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Conjoncture Euro zone

A wake up call for Europe ! Find my point of view, published in Les Echos on 11 December 2018

The European elections are approaching, while we are experiencing a period of falling confidence in Europe and seeing the pendulum of power swing back towards nation states.

For the first time, a member state wants to leave the European Union. The rise in illiberalism in some countries raises the question of the purpose of membership of the European Union. North-South tensions within the European Union against a backdrop of mutual lack of trust are hampering further progress in the building of the euro zone, which remains shaky even now.

In addition, populist movements are on the rise throughout Europe, seeking simplistic solutions to genuine problems and easy scapegoats. These movements are the tangible political and electoral outcome of a demand for identity, security and protection. This itself is a consequence, both in Europe and elsewhere, of middle-class fears of becoming weaker plus a government response perceived as inadequate or insufficient.

Globalisation, the technological revolution, poorly controlled immigration and Islamist terrorism are the catalysts of this anxiety, and all against a backdrop of gradual disintegration of multilateral organisations and the rules and principles developed post-war linking the community of nations. A higher risk, therefore, of a potentially very dangerous situation of non-cooperation.

What brings people together

It is therefore a matter of urgency for Europe to decide on the right way to respond to this mistrust. It would be futile to deny Europe’s intrinsic flaws. We need to face up to the real problems that exist and acknowledge poorly managed immigration issues at Community level and the effects of European expansion, which has made governance of the European Union less clear and less effective. Likewise, openness is needed about the faults in the establishment of the euro zone; its incompleteness has caused a number of undesirable effects.

Even if it is very difficult, the only possible way forward is to tirelessly strive to set up and strengthen active cooperation in Europe. In the face of the current entropy, it is vital first of all to firmly reiterate what brings Europeans together and how the European Union improves their lives, through aspects such as the protection and effectiveness of a social economy; the crucial importance of the rule of law, with the inalienable nature of personal freedom and freedom of critical thought, which goes hand in hand with freedom of the press; the secularism that allows people to live together; the benefits of the single market and the free movement of people; not to mention peace, of course.

Opening our eyes

We are currently witnessing a titanic struggle between the United States and China over their respective spheres of influence. We Europeans need to open our eyes quickly, if we want our people to retain control over their own destinies and continue to influence the course of history. To survive between the two titans of the new world, Europe needs to be strong.

Areas we need to work on together as soon as possible include high added value production, new technologies, ecological transition, a common defence policy as was recently proposed by France and Germany, migration issues, and so on. To be more influential in this new world order.  Furthermore, we need a specific view of how world trade is organised. And lastly, on the basis of a complete and solid monetary area, we must look to make the euro a more international currency. With Europe acting more strategically, greater use of the euro worldwide would actually be useful to help avoid the unacceptable unilateral, extraterritoriality rules imposed by the United States.

Nothing will happen without making a pragmatic start on practical projects in the various areas mentioned above, joining forces with our German neighbours. Nor will anything happen without all of us, wherever we are and whoever we are, contributing to the best of our ability!

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Conjoncture Economical policy Euro zone Finance

Exiting the ECB’s highly accomodating monetary policy : stakes and challenges

Revue D’Économie Financière – Extrait du numéro 127 – Article Olivier Klein

Categories
Conjoncture Economical policy Finance

Cercle Les Échos : Faced with predicted Uberisation, what are the keys to success for banks ?

Is banking experiencing Uberisation? And if so, how do we deal with it? What assets do we have? There are certain analyses and lines of reasoning that we can put forward with a fair degree of certainty without looking into a crystal ball.

The word “Uberisation”, broadly speaking, can refer to the threat to an established model posed by a series of innovations and new players. We shall focus here on retail banking since it is, in principle, more greatly affected by this phenomenon than corporate banking. There are various types of digital innovations that may find an application in the banking sector: robotisation, the digitalisation of processes, of contracts and signatures, big data, artificial intelligence, payments, payments and many more. Clearly, these innovations are causing many profound changes and are creating a number of possibilities for revolutions that need to be analysed and incorporated into our strategies. Two types of profound change in particular are interesting to study.

