Categories
Economical policy Global economy

Wokism, Undifferentiation, and the Inverted Logic of the Scapegoat

By Olivier Klein – July 18, 2025

René Girard’s thought provides a penetrating lens through which to view the ideological excesses of wokism and the deep dangers they entail. Wokism—understood not as simple ethical vigilance but as an ideological system aimed at erasing all perceived differences—can be seen as an advanced episode in the mimetic dynamic. What this movement claims to fight—exclusionary violence—it reactivates, in reversed form. And in doing so, it maintains a sacrificial logic that has marked the history of humanity.

Mimetic theory is based on a fundamental discovery: human desire is never autonomous or free from others. It does not preexist the socialization process of the individual. We are not born with our desires or with fixed preference curves, as some individualist anthropologies or economic schools propose. We desire what others desire, precisely because they desire it. The other is envied and imitated because we believe they are complete, lacking nothing—unlike ourselves, who feel an inner void. This drives us to desire what the other desires: to define ourselves, to be, by mimicking their desires in the hope of filling our own emptiness.

This structurally mimetic nature of desire breeds rivalries, since we desire what others desire. This can unleash violence that is itself contagious. It can spread throughout the entire group and, in its extreme phase, lead to the group’s self-destruction.

This rivalry over possession intensifies when differences between group members fade, as the mimetic logic then spirals more easily and dangerously. Everyone develops a desire to possess what others covet—others doing the same. When two individuals resemble each other too closely, each becomes both a model and a rival to the other—especially dangerous because the other is nearly identical. This is Girard’s archetype (frequently found in myths) of the mimetic double, inherently charged with violent potential. Undifferentiation accelerates the mimetic process and its violent outcome.

Differences—sexual, symbolic, cultural—are thus not obstacles to peace. They do not hinder the prevention of violence. Quite the contrary: differences are conditions for preventing it. This is the heart of the paradox: the forced equalization of human conditions, far from abolishing conflict, exacerbates it.

How can the “mimetic crisis” that spreads among all members of a community avoid leading to the group’s self-destruction? A catastrophic outcome can be avoided if the crisis is resolved by designating a scapegoat. The scapegoat channels the violence of all-against-all into a unified violence of all-against-one. The scapegoat is chosen through a mimetic, quasi-random process and becomes the focus of a sudden consensus about their guilt—even though it has no real basis. The expiatory victim absorbs and takes away the contagious violence that had erupted within the group and become focused on them. In primitive societies, once the group is re-united, the victim is often sanctified as the figure who saved the community. Myth arises from this process, concealing the real mechanism while still allowing it to be deciphered for those who look closely enough.

Human groups, societies, establish strategies to avoid the repetition of the destructive logic of the mimetic crisis. In Violence and the Sacred, Girard shows that archaic societies managed to contain this violence by instituting differences, rituals, and taboos that constrain mimetic desire and limit its catastrophic escalation. This stands in opposition to the modern idea of “liberated” desire, assumed to emancipate individuals by freeing them from social constraints. It opposes the will to deconstruct taboos. But this so-called free, autonomous, unbounded desire is an illusion: it denies the mimetic structure of our desires, and therefore their destructive potential. On the contrary, it is civilization—with its mediations, rules, and norms—that can contain this endemic violence.

Differences—sexual, hierarchical, ritual, symbolic—are not archaic remnants. According to Girard, they are cultural tools for peace. In modern societies, this role is taken up by the law, the State (which has monopolized violence), and social norms. Differences remain, particularly economic or status-based. But rather than being sources of oppression, in today’s world these differences are fortunately mobile, evolving, not fixed—and thus become engines of economic dynamism and growth. At the same time, they subtly help restrain mimetic violence. Furthermore, rituals and moral taboos, though weakened in modern society, still play a useful complementary role in containing violence.

