Categories
Conjoncture Economical and financial crisis Economical policy

The French social and economic model is unsustainable

It would be more than reckless to claim that France does not have a serious public debt problem, nor that its social and administrative model does not require profound reforms to become sustainable. Admittedly, an immediate catastrophe on the markets is unlikely to arise solely from France’s financial situation, notably thanks to the protection offered by the euro. However, a lasting political chaos with no foreseeable solution could eventually trigger such a crisis.
In any case, the issue is to act deeply and swiftly to restore the sustainability of our economic and social model, which is now out of breath. Notably, the sharp rise in public debt interest payments, especially from 2026 onwards, will further weigh down the budgetary equation.

France’s Economic Disconnect

Our GDP per capita is increasingly lagging behind that of its neighbors. In 2024, Germany reached 116.2% of France’s GDP per capita, up from 105% in 2000; the Netherlands hit 136.4% versus 114; Denmark 129.3% versus 117.8; and Sweden 114.1% versus 100, for example. This serious disconnect, occurring over just two decades, reflects a decline in competitiveness and the exhaustion of the French productive model.
Meanwhile, since 2000, France’s public debt has risen from 59% to 113% of GDP—a 54-point increase. In comparison, the eurozone (excluding France) saw an increase of only 17 points, from 70% to 87% of GDP. This debt surge did not boost French growth, which has been slightly weaker over the period than in the rest of the eurozone.

116.2%

The tax burden in France reached 45.3% in 2024, compared to 40.3% for Germany, 40.6% for the eurozone (excluding France), and 34% on average in the OECD. Not to mention the growing overadministration and overregulation, which weigh heavily on our competitiveness and entrepreneurial spirit. Our employment rate (68%) is comparatively too low, while Northern European countries and Germany are between 75 and over 80%. The employment rate is strongly correlated with the level of social contributions paid by companies and with retirement rules. Meanwhile, the share of French merchandise exports in total eurozone exports has fallen from 16% to 11%, marking a significant decline in our industrial competitiveness.

It should also be noted that the redistribution rate in France is among the highest in the world. According to calculations by INSEE, the income gap between the top 10% and the bottom 10% drops from 18 to 3 after extended redistribution. The top 1% receive 7.2% of household income in France, compared to 8.7% in Sweden, 10.3% in Italy, and 14.4% in the United States.

Finally, public spending in France amounted to 57.1% of GDP in 2024, far ahead of Germany (49.5%), the eurozone (excluding France, 49.6%) and the OECD (42.6%). In the long term, there is no positive correlation across OECD countries between public spending and growth rates—quite the opposite beyond a certain threshold.

Work and Production Must Increase

Should we ignore these figures and, against all evidence, propose further increases in tax and public spending, instead of reducing them? Can we seriously fail to realize that the right answer for France is to increase the wealth produced, and not even more redistribution? That the issue also lies in the insufficient quantity of work, both annually and over a lifetime? Without understanding that this shortage only supports our standard of living and social protection at the cost of ever-increasing debt?
We must speak honestly and act justly to avoid the accelerated decline of our economic and social model. These observations are not ideological—they are neither right nor left. As Pierre Mendès France used to say: “Public accounts in disorder are the sign of nations in decline.”

Olivier Klein is Professor of Economics at HEC.

Categories
Conjoncture Economical and financial crisis

The Thought of Social Democracy Must Undergo a Profound Renewal in France

27.01.2025

A state that interferes in everything not only weakens institutions; it also destroys the bonds of trust between citizens, by positioning itself between them and making them strangers to one another.”
(The Crisis of Culture) – Hannah Arendt


Social-democratic thinking as it currently stands in France has run its course. It accomplished much over many decades, but its intellectual model has scarcely evolved in the face of at least four major trends that have emerged over time. These shifts were either ignored, insufficiently addressed, outright denied, or blindly followed without a grasp of their consequences. Citing them without regard to priority: public authority, security, and the migration phenomenon — particularly with the rise of Islamist ideology — making the question of national identity more acute. The rise of a fierce individualism that overemphasizes rights while devaluing obligations. An obsession with equality that tips into dangerous egalitarianism, undermining the pursuit of equal opportunity and justice. Finally, the hypertrophy of the public sphere, whose entropy breeds inefficiency, discouragement, loss of trust, and rising anxiety.