The first approach involves asking the question of whether digitalisation could go as far as to do away with branches, or at least a significant reduction in the network bank model. This is a question that needs to be asked since there are far fewer customers visiting branches. We can therefore legitimately ask ourselves whether this will continue, whether this reduction is affecting all branch-based roles and whether we are heading towards an almost unique model of online banking or neo-banking.

The second approach involves studying the extent to which this technological revolution is allowing a number of start-ups, such as the fintechs, to grow and compete with commercial banks on one part or another of their value chain. Is there a possibility, in this case, that, in time, profitable segments will be lost? Could profitability fall without jeopardising the network banking model in the process?

These two questions are important and different, even if the answers one might give to them sometimes merge into one.

The first approach is fundamental: can we imagine a world where banks have no branches? This is what some analysts are claiming, speaking of banking’s “tomorrow’s Kodak” or, a little less radically, “the next iron and steel industry”. This question cannot be ignored. On the contrary, we need to get to the bottom of things. This subject merits answers founded on solid analyses. First of all, we need to differentiate the issue of digital from that of interest rates. We can see the convergence of these two phenomena but neither has anything to do with the other. On the one hand there is a very flat interest rate curve that is damaging the profitability of retail banks. We can reasonably expect that these rates will rise again, specifically with a sufficient gap between short- and long-term rates and a central bank which will gradually emerge from quantitative easing. We expect the ECB to make announcements in this vein at the end of October.

On the other hand, we have digital and its impact on profitability. I think we need to be careful not to answer the question of interest rates with digital by thinking that low rates structurally change the model. The interest rates as they are today do not change the model in itself but temporarily damage profitability, which is not exactly the same thing.


In my opinion, the line of reasoning to be followed involves going back to basics: What is the very essence of a retail bank? What is the essence of the banking relationship? Here we need to distinguish those non-variable contextual points which vary depending on current technology and how they are used by customers. In retail banking – the model of which can incidentally differ by country according to the customs and habits that are specific to each one – there are two major areas: everyday, transactional and relationship banking, that of “life plans” and advisory banking. These are two very distinct banking requirements, even if their paths often cross.

Clearly, everyday banking involves current transactions: picking up a cheque book, making a payment, making cash withdrawals or deposits etc. This type of banking practically no longer requires a network, even if there is still demand, albeit ever decreasing, to go the counter. The development of the internet, smartphones and automated machines means that this transactional banking practically no longer requires a network to carry out these common transactions. This reduction in visits to banks is very significant overall. This is very important because the demand for “cashiers” is becoming increasingly small and this must clearly be integrated.

On the other side is relationship banking, that of life plans and advisory services ̶ as well as being the banking called upon at those difficult times that can come upon everyone sooner or later – which essentially characterises the most profound relationship between private individuals and their bank, going far beyond managing means of payment. This is the long-term relationship with customers. This is crucial because this long time is linked to the fact that their life plans are being taken care of, both in their development and their deployment. These can be very important projects: financing one’s studies, your first start in the professional world, buying a home, preparing for retirement or planning for your heirs. They can also be small life plans that are linked, such as preparing for a trip or buying a car. This is all part of a world in which banks are entirely legitimate since they meet the needs of customers by offering them the necessary products, namely loans, savings and, of course, insurance (for property and people), which enables them to be protected. These plans require time to be for them to be prepared and brought to fruition. This creates a long and strong relationship of trust between customer and banker since it relates to the security of one’s property, person, family and, fundamentally, one’s well-being. The world of needs served by relationship banking is therefore a long-term one, just as loans, savings and insurance are long-term products.