Herein lies the clear paradox of wokism. By aiming to erase all differences—perceived as discriminatory—wokism seeks to deconstruct the existing order in order to rebuild society on the basis of absolute egalitarianism. But this constructivism, rooted in the pursuit of undifferentiation, does not pacify—it intensifies mimeticism. It stirs up envy, jealousy, and ultimately hatred. Everyone competes to defend—or even embody—the purest victim, and to sanctify it. This is the contemporary logic of victimhood competition, analyzed by René Girard in I See Satan Fall Like Lightning: “The victim has become the absolute foundation of moral judgment.”

But if everyone is a victim in this artificially constructed world of undifferentiation, the barriers that once contained violence are destroyed. New scapegoats must then be found to absorb the violence this generates. The oppressor—vaguely defined but necessary to the ideological framework—becomes the new scapegoat. The man, the white person, the Westerner, or even the former and long-standing expiatory victim—now, through a historical reversal, recast as the quintessential oppressor—are singled out. The symbolic dominant is targeted for condemnation. The logic of sacrifice returns, but inverted.

From this perspective, wokism becomes a form of mimetic compassionism unaware of its own dynamics. It designates victims en masse, sanctifies them, and traps them in that status by assigning them to a fixed identity. It builds inverted hierarchies where guilt crushes responsibility, where identity replaces action, where absolute determinism denies the capacity to evolve or change status. Having dismantled the civilizational barriers to mimetic violence, the need for a scapegoat returns. But now the aim is not to sacrifice the victim to save the community; it is to sacrifice the supposed dominant—designated by new inquisitors—to redeem a presumed collective guilt. The barriers collapse, and the sacrificial logic endures. In Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, Girard wrote that “the modern world is increasingly mimetic.” Wokism illustrates this. Beneath a posture of moral purity, it reproduces what it denounces: judgment, exclusion, violence, sacrifice. The victim is not abolished—only replaced. And the more this is done in the name of Good, the more dangerous the mechanism becomes. Evil—the principle of the scapegoat—thus takes on the appearance of virtue.

Should we then return to old hierarchies? No more than Girard, I believe we should. We must recognize the dynamics of mimetic desire, help disarm scandal, and break the cycle of vengeance. This requires rehabilitating symbolic mediations, legitimate structuring differences, and institutions that prevent the generalization of rivalry—without ever legitimizing injustice. This is what distinguishes equality of opportunity from egalitarianism.

Without differences, there are only rivals. And a society of rivals, without mediation and without cultural boundaries, is a society ready to ignite—and at risk of exploding. Integral egalitarianism, leading to generalized undifferentiation, becomes a breeding ground for distrust, amplified mimetic envy, and ultimately destructive violence.

Olivier Klein
Professor of economics at HEC

Note [1]: From a Girardian perspective, consider the rivalrous battle and striking mimetic behavior in the U.S. between proponents of wokism and religious ultra-conservatism. Both hurl anathemas at each other and claim victimhood at the hands of the other. Mimetic violence leads both sides to ban each other’s books and rewrite educational programs by erasing what contradicts their worldview—often with anti-scientific approaches. Both camps become polarized in a mimetic refusal of dialogue or exchange.

Categories
Conjoncture Economical policy Global economy

THE FRENCH MODEL: FROM EXCESS TO NECESSARY RENEWAL

The European model, and especially the French one, of political, economic, and social regulation is undergoing a profound crisis. Under the pressure of its excesses, this model proves hardly capable of meeting contemporary challenges.

Five major trends highlight its limits: the weakening of public authority and sense of security, the insufficient immigration regulation and integration of immigrants, the rise of exacerbated individualism, the expression of excessive egalitarianism, and finally, the hypertrophy of the state and regulation.

