at HEC

Categories
Economical policy Global economy

Public finances and social justice – be careful not to make the wrong diagnosis

“It is in developing the employment rate, encouraging work, revaluing the value of work, social mobility, encouraging entrepreneurship, education (a decisive factor), innovation and growth that we must find solutions… And not through additional taxes on income from work or savings, any more than on businesses”

Correcting the poor trajectory of our public finances is a necessity that has become an urgent priority. To avoid a public debt crisis, ensure France’s independence and regain credibility, and therefore a real capacity for influence within the European Union. To this end, it is theoretically possible to increase taxes and social security contributions, reduce public spending and strengthen growth
through structural reforms and investments for the future. However, each of these measures, in the specific situation of France, will not produce the same effect and will not have the same effectiveness. Let us focus here on increasing taxes, which might seem, at first glance, to both reduce the public deficit and improve social justice. The reality is quite different. Increasing taxes in France could worsen the vicious circle between very high redistribution – in itself and compared to similar countries – and relatively high income inequality before redistribution. By again degrading the lack of competitiveness and the inadequacy of our offer and thus
reducing growth and ultimately damaging the standard of living of all and the tax base itself.

Lack of competitiveness. The rate of compulsory taxes has been on an upward trend in France for a long time, reaching more than 43% of GDP in 2023, one of the highest in the European Union with around 6 points more than the average for the eurozone. With a part of public spending that is inefficient (e.g the situation of hospitals, education, the redundancy of administrative operating costs, etc.) and also significantly higher than the European average – by around 8 to 10 points of GDP – and all this for a lesser result. This state of affairs contributes to the lack of competitiveness of our offer, which is currently the heart of the issue.

Furthermore, after redistribution, income inequality in France, measured by the ratio between the income of the wealthiest 10% and that of the least wealthy 10% or by the relative poverty rate, has not changed or has changed little for over 20 years. And is among the lowest in Europe. The Gini index of post-redistribution inequality stands at 0.298, while Germany reaches 0.303 and Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom have levels between 0.320 and 0.354. Let us also add that the share of national income after redistribution held by the wealthiest 1% in France is also one of the lowest at 7.17%, compared to 8.72% in Sweden, 10.32% in Italy or 14.35% in the United States. France in fact has one of the highest levels of redistribution in the OECD. Overall, in France, redistribution reduces the ratio between the income before redistribution of the wealthiest 10% and that of the least wealthy 10% from around 20 to 9. And this ratio increases to 3 by adding the effect of public services, by comparing for each the cost paid versus the monetary equivalent of what is received by using them. The wealthiest pay more, due to the high progressiveness of taxes. Thus, 85% of people among the poorest 30% receive more in terms of public services than they pay, compared to 57% for all people in France (INSEE study of 2023 on extended redistribution).

The marginal tax rate on household income is 55.2%, compared to 47.5% in Germany. It is higher than in Italy, Spain, the Netherlands or Belgium, for example. And the tax rate on capital income is still higher than the European average despite
recent reductions that have been very useful for the French economy, which has been well documented.

Ignoring this when building economic programs will obviously lead to inadequate and dangerous proposals for the economy and ultimately for the less well-off.

Inequality of opportunity. True social justice, given the reality in France, is to tackle inequality of opportunity, which is quite high compared to the European average. And it is in developing the employment rate, encouraging work, revaluing the value of work, social mobility, encouraging entrepreneurship, education (a decisive factor), innovation and growth that we must find solutions… And not through additional taxes on income from work or savings, any more than on businesses. Increasing redistribution further and further, at the particularly high level we are at, is making the problem worse, by leading to less competitiveness, therefore less production and less growth. The overall risk is very high of causing more inequality of income before redistribution and more inequality of opportunity.

And of not improving the sustainability of our public finances, or even of deteriorating it further. French history in recent decades bears witness to this nonvirtuous loop. The economy, like income, is in fact a dynamic, not a zero-sum game. Serious long term research has shown this unambiguously.