It is a nomal and commonplace for thoughts to be polarised within society: at the end of the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, there was a lot of debate over whether mass retail would replace banking. At that time many people wrote knowledgeably that mass retail would remove whole swathes of banking. This is not what happened, however. Back in 2004, I wrote a long article in Les Échos on this subject. My thought process stemmed from the following point: mass retail deals with the short-term because what is bought through this medium is consumed almost immediately. If this does not satisfy us, it’s easy to change to a different brand or even a different outlet. In banking it is difficult to change quickly, depending on the consumer experience, because if someone takes out a loan, makes savings or takes out an insurance policy, this is generally a long-term affair. This is why bank advisors need to remain in their jobs for a sufficient length of time. This is also a strong demand from customers. Whereas in mass retail, by and large, there are no more “sales representatives” in store. I have never truly believed, therefore, that mass retail can take significant market share from banks, specifically because the fundamental analysis of what makes the very essence of what was the banking relationship led me to believe that no-one would buy savings in a pre-packaged form. The only meeting points between mass retail and banking are consumer credit and payment and loyalty cards, both of which are an exact extension of the act of purchase. There is therefore only one area in which, until now, there has truly been competition between mass retail and banks.

Furthermore, depending on the country, there are different mixtures between relationship and everyday banking models. A study carried out on behalf of the French Banking Federation in 2010 sought to discover which countries had a strong relationship model. France stood out as one of the strongest countries. This does not mean that French banks are not transactional but simply that they placed relatively more weight on the relationship aspect than many other countries do. Countries that have models which are far more transactional than relationship-focused therefore have a vested interest in closing large numbers of branches since branches have little new to offer. In relationship-focused banks, something else is going on.

Therefore, people are visiting their banks less and less for everyday matters, that is certain. However, will people’s appetite for relationship banking decline? For the last decade or so, relationships with banking networks have been evolving: physically and due to telephone, e-mail, visual communication and live chats etc. These are not however removing the need for banking advisors. Although banking advisors are needed as much as ever, if not more, it is therefore important to know where to place and accommodate them. Customers want to see their advisors face to face on a regular basis, for more complex subjects or for simple reassurance. Having branches closer to them is, therefore, not entirely incongruous, especially since branches, as a place where banking takes places, also act as reassurance for many private individuals and even professionals. Therefore, since we already have branches nearby, why deprive ourselves of this asset, especially when they offer us miles’ worth of advertising space in our branch windows that even online banks envy?

Therefore, relationship modes evolve and complement each other but they are not killing each other off. The essence of what they are is not changing because there is no fall in demand for banking related to life plans, far from it in fact. With the advent of the Internet, customers are ever more demanding when it comes to the quality of advice because they are adept at browsing the web to find out information and to compare and switch if they need to. They require their advisor to be even better, more responsive and more proactive than before.

In reality, the fact that fewer people are going to “counters” is an opportunity for banks and this is not a paradox. Firstly, digital is taking repetitive, unpaid tasks away from the counter, thereby reducing costs. We can therefore offer a lot more business time to customers who request more and, in doing so, make customer advisors out of those employees who used to be at the counters. Most of the time these are young people in their first job who don’t expect anything different, therefore making them easy to train. Thanks to digital, business time is developed and therefore avoids repetitive tasks for experienced sales staff.

The second argument, which follows from the first, is that we increase the productive business time of our own advisors, which increases our productivity. Our net banking profit is therefore increased by our ability to better serve and advise our customers and therefore meet their needs.

Thirdly, the customer experience is clearly made easier by digital since certain operations are much more easily handled remotely or by machines. Customer satisfaction is therefore increased because the bank becomes more practical.

Lastly, digital is also an opportunity because it makes it possible to improve the relationship model itself. Big data and artificial intelligence, which we are gradually trying to integrate, may allow us to better understand our customers and their needs, to better prepare for our meetings and therefore serve customers better. This therefore makes us much more efficient. This is about intelligent commercial productivity, which really satisfies customers since they will only be called regarding things that concern their true needs.

Increasing the practicality of our banks and the quality of the advice are therefore two fundamental keys to success. There are two axes that allow the banks to do this: training, the budget of which we have increased significantly at BRED, and digital itself!

We therefore need to ensure that online banking is just as practical. Of course, if we ensure it is just as practical but we don’t have correspondingly low prices, there needs to be something else that sets us apart: high quality advice. Without wanting to criticise them, because they are perfectly legitimate, purely digital banks do not have advisors.

Customers in France actually want both: highly practical everyday banking and an assigned advisor who can provide them with added value. They will only, therefore, seek to separate transactional and advisory banking or even to be satisfied with just one low-cost everyday bank if their usual bank does not excel at these two levels.