These dynamics weaken institutions and fuel distrust towards politics, favoring the rise of populism.
The market, essential for economic dynamism, requires effective public regulation to avoid its excesses. However, in France specifically, the public sphere has grown excessively, causing both inefficiency and discouragement. The omnipresent state tends to infantilize citizens and interfere in their social relations while reducing the role of intermediary bodies. As Hannah Arendt points out: “When the state monopolizes this capacity to act, citizens are reduced to the role of spectators.” Over-administration indeed causes a loss of individual and collective responsibility, while weakening respect for others and social rules. This in turn provokes widespread anxiety and distrust.

At the same time, what I call hyper-democracy is developing in our societies, due to an endogenous dynamic that, if unchecked, can lead to pathological excesses that may even endanger democracy itself. These excesses manifest as an unlimited extension of individual rights at the expense of everyone’s duties, fostering selfishness, withdrawal into oneself, and an exacerbated, compartmentalized communitarianism. Additionally, this also weakens the meaning and necessity of work.

These excesses also include an extreme egalitarian obsession, fueling jealousy, resentment, and hatred. Egalitarianism also hinders the engines of growth and progress. Tocqueville, who already analyzed the potentially self-destructive developments of democracy, warned: “There is no passion so fatal to man as this love of equality which can degrade individuals and push them to prefer common mediocrity to individual excellence.”

These excesses threaten the ability to live together and can lead to both moral and economic ruin. The issues induced by financing over-administration and the lack of responsibility regarding social protection spending result in a permanent public deficit, leading to soon unsustainable public debt. These in turn reinforce distrust.

To avoid irreversible decline, it is imperative to reinvent our political, social, and economic balance around several axes. Reconcile ethics (including social justice) and economic dynamics (economic system efficiency). Neither is sustainably viable without the other. In other words, today norms, regulations, and tax systems must not unduly hinder innovation, growth, and business development, lest efforts towards ethics be in vain. Address public authority, security, and immigration matters in a democratic and effective manner, without moralizing bias or contempt. This will also prevent populism from monopolizing these debates. Ensure better social mobility through appropriate quality education. Reject egalitarian excesses by recalling the essential notions of equality of rights and duties, equality of opportunity, and equity, so as not to confuse them with absolute equality in everything, which often contradicts the former.

The survival of the European democratic model and social market economy depends on its ability to renew itself. Without an intellectual awakening to limit the excesses that have developed and to regain the essential balances that underpin them, our politico-economic-social system will sink into entropy. Moreover, this is in a world where power struggles have again become the rule. This renewal is crucial to restore trust in institutions and politics, as well as in democracy itself. It is also crucial to regain vitality and dynamism without which nothing is possible. The sustainability of our beautiful European model depends on it.

Olivier Klein
Professor of Economics at HEC

Categories
Conjoncture Economical policy Global economy

THE DOLLAR-BACKED STABLECOINS: A NEW STRATEGIC WEAPON FOR THE UNITED STATES

Stablecoins are experiencing explosive growth as a means of settlement. In 2024, they processed more transactions than Visa and Mastercard combined. Unlike “pure” cryptocurrencies, which are issued without any backing and whose value is inherently speculative and highly volatile-since it depends solely on the self-referential opinion of the market-stablecoins are cryptocurrencies backed by assets such as the dollar. For each unit of stablecoin issued and purchased in exchange of any currency, the amount received is immediately used to buy U.S. dollars and invested in U.S. Treasury securities. It is this one-to-one rule that makes these specific cryptocurrencies “stable” rather than purely speculative.

Amid rising uncertainties in the U.S. bond market, reflected by a reduction in Treasury purchases, the United States sees stablecoins as a strategic opportunity: to attract new demand for its sovereign debt and reinforce the dollar’s dominance in global trade. Indeed, the more dollar-backed stablecoins are used internationally, the more issuers must acquire U.S. debt to guarantee their value. Washington thus could use stablecoins as a tool to refinance its external debt while expanding the dollarization of the global economy. The recent adoption of the Genius Act bill, supported by the U.S. administration, aims to support and regulate the development of dollar-backed stablecoins, giving American issuers a competitive advantage and consolidating the dollar’s supremacy.

