Since the global financial crisis, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)—including pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, private debt funds, and others—have significantly increased in importance. They now account for nearly 50% of global financing and approximately 30% of corporate financing. This rise reflects a structural rebalancing of the financial system. Since Basel III, banks have faced tighter prudential requirements, which limit their ability to meet all financing needs. NBFIs have stepped in, particularly in the riskier or longer-term segments. Their growth therefore corresponds to a real economic rationale. However, this evolution is not without risks, and the stability of the global financial system now also depends on their resilience.
In an environment of persistently low interest rates, NBFIs have been inclined to seek higher returns, pushing them to take on more risk: exposure to lower-quality credit, longer maturities, use of leverage through derivatives and repos, and liquidity mismatches between illiquid assets and short-term liabilities. The March 2020 crisis highlighted the vulnerability of some of these entities: those faced with massive redemptions were forced to rapidly liquidate assets, threatening to trigger a downward spiral and substantial losses. During this crisis, central banks significantly expanded their quantitative easing policies to prevent systemic liquidity crises and had to act, in some cases, as “market-makers of last resort” to avoid possible contagion across the entire financial system.
To address these vulnerabilities, several tools have been deployed. Some open-ended funds now include liquidity management mechanisms (gates, swing pricing). Margin requirements (initial margins, margin calls, collateral) have been strengthened for derivatives, and reporting on exposures, funding, and liquidity risks has improved. Yet these advances remain partial. The prudential framework remains heterogeneous, sometimes incomplete, and supervision is fragmented, especially at the international level.
Several improvement avenues have been identified. There is a need for better oversight of leverage, the imposition of minimum haircuts in securities financing transactions, and greater transparency regarding liquidity mismatches. Closer cross-border cooperation is also essential to prevent regulatory arbitrage between jurisdictions. The goal is not to impose a banking-style regulatory regime on NBFIs, but rather to establish a coherent framework, proportionate to the risks and differentiated by business model. The interconnections between NBFIs and between NBFIs and banks must also be closely monitored.
Finally, the idea of conditional access to central bank liquidity facilities deserves discussion. This could serve as a useful safety net in times of severe stress—but only if strict requirements are imposed in terms of regulation—transparency, liquidity ratios, leverage limits, high-quality collateral requirements—as well as supervision. The aim would be to support the most prudent actors without creating a broad incentive for risk-taking.
Thus, the resilience of the contemporary financial system depends as much on the strength of the banking sector as it does on the non-bank sphere. Smart regulation must prevent potential excesses without stifling innovation.
Olivier Klein
Professor of Economics at HEC
CEO of Lazard Frères Banque