Categories
Bank

Olivier Klein and Karine Berger discuss the draft law on the separation and regulation of banking activities

At the roundtable, which took place on 27 June and was jointly organised by law firm Carbonnier Lamaze Rasle & Associés (CARLARA), Bulletin Quotidien and Correspondance Economique, Karine Berger, the French member of parliament (PS) for the Hautes-Alpes and rapporteur for the draft law on the separation and regulation of banking activities, and Olivier Klein, CEO of Bred Banque Populaire and a professor at HEC, emphasised the need to reduce financial instability whilst maintaining the competitiveness of French banks.

The discussion, which was introduced by Edouard de Lamaze, focused on the draft law on the separation and regulation of banking activities. The draft law, which was passed by the French Senate at its second reading on 27 June and is scheduled for review by a joint committee today (before a formal vote on 17 July), is a key measure in President François Hollande’s programme, as Mr. de Lamaze pointed out. Alongside Germany, France will be one of the first countries in Europe to implement the separation of banking activities.

Reducing the systemic risk and moral hazard that lead to financial instability

Ms. Berger and Mr. Klein stressed the need to regulate the systemic risk and moral hazard intrinsic to the financial system to avoid recurrent financial crises. Ms. Berger said that the separation of speculative banking activities from those that are useful for the economy (Title 1 of the draft law) was an effort to respond to this issue. “To understand speculation, we have to go right back to the roots of the crisis in the autumn of 2008. A combination of insufficient liquidity and solvency was involved, which Basel 3 is designed to tackle, but the most important aspect was the discovery of systemic risk and moral hazard.

The systemic risk can be seen in the fact that a single bank can jeopardise an entire economy by ceasing to operate. The fact that the banks know that their governments will rescue them whatever happens, effectively encouraging them to take unacceptable risks, represents moral hazard,” she said. Michel Rouger, chairman and joint founder of the PRESAJE institute (the French thinktank that carries out social research in the fields of law and economics), former chairman of the Paris commercial court (1992/1995) and former chairman of the Consortium de Realisation (the defeasance entity for Crédit Lyonnais) (1995/1998), argued that the system should “have the courage to allow banks to fail, which the French people and their government refuse to do, for the good reason of protecting ‘deposits, which are just what is available before taxation takes it off you.’ (…) The Americans didn’t hesitate with Lehman Brothers, and neither did the UK. The only truly effective way of making bankers responsible is confronting them with their own failure.”

Mr. Klein said that the 2008 crisis had not, in the strictest sense, originated with the banks, but “from a transitional phase in the globalisation process, with global overproduction, which had been masked for some time by global over-indebtedness. The financial system was at fault in that the investment banks, particularly in the US and the UK, found highly imaginative ways of preventing this over-indebtedness from coming to light.” BRED’s CEO stressed the “intrinsically procyclical and unstable” nature of finance.

“Finance cannot self-regulate indefinitely, as traditional economic theory suggested, because there is no clear equilibrium value for the price of financial assets that are based on a promise of future return when the future is hard to predict. This is why prudential regulation is necessary.” However, he added, although there were market errors, these had been compounded by errors in economic policy and prudential regulation. These regulations need to be appropriate and take full account of their macro-economic effects, avoiding any procyclical tendencies.

Picking up on a road safety analogy made by Ms. Berger, Christian Walter, associate professor at the IAE at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and head of science for the History and Epistemology of Finance programme at social research institute FMSH, pointed out the limitations of the conventional diagnosis of the crisis, and, therefore, of the remedy provided by the new banking regulation, because the blinding effect of the technical instruments used had not been taken into account: “Even if the highway code (regulation) has been properly established and the signage (information) is in place, and even if he is driving legally and not under the influence of alcohol or drugs (ethics), if the speedometer is faulty, the driver will believe that he is travelling at 30km/h rather than 100km/h, and the car will come off the road.