This strategy is not without risk for the rest of the world. The possible massive adoption of dollar-backed stablecoins could accelerate capital flight from emerging or fragile economies, as citizens seek protection from inflation or currency devaluation by turning to these stable payment methods. More broadly, stablecoins weaken the monetary sovereignty of countries outside the United States, reduce their ability to finance their economies with local savings, and expose their financial systems to risks of banking disintermediation. The global reallocation of savings toward stablecoins backed by U.S. debt diverts resources from local private sector financing to the benefit of the U.S. Treasury. National banks, deprived of deposits, see their lending capacity shrink accordingly, slowing economic growth in these countries.

Finally, the expansion of stablecoins poses major challenges in terms of regulation, anti-money laundering efforts, and consumer protection. These assets can circulate without constraint, facilitating illicit flows and eroding the integrity of financial markets.

Ultimately, increased dependence on the dollar via stablecoins further entrenches the asymmetry of the international monetary system, making economies-especially emerging ones-even more vulnerable to U.S. monetary policy decisions.
In sum, by developing dollar-backed stablecoins, the United States has gained an unprecedented lever to further dollarize global trade and refinance its external debt. But this strategy imposes significant risks on the monetary sovereignty, financial stability, and economic development of the rest of the world.

But it’s a double-edged sword for the United States. Stablecoins can also accelerate both the appreciation and depreciation of the dollar, thereby increasing macro-financial volatility.

Olivier Klein
Professor of Economics at HEC and Banker

Categories
Economical policy Global economy

Businesses, State: the Necessary Art of Change

Today, the urgency of change in the management of public administrations is essential. For companies as well as for public administrations, without confusing the two, changes in the behaviour of employees and users or  customers or technological revolutions often require deep transformations to survive and develop for some and to remain effective and legitimate for others. In a changing world, nothing is a given. And, without anticipation, crises lie in wait, which then force sudden, uncertain and socially painful ruptures.

We have to be constantly attentive to changes in the conditions in which we carry out our activity, regularly rethink the validity of our model, while maintaining a methodological doubt so as to never be caught up in our own certainties. At the same time, to avoid Brownian movements, it is essential to rely on a clear analysis of what is invariable in our activity. What it is fundamentally and how it is sustainably useful to people and the economy. Thus, clearly conceiving the very essence of our activity and simultaneously perceiving the changes linked to our mode of practice is a crucial key to forging a good strategy and reaching your goal in the best way possible, ensuring a calm transformation and not a brutal disruption.

But as necessary as this may be, to succeed, it also requires thoughtful and appropriately organised change management. We have to anticipate the reactions that employees, customers/users, and even the competition will manifest in response to the changes that we want to implement. To anticipate correctly is to allow ourselves to act correctly.

Consistency is also a fundamental key to success. It must be totally implemented in the strategy. Otherwise, there is a loss of meaning and with an inconsistent course and divergent directions given, we will go nowhere. But there is more. There must be constant alignment of the strategy, the means needed to achieve it and the incentive systems. When the means implemented are in line with a relevant strategy and the incentive system ensures that each person or team is inclined to direct their action towards the achievement of the proposed strategy, success is often the result.

Finally, it is necessary to have adequate change management and support. This means detecting and considering obstacles to change in advance, thanks to feedback from the teams themselves, especially because they are stakeholders in the change but also because they are in their field. Change cannot only be driven from above. It must be the result of ongoing dialogue between managers and managees. This process is demanding but necessary and fruitful.

Which logically leads to a well-conducted trial-and-error process. Change must have a clearly defined course. But, if it is necessarily a well-thought-out process, it must be flexible. Change should not be planned rigidly and stuck to no matter what. Very flexible and dynamic planning, with a clear route, integrating the encountered realities, in a back and forth between the conceptualisation of the process followed and the reality that is revealed as it is deployed, allows one to achieve one’s objective with much more certainty.