What remains is action in the gradual reduction of public spending (well chosen and well managed) in relation to GDP, as well as structural reforms and future investments to increase the competitiveness of our offer and our growth potential, and at the same time promote social justice and restore the sustainability of our public finances. And thus sustainably protect the precious asset that is the level of income and social protection in France.

Let’s not confuse effects and causes

Categories
Conjoncture Economical and financial crisis Global economy Uncategorized

Inflation, Endgame?

After having surprised us with its vigour, inflation, due to a demand shock – which rebounded very strongly once the lockdowns ended – and to a supply shock – dramatically reduced during the pandemic -, seems to be gradually returning to acceptable levels. The causes of this decline can be attributed to a gradual increase in global production capacities and the fall in excess demand through the deflation of excess savings generated by the lockdowns. But disinflation was also caused by a very reactive and internationally coordinated monetary policy as well as the strong credibility of central banks who showed great determination in wanting to bring inflation back on target. This has ensured that the inflation expectations of the various economic actors – businesses and households – do not become dislodged. Let us add that until now, contrary to a number of forecasts based on historical data, we have witnessed a soft landing of the economy, that is to say without recession and without any systemic financial shock. So is the game won? Quite possibly. However, several points should make us cautious about this diagnosis.

Salaries have recently increased at a rate that remains high (between 4 and 5% per year). However, in the euro zone, almost zero productivity gains make it impossible to compensate for this increase. Corporate margins are therefore at stake. Continuing in the euro zone, it is the fall in import prices which has provided a large portion of the disinflation. But can they continue to fall further? And prices for services continue to rise rapidly. Furthermore, until now, the sharp increase in interest rates in a context of historically very high public and private debts has not produced the financial impact that was feared. And yet hadn’t we talked about a possible “perfect storm” on this topic? Some reasons for this non-event: increased savings and inflation protection policies have fuelled growth which helps overcome rising costs of debt. Banking regulations, significantly tightened since the last major financial crisis (2007-2009), have generally succeeded in safeguarding the banks.

Companies, taking advantage of the very low rates preceding the return of inflation, had extended their loans and had taken them out at a fixed rate instead. However, let’s keep in mind a few elements that also encourage caution. The professional real estate sector, during the real estate bubble preceding the pandemic, may have experienced excess debt here and there, resulting in insolvencies beginning to appear. Many companies in all sectors, sometimes with high leverage, will have to refinance their loans over the next few years. States themselves, which are highly indebted, will gradually have to bear sharply increasing interest charges which will disrupt their solvency trajectories. The sensitivity of financial markets to this type of situation could thus increase significantly. In addition, central banks will certainly be keen not to reproduce periods of interest rates that are too low for too long, periods which weaken financial stability. And they will want to maintain room for manoeuvre to deal with future systemic crises. Inflation, moreover, for structural reasons, will no longer be as low as during the last 30 years.

We should therefore have changed our interest rate regime a long time ago, returning to more normal rates, that is to say closer to nominal growth rates. Also, if the situation so far has proven to be a successful landing of inflation without major damage to the economy, to avoid a large-scale upheaval that is still possible, it is therefore up to private and public economic actors, supported by macro-prudential rules well established by the concerned authorities, to adapt vigorously to ensure the sustainability of their solvency and their growth.

Categories
Economical policy Euro zone Global economy Uncategorized

The reasoning errors of those who want to increase compulsory contributions.

We know that the rate of compulsory contributions in France is one of the highest of the 38 OECD countries and much higher than the average of those countries. We are less aware that after redistribution, income inequalities in France, whether measured by the Gini index, by the ratio between the income of the wealthiest 10% and that of the least wealthy 10% or by the relative poverty rate, have not changed or have barely changed over the past 20 years, contrary to what some say. And that they are among the lowest in Europe and in the world.