Retail banks therefore have a certain comparative advantage, provided that today, on the one hand, they continue to invest so they are as good as online banks when it comes to the practicality of everyday banking. Nothing impossible here. On the other, they also need to make sure that they can provide quality advice at the same time, the added value of which warrants remuneration. Significant investment in digital and training are therefore definitely two keys to success.

However, the agile organisation of each branch and of the network and optimising the use of resources to ascribe them to the most productive in terms of net banking profit is also crucial. In certain cases, banks may close branches because the need for transaction counters is disappearing. As a result, we effectively no longer need to have a branch every 200 metres in large cities, even if we still need branches to provide advice. Therefore, according to the configuration of banks today, the number of branches to be reduced may be quite different.

It should be added that, for the moment, online banking is not profitable precisely because it is having great trouble equipping customers. Furthermore, in order to gain customers, it incurs considerable cost corresponding to the need to advertise more than the other banks. Since they have no “shop windows”, online banks need to attract the customer before they spontaneously visit one of our branches. In the same vein, online banks need to offer many more gifts and free offers. For example, customers typically receive 80 euros for opening an account, but many students go to several banks one after another to collect these incentives in turn. Enhancing loyalty is not easy, therefore. As a result, online banking focuses mainly on transactional banking. It is therefore quite difficult to monetise these models and capitalise on customers unless they start to expand their offering and assign advisors, which is starting to happen here and there. If this were to develop, it would be very interesting since there could then be transactional banks that go digital and online banks which would start to play the traditional banks’ game by appointing advisors. Both types of bank would then start drawing nearer to one another in an interesting way.

However, this begs the question: can advisory services be digitalised? Can we do without humans therein? We could of course say the following: with quality big data and good automatic intelligence, automating “pushes” (text messages or e-mails) to customers would render the human advisor useless. The customer would receive intelligent suggestions, sometimes even more intelligent than those an advisor who has not been sufficiently trained or assisted would make. Why, therefore, would we need banking advisors in future since everything would be digital?

We are convinced that the opposite is true, even if it is impossible to predict with any certainty what will happen in ten or twenty years’ time.

We know that machines can beat humans in many areas. We also know that humans and machines acting in concert beat the machine alone. We need to remain very modest, however, because who knows today what artificial intelligence will be capable of tomorrow? Artificial intelligence experts themselves remain very cautious. There are, however, some key elements to be borne in mind.

The first element is that trust is a key part of the banking relationship for a very simple reason: people are trusting us with their money and helping them to construct their life plans. We enter into the inner world and security of people and their families. Having an interpersonal relationship allows us today to cultivate infinitely more trust than is possible with a robot, even an “intelligent” robot. The youngest among us, who are extraordinarily accustomed to digital, for example, need our banks to have assigned customer advisors, even if they are visiting our branches less often. At BRED, we have also experimented with sending commercial proposals to groups of customers who are in identical situations via text message or e-mail. As is always the case with mailings, there was a positive response rate of around 2% to 3%. We then sent out e-mails or texts again to other people with identical characteristics and then had the customer advisors ring them regarding the same subject. Our success rate then multiplied ten-fold. This very modest experiment therefore provides some hope for the human relationship.

The second challenge hinges on the fact that the basis for trust also resides with the institution’s reputation, which is an added value and an asset for banks.

Moreover, cognitive science currently shows that, to be able to make a decision, rational intelligence but also emotional intelligence is needed. Studies present certain cases of people who have been injured and lost the use of part of their brain used for emotional intelligence. They are therefore entirely incapable of making decisions even though their capacity for reasoning and analysis remains intact. Advances in cognitive science therefore demonstrate that, in order to make a good decision, we need to have an inkling of the solution as well as good analysis. Therefore, the human relationship can be a powerful aid in the decision-making process. In the same vein, econometric studies have recently updated the belief that a lesson could be learned more successfully in a “classroom setting” with a teacher, than through massive open online courses (MOOC). This in no way calls into question the extraordinary interest MOOC have in disseminating knowledge and their ability to reach many more students. However, this does not mean the classroom teacher has no future.