Life is change, a permanent evolution. Just like companies and administrations and their environment. We must therefore think about and lead the essential changes, before being forced to do so by the otherwise inevitable crises. Companies are born and die when they have not been able to adapt. Public administrations do not die by themselves, but they can experience such entropy that they become less and less efficient and more and more costly, and can even lose their legitimacy. This then leads to deficits and debts which, when facing the wall, can lead to a disruption that is always hazardous and painful.

Olivier Klein
Chief Executive Officer of Lazard Frères Banque
Professor of Economics at HEC

Categories
Economical policy Global economy

Public finances and social justice – be careful not to make the wrong diagnosis

“It is in developing the employment rate, encouraging work, revaluing the value of work, social mobility, encouraging entrepreneurship, education (a decisive factor), innovation and growth that we must find solutions… And not through additional taxes on income from work or savings, any more than on businesses”

Correcting the poor trajectory of our public finances is a necessity that has become an urgent priority. To avoid a public debt crisis, ensure France’s independence and regain credibility, and therefore a real capacity for influence within the European Union. To this end, it is theoretically possible to increase taxes and social security contributions, reduce public spending and strengthen growth
through structural reforms and investments for the future. However, each of these measures, in the specific situation of France, will not produce the same effect and will not have the same effectiveness. Let us focus here on increasing taxes, which might seem, at first glance, to both reduce the public deficit and improve social justice. The reality is quite different. Increasing taxes in France could worsen the vicious circle between very high redistribution – in itself and compared to similar countries – and relatively high income inequality before redistribution. By again degrading the lack of competitiveness and the inadequacy of our offer and thus
reducing growth and ultimately damaging the standard of living of all and the tax base itself.

Lack of competitiveness. The rate of compulsory taxes has been on an upward trend in France for a long time, reaching more than 43% of GDP in 2023, one of the highest in the European Union with around 6 points more than the average for the eurozone. With a part of public spending that is inefficient (e.g the situation of hospitals, education, the redundancy of administrative operating costs, etc.) and also significantly higher than the European average – by around 8 to 10 points of GDP – and all this for a lesser result. This state of affairs contributes to the lack of competitiveness of our offer, which is currently the heart of the issue.

Furthermore, after redistribution, income inequality in France, measured by the ratio between the income of the wealthiest 10% and that of the least wealthy 10% or by the relative poverty rate, has not changed or has changed little for over 20 years. And is among the lowest in Europe. The Gini index of post-redistribution inequality stands at 0.298, while Germany reaches 0.303 and Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom have levels between 0.320 and 0.354. Let us also add that the share of national income after redistribution held by the wealthiest 1% in France is also one of the lowest at 7.17%, compared to 8.72% in Sweden, 10.32% in Italy or 14.35% in the United States. France in fact has one of the highest levels of redistribution in the OECD. Overall, in France, redistribution reduces the ratio between the income before redistribution of the wealthiest 10% and that of the least wealthy 10% from around 20 to 9. And this ratio increases to 3 by adding the effect of public services, by comparing for each the cost paid versus the monetary equivalent of what is received by using them. The wealthiest pay more, due to the high progressiveness of taxes. Thus, 85% of people among the poorest 30% receive more in terms of public services than they pay, compared to 57% for all people in France (INSEE study of 2023 on extended redistribution).

The marginal tax rate on household income is 55.2%, compared to 47.5% in Germany. It is higher than in Italy, Spain, the Netherlands or Belgium, for example. And the tax rate on capital income is still higher than the European average despite
recent reductions that have been very useful for the French economy, which has been well documented.

Ignoring this when building economic programs will obviously lead to inadequate and dangerous proposals for the economy and ultimately for the less well-off.