In France, redistribution is very high, reducing the ratio between the income before redistribution of the wealthiest 10% and that of the least well-off 10% from 20 to 9. And from 20 to 3 by adding the effect of public services paid more by the wealthiest due to the high progressivity of taxes. 85% of people among the poorest 30% thus receive more in terms of public services than they pay, compared to 57% for all people in France (INSEE study of 2023 on extended redistribution). Ignoring this when building economic programs is obviously a source of inadequate proposals and therefore dangerous for the economy and ultimately for the least well-off. Obviously, the same reasoning is not tenable for the United States for example, where income inequality is much higher and has increased significantly over the past 20 years.

Another fundamental point is seriously ignored by certain programs. The economy and the social spheres are not static. They are dynamics whose effects are difficult to isolate from each other and whose interactions can cause favorable or catastrophic developments, even contrary to the desired goals.

If, compulsory contributions in France which are already on the European and OECD podium, are increased further, they will have a negative effect on employment – by reducing the competitiveness of companies, the dynamics of entrepreneurship, the incentive to work, etc. – as well as on growth. However, employment and growth are the main factors in the fight against poverty and in the development of the standard of living. Since 2000, France’s GDP per capita has declined in relative terms in Europe.

Similarly, supply and demand should not be considered separately. France already has a very large trade deficit and a current deficit that demonstrate its insufficient competitiveness. Its financial dependence on the rest of the world is thus constantly increasing. Artificially increasing demand would only further aggravate the external deficit. The development of the economy requires that demand be firm, but it also requires the simultaneous development of a competitive supply, which will also increase demand, particularly through the development of employment. Demand cannot be sustained for long through ever-increasing public spending, which ends up

leading to unsustainable debt. Nor can it be sustained by financing this spending through an incessant increase in contributions that end up reducing supply and jobs. The right way to fight against poverty and for purchasing power is therefore certainly not to further increase taxes and contributions, which are already very high, nor public spending (which in the long term is not positively correlated with growth), but to promote technological and green innovation, social mobility to improve equality of opportunity and incentives to work, since many companies cannot grow due to a lack of human resources, etc. Let’s stop cherishing the causes that lead to the effects that we deplore!

Categories
Economical policy Global economy

The European Capital Markets Union, useful but not enough!

Let us not overestimate the decisive nature of the change desired by the European Capital Markets Union project. Will the reinvestment of the financing capacity (surplus) of the European Union in Europe, rather than in the United States, be guaranteed? Indeed, before the idiosyncratic crisis in the euro zone beginning in 2010, the financing capacities of the Northern countries were able to back the financing needs of the countries in the Southern zone, despite the organisation of the financial markets as it still stands today. The measures proposed in favour of the capital markets union, by Christian Noyer for example, seem very useful to me. But they are not a “game changer”. Today, we can invest freely on each European stock exchange or finance European companies through deposits in banks or investment in debt or private equity funds… Certainly, a more integrated, more harmonised, more European-supervised market, would give more depth and liquidity to European financial markets. They would therefore become more attractive. The unity of the European market would also better protect savers by providing them with greater security. So, it would undeniably be a significant plus, but not enough to ensure the recycling of surplus savings from certain European countries in Europe itself. Why? How can we be sure of this with more certainty?

Two elements would be able to trigger a change in the geographical orientation of the European savings surplus: -On the one hand, the implementation of reforms in the Southern countries (France included) aimed at not having permanently high public deficits, and at gradually approaching the level of public debt to GDP of the Northern countries. This would enable the acquisition of a sustainable credibility of public finances. This would allow significant progress in real and structural solidarity between the countries in the zone. And thus promote “risk sharing” between European countries. Leading to the confidence of Northern savers-investors in the sustainability of the debt of Southern countries.

