Democracy is under attack from autocracies. More worryingly, it is increasingly being questioned from within democratic nations themselves. At the very least, distrust toward democratic institutions is rising. What explains this erosion? And does it justify pessimism about the future?
The risk of democratic decline rests on several factors. In both the United States and Europe, democracy is sometimes undermined by politicians themselves, who mistreat or bypass institutional safeguards. But a major reason lies in how mainstream political parties often ignore or respond moralistically to public concerns about security, public order, and immigration control and integration. This disconnect has significantly fueled the rise of populist movements on both sides of the Atlantic.
Moreover, the spread of new normative ideologies—wokeism, radical environmentalism, and others—embraced by many political actors and institutions, is increasingly rejected by the broader population when presented in dogmatic or quasi-totalitarian forms. This fosters growing distrust toward institutions and the political class, thereby weakening faith in democracy itself. Ideological wokeism is, in fact, a distortion of democratic values. It is not a legitimate extension of democracy, nor even of progressivism, but rather a new ideology reflecting democracy’s most pernicious excesses—excesses that ultimately threaten the democratic consensus.
In Europe, the surge in populist movements echoes these issues. In the United States, Democrats have paid a political price for them, with Trump emerging as an extreme reaction. In turn, his return could further damage institutions and accelerate the decline.
The perceived inefficiency of the public sector is another source of disillusionment. Just as markets are prone to failures, so too can public decisions be ineffective, misguided, or even counterproductive. There is no such thing as omniscience—neither from the market nor from the state. Public administrations may also decline in effectiveness through entropy, as their functions continuously expand, provoking doubts about the validity of institutions and democratic governance.
Overadministration generates a sense of helplessness, resignation, and backward-looking attitudes. It also encourages self-interest and, in some, a desire for rebellion or disengagement. By attempting to manage everything and infantilize citizens, the overbearing state fosters growing dependence and, inevitably, disappointment. This leads to anxiety and a sense of panic in the face of even minor problems, as individual responsibility is steadily eroded. Too much state intervention alienates individuals from their own agency. As trust in oneself and in others declines, so too does confidence in democracy. “A state that interferes in everything not only weakens institutions; it also destroys the bonds of trust between citizens, making them strangers to one another,” wrote Hannah Arendt in The Crisis of Culture.
In the United States, reducing the scope of the public sector may have either positive or negative consequences, depending on whether it targets essential functions or dispensable ones, and whether those roles can be handled by private actors. In Europe, however, tackling overregulation and bureaucratic excess is essential to restoring trust in institutions.
In the U.S., rising inequality is also undermining democracy. The growing concentration of wealth and income inequality cuts across partisan lines. Whether Trump exacerbates or mitigates this trend will partly depend on his success in addressing long-term deindustrialization. In Europe—and particularly in France—the danger is the opposite: excessive taxation and an overzealous push for radical egalitarianism. Total equality, in all things and for everyone, fosters widespread envy, leading to what Spinoza called “sad passions.” It also suppresses the very engines of progress: personal effort, ambition, and the pursuit of excellence. Tocqueville warned: “There is no passion more dangerous to man and society than this love of equality, which can lead people to prefer shared mediocrity over individual excellence.” Distrust among individuals breeds extreme individualism, toxic emotions, and polarization—making democratic governance increasingly difficult.
Another cause, identified by Daron Acemoglu (2024 Nobel Laureate in Economics), lies in monopolistic concentration, which undermines competition and democratic norms. Antitrust laws are meant to prevent dominant positions that threaten both democracy and market economies. Yet the U.S. has allowed monopolies to emerge over the past decade, especially in the tech sector. Europe, conversely, must enable the rise of European champions by reassessing antitrust laws in the context of relevant markets, while also avoiding overregulation. Reindustrialization is vital for both democracy and economic resilience. Its absence contributes to institutional distrust and the rise of populism.
American and European democracies—each with their own specific challenges—must act decisively and clear-headedly to confront these dangers. The rise of populism is not inevitable.
Olivier Klein is Professor of Economics at HEC