Finally, every day we receive more diverse and varied requests from people or organisations we do not know, in the form of “push” e-mails or text messages. A few years from now, we will all be saturated with these requests, if we aren’t already. What will make the difference at that point are humans capable of calling, in addition to these “pushes”, providing additional added value. This differentiation will surely prove decisive.

For all these reasons, retail banks will probably not be threatened with extinction by what seems to be a possible “Uberisation”.


There is a second approach that involves asking ourselves whether there is a possibility that profitable market segments will be lost due to external players like fintechs.

Let’s take fintechs which are flourishing. We are seeing more and more development of services proposed on certifications and authentications, biometrics, budgetary management, electronic safes, aggregators, payments, blockchain etc. The question therefore is: is there a risk of becoming disintermediated, as a bank, from portions of the banking chain that would be profitable?

The example that could be of legitimate concern is that of external aggregators which are now capable of accessing data, suggesting bank transfers and therefore initiating payments. On top of these, they can also add budgetary management services and suggest best-priced banking products. What could actually stop them, in future, from analysing our customers’ data and offering them the banking services they need? Such players could, for example, offer consumer credit by using brokers and suggest the cheapest provider – though not necessarily the most suitable one – which may not be the customer’s traditional bank. This hypothesis of banks being partially disintermediated is perfectly foreseeable.

I think – perhaps wrongly – that these fears may be exaggerated.

Firstly, many fintechs will not have access to customer data, such companies being, for example, those that offer budgetary management software. These companies will have difficulty in taking market share away from certain segments that are currently operated by banks. There are therefore two solutions open to them: either they cooperate with specific banks, the former being bought out by the latter or by forming a more or less exclusive partnership, or they form cooperative platforms with several banks in order to offer services that can be shared. Thus, they invite and integrate themselves into the banks’ value chain without disrupting their model. They would even help to enrich it since banks would become even stronger in the global model with their customers by expanding their services. For example, in the BCPE group, we sought out fintechs to offer professional customers CRM solutions linked to payments. Therefore, either the banks have the IT investment capacity to enhance their services themselves or they can look to subcontract. In fact, the reality is, of course, a mixture of the two. What does change, however, is the fact that banks were wont to do everything themselves, whereas in the future this is also likely to be an assembly profession, not just a complete, fully integrated profession. There’s nothing wrong with assembling as long as that allows us to expand our overall relationship base and our revenue.

The second case, which could of course pose a problem, is the one in which fintechs will have access to some of the data. Web scratching – which may soon be prohibited or at least highly regulated – and, more generally, DSP2 and APIs, pose the question of opening up banks’ data and customer accounts. Currently, all banks have built their aggregators to try to make sure that their customers don’t need to leave the bank’s environment to access their accounts at other banks and this works well. In future, by regulation, accessing data will be accompanied by strong authorisations which will certainly, and legitimately, make it much more difficult for external players other than the customer’s bank to process data (whether or not these players are banks).

The discussion is also currently focused on knowing which data can be accessed. We can say that there is growing awareness amongst customers, and the population in general, of the danger of allowing uncontrolled use of their data. This trend is likely to accelerate, being particularly noticeable among young people. This awareness will most likely put the brakes on any intrusion.

Furthermore, a new data protection regulation will be implemented next year (the General Data Protection Regulation – GDPR – which will apply from May 2018), which will reiterate the fact that the data belongs to the customers and that any use of such data must be approved by the customer. This will apply not only to banks but also to all data users. This is probably good news since, even if it is difficult for banks to justify everything, this regulation will make it possible to slow down the arrival of third parties that wish to use this data in a cavalier fashion, which will again put the brakes on intrusion. Banks must remain this trusted third party which processes people’s personal data and they clearly must not be allowed to disclose this information without the customer being aware of this and giving their consent.


Once again, therefore, banks’ ability to provide for and improve their overall relationship model with their private customers will be a deciding factor in resisting Uberisation while integrating and offering new services that meet the needs of the customers served by banks.