The current remedies (regulation, information, ethics) do not include instruments. Misleading instruments helped to destabilise finance and increase moral hazard.” Mr. Walter wondered whether the problem could be due to “a faulty speedometer. Even if the highway code is rewritten, if the driver believes he is travelling at 30km/h when he is at 100km/h the rules are not enough.”
Ms. Berger responded that “information has a cost, and the asymmetry of information is precisely why the financial markets are not efficient. But there is no solution, it’s a negative factor that we cannot correct.”

In view of this, international financial regulation would appear to be necessary. However, Yves Jacquot, Deputy Chief Executive of BRED, commented that errors in regulation could also represent a “systemic macro-risk”. Ms. Berger, citing the example of the International Financial Reporting Standards, which have created “volatility and instability”, said that it was international debate that led progressively to good regulation, and that she no longer had faith in purely local regulations. Mr. Klein agreed, stressing that regulation had to be international to avoid risks relating to inadequate regulation.

Mr. Klein also said that the issue of the separation of banking activities needs to be supported with a raft of measures, such as stronger bank solvency and liquidity rules (cf. Basel III), spreading risk-takers’ remuneration and adequate regulation of “shadow-banking”. Title II of the draft law therefore aims to establish a winding-up mechanism to prevent crisis contagion. “This is a vital tool, as the crisis in Cyprus showed,” said Karine Berger. “But it’s not enough – we have to have international regulation, starting with Europe and the creation of banking union.”

The creation of a High Authority for Financial Stability (Title III) by the draft law – “a first in France and in Europe,” as Ms. Berger pointed out – would improve supervision of systemic risks. Equipped with “extraordinary macro-prudential powers”, the authority could, amongst other things, “decide on the unilateral reinforcement of prudential solvency and liquidity ratios.”

“There are indicators for speculative drift, which can pick up bubble development with a good level of probability, alert the markets and act accordingly at macro-prudential level,” added Mr. Klein. On this subject, Michel Rasle, a partner at CARLARA, enquired about the situation in the Chinese banking system. Ms. Berger reassured him that it was not a global systemic problem. China had a combination of too-rapid lending growth and over-developed shadow banking, which had created some jerkiness, she said. But China definitely had the means to regulate this, because national savings as a percentage of GDP were very substantial and the central bank had huge reserves.

Separating useful market activities from speculation: the dividing line is hard to establish

The key thrust of the legislation, which is the separation between speculative market activities, to be ring-fenced within a specialised subsidiary, and activities regarded as “useful for the economy”, was not easy to define, pointed out Ms. Berger. The Liikanen report, submitted to Brussels, recommended hiving off all market activities, including market making, within a single subsidiary. The French legislation initially stipulated only the separation of proprietary market activities, leaving market making within the parent company.

Mr. Klein said that, while there was “some porosity” between trading and market making, the two activities were different: “Pure trading relies on short-term market price variations. It is, in theory, and in practice, useful for setting an equilibrium price on the markets: but since the equilibrium price is hard to define, pure trading, through mimetic behaviour, may also strengthen speculative bubbles. Trading should therefore be allowed, but it should be regulated to make these transactions slightly more difficult to carry out. Market making, which consists of transactions carried out according to the requirements of buyers and sellers, is useful in creating liquidity and depth in the financial markets, allowing each party to find the appropriate counterparty at the right time.” In the end, the legislation had achieved a good balance in this regard, he said.

Ms. Berger said that she had reached the conclusion that market making was no different from any other market activity, which was why the National Assembly wanted to go further, with an amendment enabling the minister for the economy to set the proportion of market making to be separated by ministerial order. The decree would allow for a posteriori adjustment to European legislation, separating out 0 to 100% of market making. Olivier Klein shared this concern: “The banking law relies on France and Germany being able to influence Europe upstream. If European legislation doesn’t go our way, we have to make an adjustment to avoid a patchwork of regulation in Europe and a potential disadvantage for French banks.”

