Published in Les Échos , May 2026 the 11th
By Olivier Klein
Since 2000, French public debt as a share of GDP has grown four to five times faster than the average debt level of the eurozone excluding France. This points to a political system and a country that no longer know how to explain or understand limits, prioritize effectively, or embrace the long term. Debt thus ceases to be a countercyclical tool and instead becomes the symptom of a headlong flight forward.
But does this drift at least succeed — even on credit — in preserving social cohesion and trust in institutions? In fact, the opposite is true. France devotes a record share of its GDP to public spending while allowing debt to spiral out of control, even as the perceived quality of public services declines and their cost-effectiveness remains average, or even mediocre, as international comparisons confirm.
A growing share of citizens doubts that taxes and social contributions are being put to good use. This situation fuels the image of an omnipresent yet ineffective state, weakening tax consent and undermining trust both in public authorities and among citizens themselves.
A vicious circle
A first vicious circle has taken hold: in order to finance a generous social model without possessing its necessary foundations (high employment, a sufficient productive base, and individual responsibility regarding social spending), France combines a very high tax burden with steadily rising debt. These taxes weigh on competitiveness and on the attractiveness of work, thereby limiting employment and the taxable base. Lacking dynamic sources of revenue, the state is then tempted to raise taxes and deficits even further, thereby closing the circle.
But a second, more insidious circle — which I also analyze in my book (*) — affects democracy itself. When deficits persist and debt keeps rising, everyone anticipates that one day the bill will have to be paid, without knowing by whom or how. Households and businesses fear higher taxation; welfare recipients fear cuts in benefits; public-sector employees and younger generations fear becoming tomorrow’s sacrifice.
Every reform therefore appears unfair, as each group fears losing more than the others. Reforms that are watered down or endlessly postponed only deepen this distrust. Debt thus acts as a solvent of trust, both vertical and horizontal. The essential transformations become politically inaccessible, making continued debt growth virtually inevitable.
This dynamic reflects a broader drift within democracy — when it no longer self-regulates — toward the endless multiplication of rights, the parallel weakening of duties, and the never-satisfied pursuit of total equality, blurring the distinction between equality of rights, equality of opportunity, and equality of income. The resulting uncontrolled debt becomes the instrument of a system that continually promises more than it can finance.
A strategy for sustainability
Escaping this double vicious circle requires precisely what France has postponed for decades: an explicit strategy to ensure the sustainability of its economic and social model, based on structural reforms openly embraced as a condition for its survival rather than accepted as a form of surrender.
Increasing the employment rate, extending effective working lives, encouraging risk-taking, fostering individual responsibility, and improving the efficiency of public spending are the essential levers for stabilizing debt without undermining social cohesion.
A democracy capable of accepting its constraints can turn debt control not into a technocratic imperative, but into an act of collective responsibility toward the future and a foundation for rebuilding trust.
(*) Dette, réformes et démocratie. Comment sortir du cercle vicieux français (Décryptage Editions, May 2026)
Olivier Klein
Professor of Economics at HEC Paris