We will return to each of these issues. Although not cited here, the climate transition remains crucial; social democracy has, with too many dogmas and insufficient scientific rigor, managed to partially internalize it. To avoid obsolescence, social-democratic thought must therefore explore new terrain — long neglected, even within itself. Let us lay a few modest foundations.

Market and State

Markets are indispensable: they drive economic dynamism, resource allocation, and (albeit imperfect) supply-demand equilibrium. However, they cannot, in and of themselves, be sufficient regulators. For markets to function effectively and sustainably, they require law, institutional norms, regulatory bodies, and intermediary institutions — all of which become essential when the market becomes volatile.


The public sphere is thus vital for guiding and regulating economic and social activity. The State — in a broad sense — plays a critical role in maintaining this balance, including supporting those intermediary bodies such as trade unions. This system enables society’s various forces to be channeled toward an often-precarious but essential harmony. This model of governance, though imperfect and far from linear, has led to increases in overall well-being, fairly distributed across much of Europe.


Its most advanced manifestations have appeared in Northern Europe and Germany. With variations, a form of social democracy has spread throughout Europe, becoming—willingly or not—a defining characteristic. Social democracy, in its broadest sense, beyond left-right government oscillations, remains the baseline regulatory framework across Europe — the backbone of its political economies.


Yet Europe today faces relative decline, and in recent years, significant economic lag — particularly compared to the American model. Possible culprits? Excessive regulations and norms, reduced incentives for initiative and risk-taking, and a pursuit of absolute equality over fairness. Even the more reformist strains of social democracy remain inadequate in navigating this trajectory.

Authority, Security, Immigration


Public policy under social democracy must now account for authority, security, and better regulatory control of immigration. Failing to integrate these themes into a republican perspective leaves the discourse to populists, who then draw in citizens rightly frustrated by their day-to-day realities being ignored.


These topics are not superficial and cannot be dismissed moralistically or condescendingly. Likewise, thinking of a nation purely as a multicultural kaleidoscope without unity, clear borders, shared culture, or true identity — founded only on abstract universal values — is naive. It denies history, geography, and the Nation itself and overlooks the cultural bonds that allow individuals to recognize and live meaningfully together. Ignoring this truth eventually leads to disaster, as Ernest Renan warned:
“What unites us is not language, religion, or race, but a shared past and a common will to live together. A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle, shaped by past glories and a current desire to continue a shared life. A nation is a daily plebiscite.”
While fundamental, these issues will not be expanded upon further in this article.

Efficiency Loss in the Public Sphere


Just as markets can fail or cause harm, public institutions too can be ineffective — or even counterproductive. Neither markets nor governments are omniscient. Public policy must be approached free of ideology: policies can be ineffective, inappropriate, or even harmful, generating the opposite outcomes they seek. Recognizing this must be central to any renewal of social-democratic thinking.


We must move past simplistic binaries of the “evil capital” versus the “benevolent State.” That dichotomy is not only naïve but misleading. Both capital and the State possess their own internal logics: one driven by return on investment, accumulation, and growth; the other by control and influence. Both must be kept in balance — neither overpowering the other — in order to foster a progressive, stable society.

The Logic of State Expansion: Overadministration


France has developed, over the decades, an omnipresent State that intermediates all social relations — inserting itself between citizens and society, exercising tighter control over individuals, and producing ever more complex, intrusive regulations. This entropic proliferation has diminishing returns.

This is a particularly French issue (more so than in the U.S. or even elsewhere in Europe). Such overgovernance causes a feeling of helplessness, discouragement, and nostalgia — even selfishness or rebellion. Bureaucracy infantilizes the citizenry, encouraging greater dependence on the State, which inevitably leads to disappointment and fear — even of minor challenges — as individual

responsibility is diminished.
Arendt again:
“Action is what allows men to appear before others, to reveal themselves in their uniqueness, and to build a common world. When the state monopolizes this capacity, citizens become mere spectators.”
— The Human Condition

Too much state presence leads to individual atomization and alienation, undermines self-confidence, erodes mutual trust, stifles communal action, and weakens self-organized solidarity. The balance between individual liberty/responsibility and societal order breaks down. As Arendt also warned:

“The danger is not just the violence of authoritarian regimes, but the gradual drift toward a soft and paternalistic administration that suffocates freedom under the pretense of protection.”