Philippe Croizat, a partner at CARLARA in Lyon, expressed concern about spin-off costs for the parent company, remarking that the subsidiary dedicated to speculative activities would have to be overcapitalised. Ms. Berger said that there had been some difficulty with communication on this subject, but that she could categorically state that the major risk criterion would prohibit the parent from transferring equity or cash above a certain ratio. She explained that the parent company would not be 100% responsible for the segregated subsidiary, but would regard it as a third party, and therefore could not lend to it as it did under current legislation, which stipulated risk limited to 25% of equity, when in practice a 10% limit was applied. The subsidiary would therefore have to seek third-party financing and be subject to scrutiny, which would increase its borrowing costs. Mr. Klein concluded by saying, “I don’t think that many subsidiaries will be created, because they will probably be very expensive to operate. But while we know that speculative risk must not be allowed to place banks in fundamental danger, we have to be careful not to suppress trading completely.” He added that, if any danger of systemic risk relating to derivatives was to be avoided, their use had to be subject to better international regulation, favouring organised markets, which offered more security.

In response to a question about banking governance from Arnould Bacot, a chartered accountant at audit firm Tilia, Karine Berger explained that the draft law had been designed to ensure that members of the board of directors could not hold office simultaneously in parent companies and subsidiaries. The subsidiaries would also have different managers and different names from the banks spinning them off. Thibaud de Gouttes, executive director in charge of the hedging of financial institutions at Nomura Bank in Paris, wondered whether the draft law would be compatible with mutual and cooperative groups formed of regional banks and central bodies. Mr. Klein said that, regardless of their structure, if these groups had to segregate their activities, they would be able to create their subsidiaries under the terms of the law.

Safeguarding competitiveness in the French banking industry

The roundtable members also voiced concerns about the effects of the draft law on the competitiveness of French banks. Mr. Klein pointed out that “market making also includes the derivatives markets, in which the French banking industry is strong. We also have to protect the French banks’ market-making capacity so that this position is not destroyed by non-French banks.”

Another cause for concern is the bank charges payable in the event of payment incidents. The caps on these charges are the main bone of contention between the National Assembly and the Senate. The lower chamber wants to establish a single, universal cap for all consumers, while the upper chamber aims to set a second, lower cap for the more vulnerable.

Mr. Klein said, “Over the past five years, we have undergone so many successive regulations on bank charges that we have lost 4.5% of net banking income.” He warned that the environment was so unfavourable to growth in net banking income that banks’ profitability models could be negatively affected and they might stop hiring when the banking sector employs over 400,000 people. He also said that, as well as removing responsibility from the persons concerned, there was a risk that “low-cost” banks could be created, with no customer service, which would eventually penalise the French economy. “The bank charges regulation should only concern the most vulnerable,” he added.

“The new international standards tend to generalise the Anglo-Saxon model of financial disintermediation whose excesses caused the 2008 crisis. Is it not worrying to see European banks withdrawing from their core business by offloading their debt portfolios onto insurers seeking returns? Doesn’t this new wave of securitisation carry new risks?” said Yves Bazin de Jessey, director of institutional management at Banque Saint Olive. Ms. Berger stressed that the phenomenon of loan securitisation by banks was still marginal in France and was worth an estimated €10 billion: “We shall do all we can to ensure that banks continue to carry out their business, i.e. lending. But on this issue, I am more concerned about the choices banks may make with regard to returns than about the impact of the regulations.” 


O.Klein-K.Berger discuss the draft law on the separation and regulation of banking activities (PDF)

Categories
Bank

Olivier Klein’s Preface for “Digital Banking”

I was open to the idea of this book on digital banking for two reasons.

First, I know the Exton Consulting partners owing to my five years working with them. I highly valued their ability to understand the issues with which they were confronted and the remarkable support they provided to us in an effective and pragmatic way.

Second, digital banking has been, for several years, my top-most concern because it is at the heart of discussions on the multi-channel bank and the client distant relationship management. It has been my main concern both as a banker, including in the developed strategy the challenges that the client relationship poses on digital channels, and as an economist, aware of the need to anticipate the technological and societal developments of our times.