Therefore, if banks invest heavily in training and digital and carry out the essential changes their organisations require, there is no reason to believe that the retail banking model is dead. However, as with all enduring models, it no longer needs to be a chemically pure model. On the contrary, that model now needs to be intimately combined with digital. Today we are seeing in all areas of distribution that purely digital models are having a hard time surviving and that purely physical distribution models are dying out. The future will involve this mixture, with the right replies being found in understanding what the very essence of the banking relationship is. It seems to me that this is possible.

The risk of Uberisation will also, as in other sectors, have provoked strong competition, which is essential in a sector that is highly regulated and poorly suited to swift changes. We must be lucid, however: this stimulating effect which, overall, has led to an improvement in the banking model and benefited its customers, is not the only factor. A reduction in profitability, all other things being equal, caused by new players entering the market and putting pressure on prices, is likely. However, other sectors can no doubt be developed in parallel, connected with the recurring activity of commercial banks, which will see their revenue grow.

The risk of Uberisation, to quote the title of the conference, must be assessed in depth in the light of the assets that can be mobilised by commercial banks. Coming out on top, therefore, seems possible. But this is contingent on correctly appreciating the changes that need to be made and the adoption of a deliberately offensive strategy by these same commercial banks.

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Conjoncture Economical policy Euro zone Finance

Exiting the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy is necessary, but difficult.

On 26 October, the ECB (European Central Bank) will probably announce how it is planning to recalibrate its current highly accommodative monetary policy. Primarily consisting of massive purchases by the ECB of sovereign and corporate bonds and the introduction of negative interest rates, this policy has proven its usefulness in combatting the risk of deflation and the disintegration of the eurozone. It has, therefore, been effective.

Gradual withdrawal of the policy now appears necessary. Deflationary fears are now behind us, growth in the eurozone is confirmed and the unemployment rate has fallen considerably. Although we are experiencing stubbornly low inflation, continuation of the policy entails significant risks.

Through a policy of very low and even negative interest rates, below the nominal growth rate, the ECB, by supporting borrowers, impacts the remuneration of savers and lenders. Germany, a country of declining demographics and thus more sensitive to this situation, reminds the ECB regularly of this. Furthermore, and whether or not they are contractually required to deliver minimum yields, institutional investors (insurance companies, pension fund managers, etc.) may therefore be inclined to extend the duration of their investments and accept higher counterparty risks in exchange for higher remuneration. Should it continue beyond its necessary duration, this policy could cause future financial instability.

Additionally, such a policy may encourage speculative behaviour, a cause of bubbles, consisting of borrowing at low rates in order to buy risky assets (equities or real estate) in order to benefit from the yield differential. Yet, although such bubbles had not clearly been seen until recently, certain assets appear to have been experiencing quite rapid price hikes over the last few months, both on the US equities markets, for example, and on real estate markets of a number of large American and European cities (including in Germany).

By seeking to position long-term interest rates at very low levels, it destroys the differential between banks’ lending rates and the rates applicable to their sources of funds, while savers’ bank deposit rates cannot fall below zero. But this interest margin constitutes a fundamental building block of retail banking income. In the case of France, for example, since 2016 this negative effect has not been offset by higher lending volumes and a lower cost of credit risk, due to the same very low interest rates. Yet at the same time, results from their other activities (investment banking, international, insurance, etc.) have enabled them to generate very good overall results. Consequently, sooner or later the lower income from retail banking in domestic markets runs the risk of impeding their ability to support lending growth alongside resurgent economic growth, at a time when the solvency ratio demanded under prudential rules continues to rise.

For all these reasons in particular, the start of normalisation of the ECB’s monetary policy has now become necessary. It would also enable the institution to re-establish vital room for manoeuvre to combat any future cycle reversal, particularly as the budgetary policy of many European governments currently has little room for manoeuvre given their levels of public debt.

To implement this turnaround, from 2014 the US Federal Reserve commenced a gradual tapering and subsequently ended its asset purchase programme, and finally gradually increased its key rates (short-term rates). The ECB will probably announce its own tapering plans on 26 October. By deciding to unwind its asset purchase programme very gradually, and by first of all stabilising its stocks, it could trigger a very prudent rise in long-term rates over the coming years. At the same time it could also raise negative rates towards zero, a situation that can only exist in very exceptional circumstances. Key rates would only be raised after this first step.