Combining Ethics and Effectiveness

To renew public trust and efficiency, the State must reclaim vision and vitality — not through blind expansion, but smart limitation. Laws, institutions, and policies should be strictly necessary for society and economic life. The public sector must aim for the best synthesis between ethics and efficacy — neither of which is the sole domain of either State or market.

These two values are interlinked, feeding one another. There is no sustainable ethics without effectiveness, nor enduring effectiveness without ethics. Social democrats must own this dialectic — not deny it.

Hyperdemocracy and Hypersocial-Democracy


Democracy and social democracy are susceptible to their own excesses. What might be called “hyperdemocracy” or “hypersocial-democracy” — their unchecked dynamic growth — risks weakening their foundations or even causing their undoing.
Tocqueville warned of this. Without deep introspection, democracy and social democracy may collapse under their own weight, ushering in forms of populism — from the left or right.


Endless expansion of individual rights, with no equivalent sense of duty, leads to exaggerated individualism and radical segmentation — identity politics, grievance culture. The framing of all human exchanges as oppressor vs. oppressed dissolves shared narratives. Everyone is assigned guilt or victimhood. This simplifies and falsifies history, which is refashioned to support this binary framing.

All this is masked behind totemic buzzwords — endlessly repeated yet hollow — enforced by a moral and ideological police. Wokism is the most complete expression of this democratic distortion. It is not progressivism nor democracy extended — but their parody, and potentially their undoing.

Criticizing it does not make one conservative or reactionary. Social democracy must not leave this fight to populists alone — or risk vanishing into irrelevance, as evidenced in both the United States and France.

Social Democracy’s Own Excesses

That said, social democracy has its internal structural flaws too — especially its pursuit of absolute equality. Magical thinking, lacking nuance. Total equality leads to jealousy, resentment, suppression of merit — and therefore, stagnation.
Tocqueville:
“There is no passion more fatal to man and society than this love of equality, which can degrade individuals and push them to prefer shared mediocrity over individual excellence.”

We must clarify the differences between absolute equality, equality of rights, equality of opportunity, and equity — along with their ethical, social, and economic effects.

Hyperdemocracy and hypersocial-democracy thus produce societal regression, economic decay, moral confusion, and ultimately collapse. They foster jealousy, resentment, and hatred. And they’re already at play.

A Pseudo-Progressivism That Hides Real Regression
Naïve goodwill or willful blindness about these dynamics masquerades as progressivism — when it is in fact dangerous regression. It isolates individuals, perverts values like universalism and humanism, and damages the foundations of real progress: emancipation, responsibility, and social harmony.
Too much state, too much democracy, too much social democracy — all unleash unchecked demands for rights, diminish any sense of duty, and breed inefficiency. Result? Generalized mistrust — of institutions, politics, others, and society itself.
This leads eventually to insurmountable public debt.
The Survival of the Social Market Economy
For a social market economy to survive, protection for the vulnerable — through the public sphere — must be paired with personal, family, and community responsibility. The welfare state — yes, but not infinite protection from everything. That breeds passivity.
Tocqueville again warns:
“The sovereign stretches its arms over all society; it covers the surface with a network of petty rules, minute and uniform, through which even the most original minds and energetic souls cannot make their way. It does not break wills, but softens, bends, and guides them; it hinders, represses, enervates, extinguishes, and stultifies people until each nation becomes a flock of timid and industrious animals with the government as their shepherd.”
Conclusion: The Stakes
The equilibrium between ethics and efficiency is broken. Without adjustment, the welfare state and the social safety net are both endangered. France’s administrative excesses threaten the very reproducibility — that is, survivability — of this governance model.
If we don’t act, we face cultural, financial, and moral collapse.
The great question, then, is this:
How can we build mechanisms that limit these excesses? How do we rediscover the vital balances upon which our societies thrive?
This is, at its core, a matter of survival — for our model, for Europe, and for France.
Social democracy has long defined the European political model, balancing markets and state authority in the pursuit of fairness and prosperity. Yet in France, this intellectual tradition has stalled — dissolving into excessive statism, inefficiency, and the distortions of hyper-democracy and identity politics. This essay argues for a profound renewal of social‑democratic thought: one that reasserts authority and responsibility alongside rights, reconciles ethics with effectiveness, and rebuilds trust among citizens. Without such a reset, the European model risks decline — culturally, economically, and politically.