The traditional French banking sector has been faced for several years already with structural and economic phenomena that are a prelude to a thorough, but necessary transformation. The growth of digital banking is, within this context of changes, a key and even major driver of this transformation.

The first phenomenon is heightened competition reinforced by the crisis. The banking sector has had to bear the brunt of very strong competitive pressure (deposits, credit, insurance, and services). This pressure has had an impact on both lending volumes and on profit margins, but also on fees and bank charges. As a result, the rise in net banking income of French retail banks has been very sluggish since 2006. The French retail banking market is stagnant or is growing very slowly as a result of weak economic growth, slow population growth and because most people already have a bank. Consequently, banks must find other growth outlets in order to stop attrition: each bank therefore tries to bolster its position by trying to win over potential clients and offering its existing clients new products and services. The growth of multi-channel and digital banking is crucial to the French retail banking sector to ensure that such growth is profitable.

The second phenomenon is the thorough transformation of the client relationship. This is what I have called the “client revolution”. Because clients have become very demanding, banks must be able to meet these new client expectations which arise from a strong need for local relationships regardless of the channel used, ease of use, as well relevance and personalization of the advisory services provided. Ease of use, as clients want a simpler, easier-to-use and easier-to-reach bank. Ease of use means availability, extended operating hours and being able to do business with the same person. Relevance of advisory services, as clients also want more advisory services that are increasingly tailored to their needs. They also demand that these services be truly personalized. This means that they want to be able to do business recurrently with the same advisor.

The technological revolution intensifies the client revolution and the need for more ease of use and relevance. The availability and immediacy that new technologies offer gives clients the impression that that there are no limits to the flow of information and they expect their bank to be more accessible as well as a new means of providing assistance. Keeping and maintaining a special relationship with them must now require using the internet and mobile telephony devices as indispensable and major channels in the relationship, which come to supplement the relationship with the advisor. These developments will only accelerate with the arrival of new generations of clients who have grown up using digital technology on a day-to-day basis.

Without going into the analysis and examples outlined by Exton on the following pages, which will allow the reader, according to his or her concerns – payments, social networks, new client experiences, etc. – to round out his or her vision of the need to expand digital services, I would like to leave you with some thoughts on the near future for retail banking in France, a country which must put all efforts in digital banking.

Think clients first

Have banks forgotten over these last ten years that the major difference between banking and other product and service distribution sectors is the personalized relationship the banker has with his or her client? As a provider of advisory services, a bank must know its client one-to-one. The bank is not a provider of products and services for immediate consumption. It is not there to meet its clients’ short-term needs.

First and foremost, a bank is a local institution which must inspire trust. It is an institution with which the client enters into a long-term relationship and which advises the client on life and family projects. The various product categories such as savings, credit and non-life insurance are by their very essence links to the present and future that make it possible to achieve life projects. To better meet these needs, we need to think about the client first before thinking about the product.

This paradigm shift is the key to selling more products and services and sustainably so. It is also the key to increasing their satisfaction, loyalty and word-of-mouth recommendations. We must promote the process which consists in knowing the client, identifying their expectations, their needs and those of their friends and families in order to offer them suitable products and services. This process will allow banks to develop a unique, trust-filled relationship over time. This relationship is, so to speak, a win-win relationship with clients. In addition, it gives advisors more independence and is more worthwhile and satisfying for them. It is also good for the sales staff.

Thinking about the client first is a response to the client revolution. It must include digital banking in order to meet the challenges facing the retail banking sector.

Digital is a must for creating a distance-less, multi-channel bank.

Not long ago, knowing and optimizing the client relationship via telephone and the internet was the mantra. Today, it is no longer the concept of remote banking which makes sense, but rather the idea of a distance-less bank. This will make it possible to nurture the ties between the client and the bank, and specifically with the bank advisor at all times over all the channels through which banking products and services are provided.