The rates rise will be managed very prudently, as it also involves significant risks. It could cause major market shocks if it is very sudden and poorly anticipated. Similarly, in view of the high levels of sovereign, corporate and household debt, it can only be implemented very gradually. The euro has already risen sharply against the dollar. With the rise of our currency clearly having an effect which could counteract anticipated inflation growth following higher economic growth in the zone, the ECB cannot, however, run the risk of accelerating the revaluation of the euro while it is seeking to get inflation back up to around 2%.

The policy implemented by the ECB has, in practice, been designed to buy time for the eurozone, to enable its states to carry out structural reforms and to make the necessary modifications to the institutional and organisational framework of the monetary zone itself. As the policy cannot last for ever, it is becoming all the more imperative for the countries concerned to implement such reforms in order to enhance their competitiveness (quality/price) and sustain their growth potential. And consequently, in the absence of austerity policies, to reduce public deficits, including welfare, and structural current account deficits. The objective must be to create the foundations of a strengthened eurozone, through better coordination, with greater solidarity and where all members will be able to improve their growth potential.

Co-written with Thibault Dubreuil, Finance Major at HEC

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Conjoncture Economical policy Euro zone

The effectiveness of monetary policy of very low interest rates will soon come to an end

Monetary policy of low, even negative, short-term and long-term rates unquestionably made it possible to avoid a catastrophic risk in 2007–2009, and then in the eurozone from 2010 to the present day. And subsequently to revive growth, if only at a low level, by stimulating the demand for credit and sustaining consumption and investment.

In the period of low growth we are currently experiencing, the monetary policy implemented by the ECB is helping the public and private sector to reduce indebtedness by guaranteeing nominal interest rates lower than the nominal growth rate, or at least at the same level. This was an essential move, lest we forget that the crisis of 2007-2009 occurred on the heels of a cycle of household and corporate debt accumulation that gradually became unsustainable. This major financial and economic crisis led in turn to a very sharp rise in public debt. Causing a drastic fall in long-term rates by buying government bonds, Mario Draghi succeeded in halting the infernal cycle based on the contagion of mistrust vis-à-vis the public debt of certain European countries. This mistrust led to a speculative hike in their interest rates, which in turn worsened both their public deficit and consequently national debt, causing a further loss of confidence.

This policy of very low, and even negative, rates was also intended to sustain global demand for credit. In principle, interest rates lower than the growth rate will sooner or later encourage lower savings and higher consumption and investment and, ultimately, stimulate growth. The current rates for property loans are a perfect illustration of this, with historically low levels. Finally, by increasing asset values (real estate, equity, etc.), lower rates also give rise to a favourable wealth effect on consumption and investment.

But if confidence fails to follow, the demand for credit can remain sluggish in spite of lower rates. In 2014 in France for example, demand remained below banks’ expectations in terms of the projects they wished to finance. Conversely, between late 2014 and early 2015, French companies rediscovered the taste for investment with a strengthening in the demand for credit.

What has been the impact on the banks? Very low rates unquestionably eat into the profitability of the banks. A bank’s net interest margin corresponds to the interest received on its outstanding loans less the interest paid on deposits. If the margin rate falls, coming up against the impossibility of lowering remuneration on deposits (which is virtually impossible to move into negative territory) relative to that received on loans, banks’ income will fall. The current challenge for the banks is therefore to offset this loss due to the rate effect by a positive volume effect. If total demand for credit increases, notably due to the lower rates caused by the central bank, every bank can take advantage. But should demand fail to grow sufficiently, the sector contracts.
The total volume of credits in France in 2015 increased sufficiently to offset the negative rate effect. But this volume effect tailed off in the first half of 2016.

However, the lower interest margin was offset during this period by the lower cost of risk. By supporting the economy, lower rates will mechanically lower the cost of credit risk. Since 2014, with the lower cost of risk having gathered pace, the banks have been able to offset the negative rate effect and inadequate volume effect. But we are now coming up against an impasse. Were the rate effect to persist, the cost of risk could not fall indefinitely and continue to produce its offsetting effect.