Categories
Conjoncture Economical policy

The Dynamics of Economic and Political Fragmentation

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of a bipolar world and the emergence of an international order centered around the United States, the sole remaining superpower. This period saw the rise of a regulatory model based on market economy principles, free trade, democracy, and the promotion of human rights. Alongside it grew the idea of a global spread of democracy and a human rights-based diplomacy, even extending to the concept of a “right of intervention.” This period—sometimes described as the “end of history”—provided a certain form of stability.

Globalization, through the increasing integration of countries into the world economy and international trade networks, as well as through the diffusion of technology and capital, led to a dramatic reduction in global poverty. The share of the global population living below the subsistence minimum dropped from 40% in 1980 to about 10% in recent years. This occurred even though certain populations in Western countries—particularly those tied to industries exposed to competition from lower-wage economies—were negatively affected.

At the same time, this dynamic enabled the emergence and assertion of new powers. China, in particular, progressively moved up the value chain, capturing significant global market shares in a wide range of sectors. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, it has also expanded its spheres of influence—securing, among other things, its access to energy resources and rare earths—eventually becoming a hyperpower in its own right.

Along the way, this transformation led to a growing challenge to the previous order. That challenge has also been taken up by the so-called “Global South,” a diverse set of countries united by their criticism of what they see as American—or more broadly Western—“double standards.” This Global South has questioned the legitimacy of the Western-led order and called for a greater role in global governance.

At the heart of today’s geopolitical fragmentation lies the systemic rivalry between China and the United States. China seeks to reclaim a dominant position on the global stage after a long period of geopolitical retreat—a goal made explicit by Xi Jinping in 2021, when he stated that China should become the world’s leading power by 2049. The United States, conversely, is determined to preserve its current status. Russia, for its part—driven by a historical complex of encirclement and lack of recognition—is striving to reassert its influence on the international stage.

Geopolitical and economic fragmentation is now evident. Between 2010 and the onset of the war in Ukraine, the number of international military conflicts increased nearly fourfold. The number of countries under financial sanctions nearly tripled. Protectionist measures affecting both international trade and cross-border direct investment multiplied sixfold. These developments reflect a logic of withdrawal and rising mistrust among states, undermining the benefits of regulated trade and capital flows. This fragmentation poses a serious threat to international peace and security.

Mistrust between the two hyperpowers has become substantial, deeply affecting global regulatory frameworks. Multilateral coordination and communication mechanisms—essential for managing and resolving conflicts in their early stages—are increasingly impaired, giving way to bilateral relations and a resurgence of confrontational dynamics. The central question today is whether contemporary societies can rebuild sufficient trust among stakeholders and develop effective forms of coordination to avoid a “every-man-for-himself” world and the resurgence of primitive violence, always justified by the anticipated aggression of the other.

Olivier Klein
Professor of Economics, HEC

Categories
Conjoncture Economical policy

Non-Bank Financial Institutions: A Systemic Risk to Watch

Since the global financial crisis, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)—including pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, private debt funds, and others—have significantly increased in importance. They now account for nearly 50% of global financing and approximately 30% of corporate financing. This rise reflects a structural rebalancing of the financial system. Since Basel III, banks have faced tighter prudential requirements, which limit their ability to meet all financing needs. NBFIs have stepped in, particularly in the riskier or longer-term segments. Their growth therefore corresponds to a real economic rationale. However, this evolution is not without risks, and the stability of the global financial system now also depends on their resilience.

In an environment of persistently low interest rates, NBFIs have been inclined to seek higher returns, pushing them to take on more risk: exposure to lower-quality credit, longer maturities, use of leverage through derivatives and repos, and liquidity mismatches between illiquid assets and short-term liabilities. The March 2020 crisis highlighted the vulnerability of some of these entities: those faced with massive redemptions were forced to rapidly liquidate assets, threatening to trigger a downward spiral and substantial losses. During this crisis, central banks significantly expanded their quantitative easing policies to prevent systemic liquidity crises and had to act, in some cases, as “market-makers of last resort” to avoid possible contagion across the entire financial system.

To address these vulnerabilities, several tools have been deployed. Some open-ended funds now include liquidity management mechanisms (gates, swing pricing). Margin requirements (initial margins, margin calls, collateral) have been strengthened for derivatives, and reporting on exposures, funding, and liquidity risks has improved. Yet these advances remain partial. The prudential framework remains heterogeneous, sometimes incomplete, and supervision is fragmented, especially at the international level.