This new proximity is felt by both the client and advisor and is reflected in a multi-channel vision of the bank, in fact, the bank branch itself. The bank advisor is the key asset in this new relationship which puts the client at the heart of the relationship; he is at the heart of the multi-channel relationship. Regardless of the channels used, it is the bank advisor who performs a thorough overview and understanding of the client’s needs and meets these needs.

The bank advisor gets an overall understanding based on all of the client’s needs by offering the entire range of products and services to come up with the best banking solution working together with his/her client who now acts as both consumer and decision-maker. The client, who consumes products and services through various channels, chooses the channels that he or she will use to do business with the bank. These channels and their interactions, whether they consist of a face-to-face appointment at a branch or an online or mobile device contact, must be overhauled, mutually enriched and the walls between them torn down.

The successful bank of today and tomorrow will be a bank that is able to respond to this client revolution profitably and sustainably, i.e., to satisfy new client demands. The response will be a client-oriented, digital bank in which the bank advisor acts as the key player. It will also mean the blending of the best of the traditional and modern bank.

These topics are the heart of the BPCE Group’s strategy, both at the Banques Populaires as well as the Caisses d’Epargne. The goal is a new, digital definition of banking to spur everyone, both clients and advisors, to act.

Categories
Bank Economical and financial crisis

Financial crisis : something old, something new

Financial crisis follows financial crisis, each one originating and playing out in fundamentally similar ways, while also displaying some unique characteristics. Every financial crisis takes at least one of the three classic forms that have been regularly observed from the 19th century to the present day. They often take the three forms in turn or simultaneously. The following analysis is inspired by the work of Michel Aglietta and economists from the Bank of International Settlements.

The first form of any banking crisis, past or present – we could even say it is the oldest form of crisis – is the speculative crisis. How is it that assets (shares, property, gold, etc.) can become the subject of speculative bubbles? It is because their prices, unlike those of reproducible industrial or commercial goods or services, do not depend on their cost price, or what economists call their marginal cost. That is why they can diverge so significantly from their manufacturing cost.

Asymmetries

The price of a financial asset is ultimately a function of the confidence that people have in the promise of future earnings it could yield, a promise made by the issuer. But determining the price also requires each player to anticipate how much confidence others will have in that promise. Everyone is thinking along the same lines.

As long as information is not readily shared (between the lender and the borrower, the shareholder and management, or between market players themselves) and the future remains highly uncertain, these informational asymmetries and this fundamental uncertainty drives players to imitate one another. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to ascertain the intrinsic value of the asset in question and thus to bet on it. In this case, the market is dictated by others, as it is a pure product of the majority opinion that emerges. Players imitate each other rationally in an effort to anticipate and play on market trends, and this process is entirely self-referential. That is how strong, long-lasting speculative bubbles arise. These bubbles end by bursting suddenly when the majority opinion swings in the opposite direction, in an even more dramatic fashion than during the previous phase.

The market is a pure product of the majority opinion that emerges.

Euphoria

The second form, a credit crisis, occurs when a long period of growth causes everyone (banks and borrowers) to gradually forget the possibility of a crisis and to believe that there is no limit to the expansion. During this euphoric phase, lenders dangerously lower their sensitivity to risk and leveraging (the ratio of debt to wealth or income for households or net assets for companies) reaches levels that any objective observer would consider inadvisable. And this phenomenon is further amplified when lenders stop evaluating borrower solvability on the basis of their likely future earnings and begin using the metric of the expected value of the financed assets (especially shares or property) or of those that are used for collateral.

During this phase they also accept margins that will not cover the future cost of risk for the credit in order to compete with others. The financial situation of these economic actors proves to be extremely exposed when the reversal occurs. Then, when the crisis finally arrives, lenders (banks and markets) have an extreme change of heart in terms of their willingness to take on risk, and they run to the opposite extreme in terms of volume and margins, until a credit crunch occurs, further worsening the economic crisis that caused it.