By sharply reducing banks’ future profitability, very low rates would ultimately restrict the supply of credit, at a time when banking regulation is demanding significantly higher solvency ratios with the corresponding strengthening of capital. All the more so as it is impossible to easily make capital increases due to the profitability of the banks falling below their cost of capital. The continuation of such a policy could therefore ultimately have a negative impact on growth. It should be noted that, unlike in the USA where the markets provide the majority of financing requirements, in Europe the situation is the opposite. Maintained at such low levels, sooner or later interest rates could also cause a property or equity bubble. Finally, they also undermine life insurance companies and pension funds.

The policy of very low rates has been essential. Which other monetary policy could have been implemented without taking even higher risks? It has also bought a certain amount of time, notably in the eurozone, providing room for governments to implement the structural reforms required to lift their growth potential and to make vital institutional changes within the monetary zone (genuine coordination of economic policy, certain elements of public debt pooling, etc.). But it is unclear if this time has been spent wisely. And time is of the essence.

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Bank Conjoncture Economical policy

Escaping banking’s vicious circle

The crisis has led to many banks worldwide suffering losses. And yet, they cannot raise new equity capital in the marketplace since investors fear the health of the banks may deteriorate further. In order to respect their solvency ratio (Basel 2), they are therefore forced to reduce their assets so that they again meet the maximum regulation multiple return (12.5 times) of their equity capital. So governments are intervening by going directly into the banks’ capital, supplanting the market and so counteracting as best they can a credit “crunch” which would be otherwise inevitable.

If this sequence of events is familiar, Basel 2 provokes another one sequence less well known, however dangerous. Even when the banks are not at a loss, when times are rough they are driven to reduce their credits and their market positions. The financial and economic crisis triggers an increasing effect on the calculated value of the banks’ assets. It is not the occurrence of nominal assets but of assets weighted by the risk they represent (risk weighted assets or RWA). This risk is measured by volatility of the positions in the financial markets, and by the probability of failure in the case of credits. In both cases the calculation of risk is based on the events of the recent past. The observation of the price drop in financial assets and of the increase of their volatility raises the value of their weighted assets by their risk and thus leads to the increase of the required level of their equity capital.

At the same time, the deterioration of borrower’s grading caused by the economic crisis mechanically increases the value of banks’ risk weighted credits, and so too their need for equity capital. And yet if, because the stock market doesn’t allow it as is the case today, the banks cannot manage to increase their equity capital to re-establish their ratio, they can only reduce their market positions by selling a portion of their financial assets. In doing so, they worsen the drop in the markets and their volatility, so provoking a new increase in their risk value. In the same way, on the credit side they cannot reduce their borrowings and so de facto they further weaken the economic agents, and the risk value of existing credits. It is here that at this point the vicious circle is perfectly complete!

Of course, faced with this risk of endless deterioration of asset prices and the economy, the Governments have thankfully reacted very quickly by directly investing in banks’ capital or by guaranteeing some of their assets at risk, or more precisely by buying these assets directly. This is absolutely necessary but the action which would help to break the vicious circle at the very moment that it is formed would be to urgently revise the methods of calculation of risk to the banks’ assets, by stopping their worrying procyclicity since they are largely based on recently observed risks. Or instead, by conserving the same methods, to adjust the required level of equity capital in an anticyclical way against the assets calculated in this way. Although today, while the economy and markets are doing well, the banks can take more and more risks with unchanged equity capital, thus strengthening the possibility of a boom. And conversely in the event of a reversal of speculation and the markets. It would clearly be preferable to progressively demand more equity capital since everything improves and maintains the same conservative level when everything deteriorates as it has today.

Even if that is insufficient, this necessary reform requires an international agreement, whereas the Governments intervene nationally. This is why the scope of the current crisis is forcing Governments to act without delay. However, with a certain parallelism, the IFRS standards which themselves are strongly procyclical have been significantly softened as soon as the end of 2008. And yet the urgency for a revision of prudential standards is also imposed. The progressive nationalisation of banks or the investment to their equity capital of funds borrowed by the Governments themselves is obviously essential but cannot be a long-term solution. It must be combined with a conservative structural reform of the calculation of bank equity capital required by Basel 2.