Several improvement avenues have been identified. There is a need for better oversight of leverage, the imposition of minimum haircuts in securities financing transactions, and greater transparency regarding liquidity mismatches. Closer cross-border cooperation is also essential to prevent regulatory arbitrage between jurisdictions. The goal is not to impose a banking-style regulatory regime on NBFIs, but rather to establish a coherent framework, proportionate to the risks and differentiated by business model. The interconnections between NBFIs and between NBFIs and banks must also be closely monitored.

Finally, the idea of conditional access to central bank liquidity facilities deserves discussion. This could serve as a useful safety net in times of severe stress—but only if strict requirements are imposed in terms of regulation—transparency, liquidity ratios, leverage limits, high-quality collateral requirements—as well as supervision. The aim would be to support the most prudent actors without creating a broad incentive for risk-taking.

Thus, the resilience of the contemporary financial system depends as much on the strength of the banking sector as it does on the non-bank sphere. Smart regulation must prevent potential excesses without stifling innovation.


Olivier Klein
Professor of Economics at HEC
CEO of Lazard Frères Banque

Categories
Conjoncture Teaching

Is the Future of Democracies at Risk?

Democracy is under attack from autocracies. More worryingly, it is increasingly being questioned from within democratic nations themselves. At the very least, distrust toward democratic institutions is rising. What explains this erosion? And does it justify pessimism about the future?

The risk of democratic decline rests on several factors. In both the United States and Europe, democracy is sometimes undermined by politicians themselves, who mistreat or bypass institutional safeguards. But a major reason lies in how mainstream political parties often ignore or respond moralistically to public concerns about security, public order, and immigration control and integration. This disconnect has significantly fueled the rise of populist movements on both sides of the Atlantic.

Moreover, the spread of new normative ideologies—wokeism, radical environmentalism, and others—embraced by many political actors and institutions, is increasingly rejected by the broader population when presented in dogmatic or quasi-totalitarian forms. This fosters growing distrust toward institutions and the political class, thereby weakening faith in democracy itself. Ideological wokeism is, in fact, a distortion of democratic values. It is not a legitimate extension of democracy, nor even of progressivism, but rather a new ideology reflecting democracy’s most pernicious excesses—excesses that ultimately threaten the democratic consensus.

In Europe, the surge in populist movements echoes these issues. In the United States, Democrats have paid a political price for them, with Trump emerging as an extreme reaction. In turn, his return could further damage institutions and accelerate the decline.

The perceived inefficiency of the public sector is another source of disillusionment. Just as markets are prone to failures, so too can public decisions be ineffective, misguided, or even counterproductive. There is no such thing as omniscience—neither from the market nor from the state. Public administrations may also decline in effectiveness through entropy, as their functions continuously expand, provoking doubts about the validity of institutions and democratic governance.

Overadministration generates a sense of helplessness, resignation, and backward-looking attitudes. It also encourages self-interest and, in some, a desire for rebellion or disengagement. By attempting to manage everything and infantilize citizens, the overbearing state fosters growing dependence and, inevitably, disappointment. This leads to anxiety and a sense of panic in the face of even minor problems, as individual responsibility is steadily eroded. Too much state intervention alienates individuals from their own agency. As trust in oneself and in others declines, so too does confidence in democracy. “A state that interferes in everything not only weakens institutions; it also destroys the bonds of trust between citizens, making them strangers to one another,” wrote Hannah Arendt in The Crisis of Culture.

In the United States, reducing the scope of the public sector may have either positive or negative consequences, depending on whether it targets essential functions or dispensable ones, and whether those roles can be handled by private actors. In Europe, however, tackling overregulation and bureaucratic excess is essential to restoring trust in institutions.

In the U.S., rising inequality is also undermining democracy. The growing concentration of wealth and income inequality cuts across partisan lines. Whether Trump exacerbates or mitigates this trend will partly depend on his success in addressing long-term deindustrialization. In Europe—and particularly in France—the danger is the opposite: excessive taxation and an overzealous push for radical egalitarianism. Total equality, in all things and for everyone, fosters widespread envy, leading to what Spinoza called “sad passions.” It also suppresses the very engines of progress: personal effort, ambition, and the pursuit of excellence. Tocqueville warned: “There is no passion more dangerous to man and society than this love of equality, which can lead people to prefer shared mediocrity over individual excellence.” Distrust among individuals breeds extreme individualism, toxic emotions, and polarization—making democratic governance increasingly difficult.