Investors from Northern countries in fact stopped investing their current account surpluses in 2010 to finance the needs of Southern countries, when they understood that solidarity was not a given. And they are still very reluctant to provide such solidarity, fearing that the ant will have to help the cicadas all year round and every year. Thus, today the current account balances of the South are at zero +, since the end of the euro zone crisis, because a current account deficit could be difficult for them to finance. And the surpluses of the North are mainly placed in the United States…

– On the other hand, a European impetus for a more dynamic European economy and Schumpeterian growth favorable to innovation. Impetus through incentives to raise the level of R&D, through well-measured and targeted subsidies and partial guarantees on carefully chosen investments, through public-private investments, through incentives for innovation and industrialisation in the future industry sectors, etc.

Likewise, non-naive regulation (ESMA, competition, green, etc.) and taking into account the competitiveness of our industries, as well as appropriate taxation, finally the development of a culture of risk and not a religion of precaution -a sign of our aging- should also allow savers and their representatives (institutional investors) to want to invest more in many future projects in Europe, because they would offer good profitability prospects.

These two elements are not contradictory, rather complementary, to the European Capital Union project. But they seem more decisive. Favouring or even focusing only on the capital union would symbolically exaggerate the role of finance and would entail the risk of major disappointments down the road. Good projects have no trouble getting financed.

Categories
Economical policy Finance Global economy

The European model will be unsustainable without reforms

The mid to long term results of Europe’s economic performance require critical reflection. And anticipating future difficulties require us to think about the reforms to be rapidly implemented to protect the European standard of living and social protection, an invaluable shared asset but unsustainable without in-depth change.

Some data. Over the last 20 years (2002-2023), the cumulative economic growth rate of the United States has reached 60%. The euro zone is at 30%. American household consumption increased by 60%, that of Europeans by 20%. The rate of American private and public research and development over GDP has exceeded the European one by about one point by year for the last 20 years, etc. Thus, over the same period productivity gains have increased by more than 45% in the United States compared to 10% in the euro zone. From 2019 to 2023, they increased by 1.7% per year in the United States and by 0.3% in the euro zone (-0.8% in France). However, the working age population is growing by around 0.2% per year in the United States while it is falling by around 0.5% per year in the euro zone. It will fall by 0.8% around 2030, with the percentage of the population over 65 continuing to increase (22% today, 26% in 2030).

To deal with this negative demographic effect and protect European standards of living, growth will be essential, and therefore more productivity gains. Innovation, research and development and robotisation should be widely encouraged. Especially since Europe is not prominent in the strategic industries of the future: wind turbines, voltaic panels, electric batteries, electric cars, industries of the fourth technological revolution…

We must therefore change the paradigm by facilitating Schumpeterian growth much more, through creative destruction. By rethinking the weight of regulations which, in Europe, are always higher than those in the rest of the world. By increasing the mobility of labour and capital. By combating the decline in the quality and effectiveness of teaching. By controlling and better allocating public spending… Indeed, European potential growth of around 0.5 to 1%, resulting from productivity gains close to zero, declining demographics and a slowing rise in the employment rate will in no way ensure the persistence of European economic prosperity.

Qualified immigration would also make it possible to resolve this difficult equation; in the United States, immigrants having, in total and on average, a level of education higher than that of the resident population. Finally, an increase in the quantity of work (number of hours worked in life as well as the number of people working as a percentage of the population), with less cultural disaffection for work, will be essential.

The Europeans preference, like their institutions, for precaution instead of risk, as well as the permanent extension of rights without their accompanying duties, is unsustainable, otherwise they risk an inexorable decline. A certain strategic naivety must give way to ethical pragmatism. Ethics without efficiency cannot survive for long. Europe cannot continue much longer without the danger of Péguy’s criticism of Kantianism: having pure hands, but having no hands at all. To preserve the very essence of what made post-war Europe, we urgently need to change our software. It remains for us to think carefully about institutional reforms, those through which Europe regulates itself, to facilitate this jumpstart and allow it to maintain its place in the world.