Inequality of opportunity. True social justice, given the reality in France, is to tackle inequality of opportunity, which is quite high compared to the European average. And it is in developing the employment rate, encouraging work, revaluing the value of work, social mobility, encouraging entrepreneurship, education (a decisive factor), innovation and growth that we must find solutions… And not through additional taxes on income from work or savings, any more than on businesses. Increasing redistribution further and further, at the particularly high level we are at, is making the problem worse, by leading to less competitiveness, therefore less production and less growth. The overall risk is very high of causing more inequality of income before redistribution and more inequality of opportunity.

And of not improving the sustainability of our public finances, or even of deteriorating it further. French history in recent decades bears witness to this nonvirtuous loop. The economy, like income, is in fact a dynamic, not a zero-sum game. Serious long term research has shown this unambiguously.

What remains is action in the gradual reduction of public spending (well chosen and well managed) in relation to GDP, as well as structural reforms and future investments to increase the competitiveness of our offer and our growth potential, and at the same time promote social justice and restore the sustainability of our public finances. And thus sustainably protect the precious asset that is the level of income and social protection in France.

Let’s not confuse effects and causes

Categories
Conjoncture Economical and financial crisis Global economy Uncategorized

Inflation, Endgame?

After having surprised us with its vigour, inflation, due to a demand shock – which rebounded very strongly once the lockdowns ended – and to a supply shock – dramatically reduced during the pandemic -, seems to be gradually returning to acceptable levels. The causes of this decline can be attributed to a gradual increase in global production capacities and the fall in excess demand through the deflation of excess savings generated by the lockdowns. But disinflation was also caused by a very reactive and internationally coordinated monetary policy as well as the strong credibility of central banks who showed great determination in wanting to bring inflation back on target. This has ensured that the inflation expectations of the various economic actors – businesses and households – do not become dislodged. Let us add that until now, contrary to a number of forecasts based on historical data, we have witnessed a soft landing of the economy, that is to say without recession and without any systemic financial shock. So is the game won? Quite possibly. However, several points should make us cautious about this diagnosis.

Salaries have recently increased at a rate that remains high (between 4 and 5% per year). However, in the euro zone, almost zero productivity gains make it impossible to compensate for this increase. Corporate margins are therefore at stake. Continuing in the euro zone, it is the fall in import prices which has provided a large portion of the disinflation. But can they continue to fall further? And prices for services continue to rise rapidly. Furthermore, until now, the sharp increase in interest rates in a context of historically very high public and private debts has not produced the financial impact that was feared. And yet hadn’t we talked about a possible “perfect storm” on this topic? Some reasons for this non-event: increased savings and inflation protection policies have fuelled growth which helps overcome rising costs of debt. Banking regulations, significantly tightened since the last major financial crisis (2007-2009), have generally succeeded in safeguarding the banks.

Companies, taking advantage of the very low rates preceding the return of inflation, had extended their loans and had taken them out at a fixed rate instead. However, let’s keep in mind a few elements that also encourage caution. The professional real estate sector, during the real estate bubble preceding the pandemic, may have experienced excess debt here and there, resulting in insolvencies beginning to appear. Many companies in all sectors, sometimes with high leverage, will have to refinance their loans over the next few years. States themselves, which are highly indebted, will gradually have to bear sharply increasing interest charges which will disrupt their solvency trajectories. The sensitivity of financial markets to this type of situation could thus increase significantly. In addition, central banks will certainly be keen not to reproduce periods of interest rates that are too low for too long, periods which weaken financial stability. And they will want to maintain room for manoeuvre to deal with future systemic crises. Inflation, moreover, for structural reasons, will no longer be as low as during the last 30 years.

We should therefore have changed our interest rate regime a long time ago, returning to more normal rates, that is to say closer to nominal growth rates. Also, if the situation so far has proven to be a successful landing of inflation without major damage to the economy, to avoid a large-scale upheaval that is still possible, it is therefore up to private and public economic actors, supported by macro-prudential rules well established by the concerned authorities, to adapt vigorously to ensure the sustainability of their solvency and their growth.