Another cause, identified by Daron Acemoglu (2024 Nobel Laureate in Economics), lies in monopolistic concentration, which undermines competition and democratic norms. Antitrust laws are meant to prevent dominant positions that threaten both democracy and market economies. Yet the U.S. has allowed monopolies to emerge over the past decade, especially in the tech sector. Europe, conversely, must enable the rise of European champions by reassessing antitrust laws in the context of relevant markets, while also avoiding overregulation. Reindustrialization is vital for both democracy and economic resilience. Its absence contributes to institutional distrust and the rise of populism.

American and European democracies—each with their own specific challenges—must act decisively and clear-headedly to confront these dangers. The rise of populism is not inevitable.

Olivier Klein is Professor of Economics at HEC

Categories
Conjoncture Economical policy Global economy

THE FRENCH MODEL: FROM EXCESS TO NECESSARY RENEWAL

The European model, and especially the French one, of political, economic, and social regulation is undergoing a profound crisis. Under the pressure of its excesses, this model proves hardly capable of meeting contemporary challenges.

Five major trends highlight its limits: the weakening of public authority and sense of security, the insufficient immigration regulation and integration of immigrants, the rise of exacerbated individualism, the expression of excessive egalitarianism, and finally, the hypertrophy of the state and regulation.

These dynamics weaken institutions and fuel distrust towards politics, favoring the rise of populism.
The market, essential for economic dynamism, requires effective public regulation to avoid its excesses. However, in France specifically, the public sphere has grown excessively, causing both inefficiency and discouragement. The omnipresent state tends to infantilize citizens and interfere in their social relations while reducing the role of intermediary bodies. As Hannah Arendt points out: “When the state monopolizes this capacity to act, citizens are reduced to the role of spectators.” Over-administration indeed causes a loss of individual and collective responsibility, while weakening respect for others and social rules. This in turn provokes widespread anxiety and distrust.

At the same time, what I call hyper-democracy is developing in our societies, due to an endogenous dynamic that, if unchecked, can lead to pathological excesses that may even endanger democracy itself. These excesses manifest as an unlimited extension of individual rights at the expense of everyone’s duties, fostering selfishness, withdrawal into oneself, and an exacerbated, compartmentalized communitarianism. Additionally, this also weakens the meaning and necessity of work.

These excesses also include an extreme egalitarian obsession, fueling jealousy, resentment, and hatred. Egalitarianism also hinders the engines of growth and progress. Tocqueville, who already analyzed the potentially self-destructive developments of democracy, warned: “There is no passion so fatal to man as this love of equality which can degrade individuals and push them to prefer common mediocrity to individual excellence.”

These excesses threaten the ability to live together and can lead to both moral and economic ruin. The issues induced by financing over-administration and the lack of responsibility regarding social protection spending result in a permanent public deficit, leading to soon unsustainable public debt. These in turn reinforce distrust.

To avoid irreversible decline, it is imperative to reinvent our political, social, and economic balance around several axes. Reconcile ethics (including social justice) and economic dynamics (economic system efficiency). Neither is sustainably viable without the other. In other words, today norms, regulations, and tax systems must not unduly hinder innovation, growth, and business development, lest efforts towards ethics be in vain. Address public authority, security, and immigration matters in a democratic and effective manner, without moralizing bias or contempt. This will also prevent populism from monopolizing these debates. Ensure better social mobility through appropriate quality education. Reject egalitarian excesses by recalling the essential notions of equality of rights and duties, equality of opportunity, and equity, so as not to confuse them with absolute equality in everything, which often contradicts the former.

The survival of the European democratic model and social market economy depends on its ability to renew itself. Without an intellectual awakening to limit the excesses that have developed and to regain the essential balances that underpin them, our politico-economic-social system will sink into entropy. Moreover, this is in a world where power struggles have again become the rule. This renewal is crucial to restore trust in institutions and politics, as well as in democracy itself. It is also crucial to regain vitality and dynamism without which nothing is possible. The sustainability of our beautiful European model depends on it.

Olivier Klein
Professor of Economics at HEC