Distrust

The third classic form of crisis: a liquidity crisis. During the dramatic events of financial crises, a contagious sort of distrust takes hold. This is typical of the financial and banking crises we know today. For some banks, this distrust leads their customers to withdraw their money in what experts call a bank run, causing the bank to fail.

It can also cause banks to slow down or even stop lending to each other altogether, fearing a chain reaction of failures. This illiquidity in the market for interbank financing – unless central banks intervene as lenders of last resort – produces the very failures they feared. There are other forms of illiquidity that can occur. Some financial markets go from being liquid one day to illiquid the next, due to the fact that the idea of market liquidity is again highly self-referential, as an analysis by André Orléan shows. A market is only liquid if the players think it is. If they begin to doubt its liquidity, all the players will try to sell so they can exit the market, and by doing so they cause the illiquidity problem from within. In the current crisis, the most emblematic case is the market for ABS (asset-backed securities).

A market is only liquid if the players think it is.

One Thing Leads to Another

These types of crises often intersect and join forces to create an extremely serious situation. For instance, credit can expand too rapidly, through abnormally high growth in the prices for the assets being used as collateral for these loans. This makes asset prices balloon, as additional purchases are made possible by these easily obtained loans. That is when a self-fulfilling and potentially long-lasting phenomenon takes hold with markets that are unable to return by themselves to “normal” levels. By the same token, the liquidity crisis may be caused by a sudden panic about the value of the bank bonds and financial assets held by financial institutions.

Looking for liquidity, banks invest less in the economy and attempt to sell off their assets. In turn, this fans the flames of the speculative crisis and the credit crisis. The devastating crisis that began in earnest in 2007 is, like previous crises, a combination of all three of these forms. It first began as a speculative housing bubble, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain. Then it became a credit crisis caused by a dangerous rise in household debt levels in these same countries and overleveraged investment banks, LBOs and hedge funds. And finally it turned into a liquidity crisis in securitisation and interbank financing markets resulting from the after-effects of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Each crisis aggravated the others in a self-perpetuating cycle.

Hidden Aspects

What makes the current crisis unique is the rapid development in the last few years of securitised debt instruments.
Through securitisation, credit institutions were able to transfer debt instruments for individuals, companies and even municipalities off their balance sheets. These instruments were then haphazardly combined into bundles into that were themselves overleveraged; these were then sold to other banks, to insurers and to investment funds, in short, to anyone and everyone.

Securitisation helped increase the financing of the global economy, as it enabled banks to grant more loans than they would have been able to if the loans had remained on their balance sheets. But this technique led the banks who used it the most (notably in the United States) to significantly lower their standards for selecting and monitoring borrowers and to provide loans to agents that were increasingly insolvent, because once they were securitised the loans no longer posed a threat to the banks. That is how the number of subprime loans proliferated, which further amplified the credit crisis that hit after the housing bubble burst.

Unregulated securitisation significantly aggravated the credit and liquidity crises. The fact that the loans were so difficult to track and the practice of bundling good and bad loans into the same securities, along with the opacity and complexity of the securitised instruments (CDOs made of CDOs, etc.), expanded the scope of the crisis as well. As the players involved no longer had any confidence in the quality of these kinds of investments, or even in their own understanding of them, liquidity was suddenly brought to a halt. Fears about the assets held on bank and insurer balance sheets caused a liquidity crisis in one fell swoop, especially for interbank lending, on a level that many had thought would never be seen again. Governments found themselves faced with the increasingly difficult task of solving these problems. The first lesson to take away from this has to do with the unregulated boom in securitisation and the role this mechanism should play for banking in the future.

Deception

Ratings agencies also played a huge role, as they gave the highest rating (AAA) to tranches of these instruments based on mathematical models that used poorly understood restrictive assumptions and solely analysed past series. This rating proved to be essentially worthless as the crisis unfolded. These ratings, which did not cover the liquidity risk, led many investors, including banks, to falsely reassure themselves about the quality of their financial assets, without thinking too deeply about how an AAA-rated investment could offer such a high rate of return. Reforms are needed to ensure that these agencies can re-establish objectivity in their work and the credibility that they need to survive.

The combination of the three classic forms of financial crises and the unique features of the current crisis explain the extreme gravity of the situation, involving distressed banks, panicked investors, an ongoing credit crunch and a severe economic crisis. Only strong measures from public authorities, at a time when players have no faith in anyone else, have been able to begin to relax the interbank market and prevent the entire financial system from imploding. Now is the time to act to counter the economic consequences of the financial and banking crisis and to prevent us from finding ourselves in a similarly dire situation again in the near future.

Categories
Bank Conjoncture Economical policy

Escaping banking’s vicious circle

The crisis has led to many banks worldwide suffering losses. And yet, they cannot raise new equity capital in the marketplace since investors fear the health of the banks may deteriorate further. In order to respect their solvency ratio (Basel 2), they are therefore forced to reduce their assets so that they again meet the maximum regulation multiple return (12.5 times) of their equity capital. So governments are intervening by going directly into the banks’ capital, supplanting the market and so counteracting as best they can a credit “crunch” which would be otherwise inevitable.

If this sequence of events is familiar, Basel 2 provokes another one sequence less well known, however dangerous. Even when the banks are not at a loss, when times are rough they are driven to reduce their credits and their market positions. The financial and economic crisis triggers an increasing effect on the calculated value of the banks’ assets. It is not the occurrence of nominal assets but of assets weighted by the risk they represent (risk weighted assets or RWA). This risk is measured by volatility of the positions in the financial markets, and by the probability of failure in the case of credits. In both cases the calculation of risk is based on the events of the recent past. The observation of the price drop in financial assets and of the increase of their volatility raises the value of their weighted assets by their risk and thus leads to the increase of the required level of their equity capital.

At the same time, the deterioration of borrower’s grading caused by the economic crisis mechanically increases the value of banks’ risk weighted credits, and so too their need for equity capital. And yet if, because the stock market doesn’t allow it as is the case today, the banks cannot manage to increase their equity capital to re-establish their ratio, they can only reduce their market positions by selling a portion of their financial assets. In doing so, they worsen the drop in the markets and their volatility, so provoking a new increase in their risk value. In the same way, on the credit side they cannot reduce their borrowings and so de facto they further weaken the economic agents, and the risk value of existing credits. It is here that at this point the vicious circle is perfectly complete!

Of course, faced with this risk of endless deterioration of asset prices and the economy, the Governments have thankfully reacted very quickly by directly investing in banks’ capital or by guaranteeing some of their assets at risk, or more precisely by buying these assets directly. This is absolutely necessary but the action which would help to break the vicious circle at the very moment that it is formed would be to urgently revise the methods of calculation of risk to the banks’ assets, by stopping their worrying procyclicity since they are largely based on recently observed risks. Or instead, by conserving the same methods, to adjust the required level of equity capital in an anticyclical way against the assets calculated in this way. Although today, while the economy and markets are doing well, the banks can take more and more risks with unchanged equity capital, thus strengthening the possibility of a boom. And conversely in the event of a reversal of speculation and the markets. It would clearly be preferable to progressively demand more equity capital since everything improves and maintains the same conservative level when everything deteriorates as it has today.

Even if that is insufficient, this necessary reform requires an international agreement, whereas the Governments intervene nationally. This is why the scope of the current crisis is forcing Governments to act without delay. However, with a certain parallelism, the IFRS standards which themselves are strongly procyclical have been significantly softened as soon as the end of 2008. And yet the urgency for a revision of prudential standards is also imposed. The progressive nationalisation of banks or the investment to their equity capital of funds borrowed by the Governments themselves is obviously essential but cannot be a long-term solution. It must be combined with a conservative structural reform of the calculation of bank equity capital required by Basel 2.